Redeeming time: special relativity, flowing time, and subjectivity in religious thought by Maness, Timothy J.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2021
Redeeming time: special relativity,






























TIMOTHY J. MANESS 
 
A.B., University of Chicago, 2003 
M.A., Lutheran School of Theology at Chicago, 2005 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 


























© 2021 by 
Timothy J. Maness 
All rights reserved 
 
 






First Reader  ___________________________________________ 
   Wesley J. Wildman, Ph.D. 






Second Reader ___________________________________________ 
   Robert Cummings Neville, Ph.D. 

































TIMOTHY J. MANESS 
 
Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2021 
Major Professor: Wesley J. Wildman, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, Theology, and 




My dissertation investigates how relativity impacts human personhood and 
freedom in theology. Assumptions about human subjectivity have always affected 
philosophical and religious discourse about time. Most Abrahamic religious traditions 
assume what James McTaggart has called an A-theory of time, in which time flows, and 
the differences among past, present and future are meaningful, in accordance with our 
subjective impressions. The A-theory complements an assumption that human beings can 
choose their actions. However, philosophers like Hilary Putnam have employed 
relativistic physics to contend that time does not flow, and that the future is as fixed as 
the past—a B-theory in McTaggart’s terminology. D. H. Mellor and others, explicitly 
assuming an opposition between scientific objectivity and all subjectivity, including the 
subjective sense of self, have built on B-theoretic arguments to claim human 
consciousness is illusory. Given Abrahamic religions’ emphasis on the importance of 





If  Abrahamic theology is to be compatible with modern physics, we must 
reconcile relativity with the A-theory of time. Two potential models already exist. 
William Lane Craig and J. R. Lucas draw upon physicist Hendrik Lorentz to posit a 
universal reference frame, based on the experience of a God who lives in time much as 
human beings do.  Robert John Russell fuses a traditional interpretation of special 
relativity with Boethius’s metaphysics to propose a pluricentric view of time in which 
God is present in every observer’s reference frame, making each relativistic construction 
of events true on its own terms, and eliminating the need to reconcile frames that 
disagree. I argue that Russell’s model is preferable: neo-Lorentzian relativity is 
vulnerable to scientific critique, and Craig’s view of God risks falling into occasionalism. 
Finally, Russell’s system not only establishes the kind of open future that is a prerequisite 
for free will, but in fact dovetails with personalist ontology and epistemology that place 
subjectivity at the heart of existence without sacrificing the importance of science. Far 
from being mutually exclusive, science and subjectivity need one another, and time’s 
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   Time present and time past 
   Are both perhaps present in time future, 
   And time future contained in time past. 
   If all time is eternally present 
   All time is unredeemable. 
   What might have been is an abstraction 
   Remaining a perpetual possibility 
   Only in a world of speculation. 
                     —from “Burnt Norton,” by T. S. Eliot1 
 
  
 Augustine of Hippo once remarked that he understood time perfectly well, 
provided that no one asked him to explain it.2 In his Four Quartets, T. S. Eliot offers a 
poetic exploration of time that throws some light on the source of Augustine’s problem. 
Time, after all, is the inescapable context for our every thought and action. When we try 
to understand it, we take on a task that lies somewhere between an attempt to see one’s 
own face without a mirror and a fish’s examination of the ocean. Eliot’s poetry swims 
around every corner of its subject: time as a story, linking past, present, and future into 
one greater whole; time as a journey, wherein we plan our steps to get from where we are 
to where we desire to be; time as a fetter binding us to the world, and time as a bridge 
beyond the world and into eternity. Eliot sees God in each of these aspects, providing 
meaning to the story, a goal to the journey, and a welcome at the end of the bridge.  
                                                          
1 T. S. Eliot, “Burnt Norton,” in Four Quartets (New York: Mariner Books, 1968), 19. 







One of the key dilemmas with which these poems wrestle is elegantly stated in the 
lines quoted above, the first lines of the first of the quartets. We human beings experience 
time as flowing, with a distinct past, present, and future that each seem to have their own 
characteristic ways of being. The past is behind us, definite and beyond our power to 
change, and accessible only to memory. The present is immediately before us, the theater 
for our actions; we know it through direct sensation. The future is uncertain, and perhaps 
even nonexistent; it is the realm of both planning and guesswork. However, since 
antiquity philosophers have disagreed about how much we can really trust this intuitive 
sense that time flows. Either the decrees of fate, the will of God or the gods, or simply the 
laws of cause and effect, could mean that future events are no less set and determined 
than past events. If this were true, we could say that the present and the future are 
contained in the past, in that everything that takes place in the future must inevitably 
follow from prior events. Thus what has happened before and what is happening now 
would arguably become no less “present” a year from now than they are today. If all of 
history always-already exists, whether because supernatural forces have planned it all out 
beforehand or because all events entail one another in an unbreakable causal chain, then 
it makes sense to think of every moment in time as changelessly existing in the same 
way. When we watch a film, every frame of it has the same kind of existence as every 
other frame; only the way that we are watching the film creates the impression that the 
characters’ actions are undetermined in the future, then actualized in the present, and 







actual or nonexistent. This view of time permits no real change: things simply are the 
way they are fated to be, and cannot be “redeemed.” Our sense of time’s flow, as 
fundamental as it may be to the way we experience the world, is only an illusion.  
Religions around the world have grappled with this question about the nature of 
time for millennia; to treat the subject comprehensively and globally would require the 
lifetimes of many scholars. For now, suffice it to say that the flow of time touches the 
heart of many core tenets of the Abrahamic religions. Indeed, certain key theological 
ideas, widely taken to be true over the centuries, depend upon a model of time with 
genuine flow in order to be plausible. Not the least of these is the belief that, at least to 
some extent, we are free to choose our present and future actions. Soteriological systems 
in which God metes out justice to human beings on the basis of their choices would seem 
to require some degree of free will. If all human choices have always-already been made, 
and our belief that we can alter our own futures is false, then free will is vitiated, and 
Abrahamic assumptions about redemption, reward, and salvation history go with it. 
Likewise, if time does not flow, then we cannot sustain an eschatology in which a 
morally good God achieves final and definitive victory over evil. Evil events would exist 
timelessly just as much as subsequent good events would, and the latter would not in any 
way supersede or cancel the former. Since doctrines of time lie near the center of so 
many crucially important theological issues, no system of philosophical theology can 
afford to be without a plausible doctrine of time: what it is, how it works, and how it 







affirms our sense that time flows, conventional Abrahamic theology becomes much more 
difficult to sustain.  
 Modern physics considerably complicates the search for a doctrine of flowing 
time. Albert Einstein’s theories of special and general relativity have upended the 
“common sense” assumptions about time and space that undergirded Newton’s physics. 
We have been forced to abandon the assumption that different observers can always 
agree about what happens when, or, in some circumstances, even about the order in 
which events take place. It no longer seems possible for every point in space to share a 
single “now”; when one’s definition of the present depends upon one’s location and state 
of motion with respect to the things one observes, the distinctions among past, present, 
and future are called seriously into question. Many distinguished thinkers argue that the 
triumph of relativity constitutes a clinching proof that time does not really flow. In 
addition to the theological problems mentioned above, this current of thought offers 
another, still more fundamental one. Even before Einstein, Bertrand Russell and others 
held that flowing time was an inherently unscientific concept on the grounds that the 
differences among past, present, and future, while apparent to our subjective senses, are 
all but invisible in our measurements of time. More recently, philosophers like D. H. 
Mellor have taken that argument farther yet, rejecting the concept of “I” altogether for the 
same reasons that they reject the concept of “now.” Assuming a strict opposition between 
objective science and subjective sensation, Mellor and others begin by denying that our 







end up denying that our experience of personhood has any significance at all. Such a 
strict embrace of positivism excludes religion altogether, and certainly has no place for 
meaningful interaction between religion and science.   
 In this dissertation, I will argue that, although relativity does require us to 
reimagine temporality, it does not exclude a flowing model of time in which past, 
present, and future are distinct. In particular, I will examine two models of relativistic 
flowing time: the neo-Lorentzian model of William Lane Craig and J. R. Lucas, and the 
relativized present model of Robert John Russell. Each of these two models has strong 
theological implications. Craig and Lucas’s neo-Lorentzian model presumes that God’s 
experience of time is analogous to our own, with a fixed past, a present in which action is 
possible, and a future that is yet to come. God’s present is the foundation for a universal 
“now” that every point in the universe shares, the traditional Einstein-Minkowski 
interpretation of relativity notwithstanding. Russell’s relativized present model, on the 
other hand, draws heavily on the theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg to argue that God’s 
experience of time is a Boethian totum simul, which is distinct from an Augustinian nunc 
stans. The relativized present model hews more closely to mainstream interpretations of 
relativity, and affirms that God knows the created universe by means of relativistic 
reference frames rather than presuming, as Craig and Lucas do, a single divine 
perspective to which physical observations may conform more or less closely. I will 
contend that, of these two, Russell’s relativized present is the more philosophically and 







flow that is necessary for traditional Abrahamic thought, the relativized present is well 
positioned to serve as the foundation for a view of the universe that has first personal 
experience at its very heart, while still affirming the importance of science. 
 My first chapter will lay out the key arguments for and against the proposition 
that time flows in 20th- and 21st-century thought, beginning from James McTaggart’s 
thesis that the passing of events among the mutually exclusive states of past, present, and 
future implies a contradiction. I will show that linguistic and other a priori arguments for 
block time have generally met with serious, albeit perhaps not unanswerable, defenses 
from supporters of the flowing time model. I will also demonstrate the links between, on 
the one hand, arguments for block time and, on the other, arguments that deemphasize 
human subjectivity, or in some important cases (like that of D. H. Mellor) even deny it 
outright. 
 My second chapter will describe in some detail the new vision of time that 
Einstein proposed with the special theory of relativity. It will then investigate the 
philosophical reception of Einsteinian ideas about time, and in particular the claims that 
special relativity necessarily implies block time. Particular emphasis will be placed on the 
arguments advanced by Hilary Putnam and C. W. Rietdijk that the relativity of 
simultaneity renders a real distinction among past, present, and future untenable. The 
chapter will also relate the tenor of this reception to pre-existing attitudes among 







epistemology and ontology, including the debate over Henri Bergson’s concept of durée 
réelle.   
 My third chapter will examine the way William Lane Craig and J. R. Lucas adapt 
Hendrik Lorentz’s interpretation of special relativity to permit a Newtonian-style absolute 
reference frame, and thus restore an essentially classical view of time . The chapter will 
then explore the implications in Craig’s thought more generally of this particular 
argument for flowing time, and of the strong view of divine temporality that Craig 
derives from it. In particular, I will discuss Craig’s efforts to reconcile divine 
omniscience with divine temporality, as well as his argument that a positivist consensus 
is responsible for the dominance of the Einstein-Minkowski model of spacetime. The 
chapter will also consider objections to Craig’s synthesis, notably including arguments 
that it fails to account for some important physical and philosophical difficulties 
attending a neo-Lorentzian interpretation of relativity, as well as the fact that the model 
appears to imply occasionalism.  
 My fourth chapter will analyze Robert John Russell’s fusion of relativistic time 
with Wolfhart Pannenberg’s theology, in which God in eternity unifies past, present, and 
future without erasing their distinctive natures. I will show how Russell’s model lies 
within a tradition of interpretations of relativity that dates back to the theory’s early days, 
building on the successes of those earlier interpretations while avoiding their failures. 
The chapter will trace Russell’s use of orthodox Einstein-Minkowski interpretations of 







construction of events is true on its own terms, and no reconciliation is really needed 
between frames that disagree. I will also examine objections that Craig advances to a 
view of time like Russell’s, and argue that Russell’s model has ready answers for all of 
them.  
 My fifth chapter will suggest that Russell’s relativized present harmonizes with 
the theories of time put forward by certain personalistic philosophies, in particular Søren 
Kierkegaard’s existentialism and the Boston personalism of Borden Parker Bowne and 
Edgar Brightman. The Boston personalists offer more detail and development for 
Russell’s idea of God’s presence in each frame of reference, arguing that the mental 
attention of a personal God is what grants existence to those frames in the first place, and 
thus locating mind and personhood at the very heart of reality. Kierkegaard demonstrates 
the close link in such a personalist philosophy between existence and ethics, emphasizing 
that the present moment’s unique character comes not only from its sensory immediacy, 
but also from the opportunity it gives us to act and make decisions. Finally, I will connect 
this emerging synthesis with the personalist epistemology of Michael Polanyi, which 
interprets all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, as the product of concrete 
human beings making decisions from within their own temporal circumstances. Far from 
being mutually exclusive, science and subjectivity need one another, and time’s flow is 













“Urging the Mind to Aftersight and Foresight”: 




 Before we can explore the future of the problem of flowing time that faces 
religious thinkers, it behooves us to examine that problem’s past and present. Arguing 
about the nature of time is by no means a new pursuit: a thorough treatment of the 
changing currents that the philosophy of time has followed over the millennia would 
constitute a small library in itself. In order to allow us to pass more quickly on to the 
heart of the issue, this introduction will restrict itself to the 20th century, which was a 
period of unprecedented ferment in thinking about time. At the center of much of that 
ferment is one whose investigations of time have placed him among the most famous 
thinkers in history: Albert Einstein. However, the details of Einstein’s physics are 
notoriously counterintuitive, and perhaps for this reason Einstein’s impact on non-
physicists’ thinking about time has so far been less than it should have been.  
 Still, one consequence of what might be called “the physics gap” in modern 
philosophy is that there exists a great deal of recent writing about time that, while it has 
little to say about relativity, remains nonetheless essential for understanding the debate 
over time’s flow. This chapter will map the landscape of this non-relativistic treatment of 
time, and will show that questions about the nature and value of subjective, first-person 
human experience have never been far beneath the surface of the landscape. We will 







shape the next hundred years of debate. From there, we will summarize the most 
important non-relativistic arguments of flowing time’s supporters and opponents. Finally, 
we will review the ways in which flowing time has shaped religious thought in the 20th 
century. 
 
Setting the Stage: James McTaggart 
In his 1908 article “The Unreality of Time,” Scottish philosopher J. M. E. 
McTaggart sets out two ways of conceiving of time, and attempts to show that neither of 
them is coherent. Comparatively few philosophers have followed McTaggart in 
concluding from this supposed incoherence that time itself must be a fiction, but his 
arguments and the categories he proposed in the course of making them have been highly 
influential nonetheless. The fundamental difference that McTaggart notes between these 
two views of time lies in the way they order events. One view places events in what 
McTaggart calls an “A-series,” so that each event belongs to one of the mutually-
exclusive categories “past,” “present,” and “future.” The distinctions among these three 
categories entail a flowing model of time, in which any given moment is first in the 
future, then becomes present, and finally passes away. Moreover, the present moment has 
a unique status, both in itself and as it relates to perceiving subjects, though the exact 
nature of that status is broadly debated, and McTaggart himself does not address that 







in which they are related only by the comparative categories “earlier” and “later.”1 
Describing events in terms of a B-series does not imply the existence of a present 
moment: t = 1 is earlier than t = 2 regardless of what time we call “now,” if indeed we 
give that name to any time at all. In our ordinary thinking about time, we regularly make 
use of both A- and B-series, of course. We see no contradiction in saying in A-series 
fashion that breakfast is in the past, lunch is in the present, and dinner is in the future, and 
also saying in B-series fashion that, during dinner, the main course comes after the salad 
and before dessert. The question that McTaggart raises is that of which way of looking at 
time is properly more basic: is time really a B-series to which our minds apply the 
illusion of a distinct past, present, and future, or is time really an A-series, so that 
“earlier” and “later” are only ways of talking about relative pastness and futurity? In the 
years since “The Unreality of Time” was published, philosophers have argued for both 
sides of this question, and they have generally used McTaggart’s terms to denote their 
positions. The claim that time is fundamentally flowing and three-natured has become 
known as the “A-theory,” and its proponents as “A-theorists.” Conversely, the claim that 
past, present, and future are not part of time as it is in itself, and therefore that all 
moments always have the same ontological status, has become known as the “B-theory,” 
and its proponents as “B-theorists.” The B-theoretic view of time has also been called 
“block time” or the “block universe,” because under the conditions it imagines, all 
moments in history exist together like a great, four-dimensional block. 
                                                          







McTaggart himself holds that a B-series description of time is dependent on an A-
series rather than the reverse. Echoing Aristotle, McTaggart asserts that the essence of 
time is change: it would be meaningless to speak of a period of time in which no change 
took place anywhere in the universe. Indeed, even to speak of something remaining 
unchanged for a particular period is to imply that it stayed as it was while other things 
were changing.2 If time is fundamentally a B-series, though, it is difficult to argue that 
any change can take place in the usual sense of the word. Events simply are permanently 
what and when they are, neither coming into nor passing out of being. The analogy 
between space and B-theoretic time is attractive here. The B-theory assumes that the 
morning, afternoon, and evening of a day exist together in time in much the same way 
that the handle, shaft, and tip of a fireplace poker exist together in space: all equally, 
without distinction, and as it were “simultaneously.” If we do not describe the fact that, at 
a given moment, a poker in a fire is hot at one end and cool at the other as a change along 
the length of the poker, then we ought not to describe the fact that the weather is cool in 
the morning and warm in the afternoon as a change in the weather over the course of a B-
theoretic day.3 A period of coolness circa 6:00AM is, if we imagine time as a B-series, 
permanently a period of coolness circa 6:00AM, and no change in that period can take 
place. The only way that McTaggart sees for events to change, as must be possible if we 
are to speak meaningfully of time, is for them to come into and out of existence, and only 
                                                          
2 McTaggart 459. 
3 cf. D. H. Mellor, “The Unreality of Tense,” in The Philosophy of Time, eds. Robin Le Poidevin 







considering time as an A-series, in which different moments may have different 
ontological characters, allows that.4 
However, although McTaggart denies that the B-series view of time is 
conceivable without first positing an A-series, he is far from being an A-theorist. Indeed, 
he suggests that the A-series has insoluble problems of its own. The difficulty that 
McTaggart sees lies in the fact that, though the categories “past,” “present,” and “future” 
are mutually exclusive, every event must belong to all three of these categories. The first 
human landing on the moon, for example, is a future event on July 20, 1929, a present 
event on July 20, 1969, and a past event on July 20, 2009, though it is the same event at 
all three times. McTaggart notes the rejoinder that no contradiction exists because an 
event is past, present, and future only sequentially and never simultaneously, but rejects 
it. First, he writes, it is a circular argument to assume “the existence of time in order to 
account for the way in which moments are past, present and future” when we have 
already assumed three sequential tenses of time in order to account for time’s existence as 
the consequence of changes in objects.5 McTaggart goes on to restate this difficulty in 
somewhat different terms, and it is this second form of the argument that later B-theorists 
most frequently cite. Some might suppose, to supply an example, that from the point of 
view of July 20, 1969, the moon landing was future, is present, and will be past. 
However, McTaggart would respond, in order to say this we would have to impose what 
                                                          
4 McTaggart 460-61. 







he calls “a second A-series” on top of the first, giving each of these facts about tense 
(e.g., “the moon landing will be past”) a tense of its own (e.g., “it was the case that the 
moon landing would be past”), and leaving us with another set of tensed facts in need of 
their own explanations. In order to provide such explanations, we would need to impose 
yet a third A-series, and so on without end.6  
So, McTaggart concludes, any attempt to assign events to an A-series results in 
logical absurdity, and if the A-series, the most fundamental description of time available, 
is untenable, then time itself must be unreal. It is literally a figment of our imaginations; 
we presume it exists only because we falsely assume that the differences among the ways 
we experience memories, anticipations, and immediate perceptions must have some basis 
in ontology. McTaggart suggests that we really ought to know better than to make such 
assumptions in any case: how could our temporal perceptions possibly point toward 
reality, given that they differ so much from person to person?7  
Though the claims advanced in “The Unreality of Time” have met with a 
decidedly mixed reception, their influence on later thinkers is plain, and not even those 
who criticize McTaggart are immune to that influence. A-theorists have noted the 
ambiguity with which McTaggart describes the paradox that he sees as fatal to flowing 
time; one critic described the whole argument as “perilously near nonsense.”8 Many B-
                                                          
6 McTaggart 469. 
7 Ibid., 473. 
8 Mary Frances Cleugh, Time and Its Importance in Modern Thought (London: Methuen, 1937), 







theorists, in contrast, have cited McTaggart’s refutation of the A-series as seminal: as we 
shall see, D. H. Mellor makes a clarified and expanded version of McTaggart’s paradox 
the centerpiece of his argument for the B-theory. Other B-theorists, though less directly 
dependent on him than Mellor is, have nonetheless adopted McTaggart’s tactic of 
refuting the A-series view of time by showing that its expression in language leads to 
logical contradictions. On the other hand, however, the grounds for McTaggart’s 
dismissal of what would become the B-theory bear a strong resemblance to the 
assumption that underlies much A-theoretic philosophy. For McTaggart as for the A-
theorists who came after him, our experience of time so clearly involves change, and 
change so clearly implies a meaningful past, present, and future, that a theory of time 
without these elements is absurd on its face. A-theorists have returned again and again to 
defenses of the reliability of human perception of time, which B-theorists, in contrast, 
have typically regarded with a much more skeptical eye. We will see both of these themes 
repeat themselves in what follows— arguments based on the absurdity of linguistic 
expressions for B-theorists, and appeals to basic human experience for A-theorists.  
 
Stopping the Clock: Key Philosophical Arguments for the B-Theory 
 McTaggart makes no appeal to the authority of science in his description of time, 
but later philosophers of time have often included in their theories arguments about the 
proper interpretation of time in physics.  In particular, many philosophers considered that 







and if anything, for reasons we shall discuss below, this perception has become even 
more widespread in the years since McTaggart wrote. In nearly every such argument for 
the block universe, whether at the turn of the twentieth century or today, “more scientific” 
is synonymous with “less explicitly centered on human subjectivity.” Bertrand Russell 
was one early proponent of this “scientific” argument, though he was rather less explicit 
than many who followed him in making it. In 1914 and 1915, Russell wrote extensively 
on the philosophy of time. Throughout this period of his writing, Russell holds up science 
as the one indispensable method for understanding (at the very least) the world outside 
our own minds. In his Our Knowledge of the External World, he defines a “thing” as 
neither more nor less than a “series of aspects [that is, perceptual appearances to an 
observer] which obey[s] the laws of physics.”9 Russell considers these laws to have 
overarching authority even in philosophical questions: he argues that as of the early 20th 
century physics has shown that no Kantian, noumenal “permanent substance” can exist, 
whereby, for instance, one could demonstrate or refute that a given puddle of water and a 
given block of ice are different “appearances of the same substance.”10  
Russell’s use of scientific investigation as a model for all inquiry gives him two 
reasons to prefer a block interpretation of time. The first reason is epistemological: in 
classically scientific fashion, Russell prefers to rely on empirical observation when 
possible, and he sees no empirical justification for a tensed view of time. We can observe 
                                                          
9 Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, (New York: Routledge, 1993), 115-6. 







events, he argues, but we cannot observe the times at which they take place, and indeed 
we can only indicate times by reference to events. Thus it simplifies matters to eliminate 
times as such from our picture of the world, and instead to speak only in terms of the 
ordering of events “by the relations of simultaneity and succession,”11 just as in 
McTaggart’s description of the B-theory of time. Russell’s second reason for preferring 
block time is axiological: in language clearly inspired by scientific emphasis on 
objectivity, Russell champions “impartiality of contemplation” as among the chief 
intellectual virtues. With this virtue in mind, Russell advises his readers that 
The felt difference of quality between past and future, therefore, is not an intrinsic 
difference, but only a difference in relation to us: to impartial contemplation, it ceases 
to exist […] Whoever wishes to see the world truly, to rise in thought above the 
tyranny of practical desires, must learn to overcome the difference of attitude towards 
past and future, and to survey the whole stream of time in one comprehensive 
vision.12 
 
The tensed view of time, then, is the intrusion of mere psychology into the realm of 
ontology. “Presence” just means the character of immediate experience, and “pastness” 
just means the character of memory.13 We can describe real events without loss of 
meaning strictly in B-theoretic terms.  
 Modern philosophers who argue for a B-theoretic understanding of time typically 
follow at least one of the two lines of argument that we have seen above in Bertrand 
Russell’s work. On one hand, they may expand and develop the claim that tense is a mere 
psychological tic that the conditions of human subjectivity impose on language, and with 
                                                          
11 B. Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, 122-3. 
12 Bertrand Russell, “Mysticism and Logic,” The Hibbert Journal 12 (1914): 795. 







which philosophers ought to dispense as much as possible. On the other, they may 
contend in greater detail that some more or less specific feature of physical law makes the 
A-theory nonsensical.  
   *   *   * 
 Linguistic arguments for the B-theory are plentiful, and have been put forward by 
some of the 20th century’s most distinguished philosophers of language. W. V. O. Quine, 
for instance, argues in Word and Object that it is absurd to derive from the presence of 
tense in human language the assumption that time really is tensed. Time may be “exalted 
grammatically,” but any number of other physical quantities, including “position, weight, 
and color,” are not.14 We are not tempted to ascribe deep ontological implications to the 
way we treat these other quantities in language, and we ought to apply the same rule to 
our philosophizing about time. In fact, Quine contends that we can do just as well without 
tense even when it comes to language. While Bertrand Russell proposes that 
philosophical language need only concern itself with the temporal relations of “before,” 
“after,” and “simultaneous with,” Quine explores just how such timeless descriptions can 
be made to work in practice. The key is in the way he treats the present: in Quine’s 
system, “is” is not a tensed verb, but a timeless predicate, and other present-tense verbs 
are similarly timeless. 
This artifice frees us to omit temporal information or, when we please, handle it like 
spatial information. ‘I will not do it again’ becomes ‘I do not do it after now’, where 
‘do’ is taken tenselessly and the future force of ‘will’ is translated into a phrase ‘after 
now’, comparable to ‘west of here’. ‘I telephoned him but he was sleeping’ becomes ‘I 
                                                          







telephone him then but he is sleeping then’, where ‘then’ refers to some time implicit 
in the circumstances of the utterance.15 
 
Statements about time, therefore, can be made adverbially, just as statements about place 
are typically made, and the essential meaning of the sentences that include them does not 
change thereby.  
 J. J. C. Smart agrees that tenseless statements are sufficient for conveying all that 
we might wish to convey, and proposes a few further linguistic points to avoid 
philosophical confusion. He worries that the metaphor of time as flowing feels so natural 
to us that it leads our thinking astray, and prompts us to treat time as something very like 
a literal fluid through or along which events pass.16 To avoid such errors, Smart sets out 
to show in detail why the seductive image of flowing time makes no sense. Drawing on 
Gilbert Ryle’s terminology of processes and actualizations, Smart begins with a 
distinction between “events,” which can be ordered temporally by means of the 
succession and simultaneity relations, and the “things” to which events happen. Precision 
with our use of verbs is important here: only things can change or become, and only 
events can happen. Furthermore, “becoming” is properly speaking always a transitive 
verb. A thing never “becomes” tout court, but only becomes something else.17 So, for 
instance, the moon is a thing, and the moon’s reaching its fullness or the point of total 
eclipse are both events. We can use the word “become” to describe the moon’s 
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transformation into another kind of thing, such as a ring of debris or an independent 
planetoid, or else we can use it to describe the moon’s taking on various properties, as in 
“the moon became cratered” or “the moon became brighter.” The events that pertain to 
the moon, however, cannot become anything at all—they can only be. It is absurd to say, 
for instance, that the moon’s fullness became bright. The full moon itself can certainly 
become bright, but the event of reaching fullness cannot change. So, a thing exists 
through some span of time, and we can speak of it changing through time only in the 
inexact sense in which we spoke above of the poker’s temperature changing along its 
length. An event, in contrast, exists at a particular point in time, and does not change or 
become anything else.  Indeed, we find that, for any event E, the phrase “E became 
[blank]” yields nonsense for nearly all values of [blank]—with “past,” “present,” and 
“future” being notable exceptions.18 This ought to be a clue that tense descriptors are not 
real properties in the way “bright” and “cratered” are. We can translate statements about 
properties like “the moon/was/is/will be at its full” into tenseless forms by relating those 
properties to the particular time when a particular utterance, called a “token,” is made of 
the statement in question. So, the tenseless, token-reflexive form of “the moon/was/is/will 
be at its full” is “the full moon is earlier than/simultaneous with/later than this utterance.” 
However, we cannot create single token reflexive forms of phrases like “July was in the 
future/is in the present/will be in the past.” If we try, we find that we must relate 
statements about pastness, presence, and futurity to three different tokens: “July is 
                                                          







present” becomes “July is simultaneous with this utterance,” but “July was future” must 
be “July is later than [some different] utterance.”19 So, we can avoid much sloppy 
thinking by sticking wherever we can with tenseless, token-reflexive statements, in which 
the confusions of tense cannot arise in the first place. 
D. H. Mellor offers a particularly detailed version of the linguistic argument for 
the B-theory, and in doing so he builds far more directly on McTaggart’s arguments for 
the incoherence of A-theory than most of his colleagues do. In order to understand 
Mellor’s updating of McTaggart’s arguments, however, we will need to discuss in some 
detail Mellor’s own claims about time, language, and belief. In his book Real Time II, 
Mellor embarks on an exploration of what he calls “temporal truthmakers”: those facts 
which make for true beliefs about events in time. For instance, supposing that I believe 
now that tomorrow at noon the weather will be fair, Mellor urges us to ask upon what 
basis that belief will eventually be rendered true (or false). He contends that A-beliefs—
that is, beliefs about the pastness, presence, or futurity of events—are only rendered true 
by B-facts—facts about events’ placement on a timeline—rather than by A-facts. This, in 
fairness, does not mean that Mellor considers tensed language to be philosophically 
dispensable, as some other B-theorists have argued.  We clearly cannot translate an A-
sentence (call it S) like “It is now 2:00PM” into tenseless terms without losing some of its 
meaning, he says, because if a B-statement is true at all, then it is true always and 
everywhere, and S is clearly not true at 3:00PM. S may well derive all of its truth from 
                                                          







the B-fact “the sentence S was uttered at 2:00PM,” says Mellor, but we cannot say that it 
means the same as that B-fact if we want to derive a sentence’s meaning from the way 
that sentence is used.20 Moreover, even B-theorists who deny the existence of A-facts 
cannot do without A-beliefs, because A-beliefs are necessary to explain people’s timely 
actions. I cannot meet my friend for dinner at 7:00PM if I do not eventually have the 
belief that 7:00PM is now. The B-facts that I want to meet my friend at the proper time 
and that I believe that I have made the necessary plans are not enough.21 
In his discussion of temporal beliefs, Mellor, like Smart, places a great deal of 
emphasis on tokens of statements that express those beliefs. In his own words: “I shall 
take it then that my belief that the earth is round is true if and only if the following are 
true: a statement of it; a sentence expressing it; and the proposition that is the meaning of 
this sentence and the content of this belief.”22 A statement of belief about an event’s 
location in A-series time will by definition contain information about the relationship 
between the time when the statement is made and the time when the event happens. To 
say that an event is past, for instance, is to say that the time when that statement is made 
is later than the time at which the event that the statement describes took place. So, 
Mellor argues, a belief that some event E is happening now (that is, at some particular 
time t that the A-theory invests with special significance) is made true by the fact that the 
belief itself is located at t. This identity between the time of E and the time of the belief 
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about E can be expressed perfectly well in B-theoretic terms of “earlier” and “later,” says 
Mellor, so we need not bring in terms like “present” that imply the truth of the A-theory. 
In fact, all true “now-beliefs,” as Mellor calls them, are rendered true by the coincidence 
of events and beliefs about those events at some particular moment in B-time. If I say “it 
is raining now,” that statement is true if and only if it is raining at some particular time t 
and I make the statement that it is raining at t—or, in Mellor’s terminology, if I issue at t 
a token of my belief that it is raining. If I make the statement “it is raining now” an hour 
later than t, when the sun is shining, then it is no longer true. So, for Mellor, the truth of 
tensed statements is token-reflexive: it depends upon a proper relationship, as measured 
on a B-series timeline, between an event and a token statement of a belief about that 
event.23 We need make no recourse to an A-theoretic ontology of time to evaluate 
statements involving pastness, presence, or futurity. 
Mellor suggests that, by framing time in this way, his B-theoretic account of 
presence explains more than an A-theoretic account would, because the latter would take 
the presence of all of our experiences as a mere brute fact. Why in principle could an 
experience not be past or future just as well as present, assuming that we believe in such 
categories as past, present, and future? After all, Mellor maintains, tense is not an 
attribute of any of our experiences as they are in themselves; we only judge the pastness 
or futurity of an event by reference to other events.24 The A-theory offers no explicit 
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answers to these questions, but Mellor’s version of the B-theory solves the problem by 
defining “presence” as the state of affairs in which a token of belief about an event is 
made at the same time as a direct experience of that event.25   
Thus Mellor argues that a tensed, A-theoretic ontology is not necessary. His next 
step is to show that such an ontology is impossible. To do this, he combines McTaggart’s 
paradox with his own token-reflexive interpretation of B-theory. To review, McTaggart 
himself argues that flowing time presumes that every event possesses the properties 
“past,” “present,” and “future,” but that these properties are mutually contradictory, and 
therefore that the idea that time flows is incoherent. McTaggart responds to what Mellor 
describes as the “immediate and obvious riposte”26 that no event possesses all three of 
these properties simultaneously with a counter-charge that this only obscures the 
contradiction without removing it, but the structure of McTaggart’s argument on this 
point is somewhat obscure, and scholars have differed in their interpretations of it. Mellor 
reads McTaggart as saying that, if we wish to assign tense designators to an event in such 
a way as to specify that they do not all apply at the same instant (for instance, by saying 
that an event was future at some past time and will be past at some future time), then we 
must imagine another layer of complexity to our system of tenses. So, rather than three 
values—past, present, and future—we will have nine—was past, is now past, will be past, 
was present, is now present, and so on. Each of these nine values faces McTaggart’s 
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objection all over again, and to avoid that objection’s force we would need to add yet a 
third layer of tenses, and so on without end. Mellor charges that this infinite regress 
renders the A-theory absurd because “at no stage in it can all the A-facts it entails be 
consistently stated [emphasis mine].”27 In other words, the A-theory fails because any 
token of a belief about tense would have to be infinitely long in order to avoid 
McTaggart’s paradox, and statements of infinite length can be neither spoken nor framed 
in the mind.  
Mellor completes his attack on the A-theory by returning to his argument about 
“temporal truthmakers,” alleging à la McTaggart that A-theory implies logical absurdity 
here, too. Mellor invites us to suppose that, given an event E which takes place at noon, 
the A-theory implies that temporal statements about E will be rendered either true or false 
by A-facts; that is, factual propositions about what is past, present, or future. If this is 
correct, says Mellor, then let us consider two statements, both saying that E is past: (1) a 
statement X that is made at 11:00AM, and (2) a statement Y that is made at 1:00PM. 
According to Mellor’s understanding of the A-theory, both X and Y will be rendered true 
by the A-fact “E is past,” and this truth will be granted to them at a point in time 
immediately after E enters the past—that is to say, immediately after E takes place at 
noon. But this is absurd: no one believes that the famously premature reports of Mark 
Twain’s death were later rendered true by his actual death, and in the same way we 
cannot suppose that a statement that E is past, made incorrectly before E has even 
                                                          







happened, could later become true. Mellor suggests to A-theorists that they might attempt 
to escape from this predicament by means of his token-reflexive model. For example, 
reasoning from the point of view of some time later than X, Y, and E—say, 5:00PM—an 
A-theorist might say that X is false because it was uttered at a time “more past” than E, 
whereas Y is true because it was uttered at a time “less past” than E. These statements are 
both perfectly correct, says Mellor, but, he concludes, closing the trap, they offer no help 
to the A-theorist, because they are tenseless B-statements!28 “More past” and “less past” 
are really just paraphrases of “earlier” and “later,” and their reference to the A-theoretic 
concept of tense is purely cosmetic. So, for Mellor, no coherent statements of flowing-
time ontology can be made, and those tensed statements that we can make must rely on 
B-theoretic, tenseless facts alone to justify their claims. The B-theory is all that remains 
to us. 
Mellor writes in remarkably explicit and detailed terms about the implications of 
his philosophy of time for human subjectivity. He proposes that “there are no subjective 
facts or selves; nor […] does our ability to think and talk about our present selves, and the 
world as seen from our present point of view, pose any special metaphysical, semantic or 
epistemic problems.”29 As Mellor himself emphasizes, his argument in favor of this view 
is analogous at every point to his argument for the B-theory. Just as tensed statements 
rely for their truth on tenseless truthmakers, so do subjective statements rely for their 
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truth on subjectless truthmakers. A statement like “I am now listening to ‘So What’ by 
Miles Davis” can only be verified or falsified by determining whether the person referred 
to as “I” is listening to the song in question at the time referred to as “now,” and those 
determinations need not involve any reference to “my” sense of my own personhood or 
of the presence of a particular moment.30 So, just as “now” has no special ontological 
meaning in Mellor’s philosophy, but only designates the time at which some given event 
takes place, “I” means only the person who does some given action or experiences some 
given phenomenon.  Furthermore, Mellor employs a variant of McTaggart’s argument 
against tensed time to show that subjectivity is not only unnecessary, but incoherent. It is 
clear that the conditions “being I” and “being not-I” are incompatible with one another. 
However, under a view of reality that incorporated ontologically-significant subjectivity, 
every subject would have to fulfill both of these contradictory conditions: “If there were 
[personal truth conditions], then since all sentence tokens of the form ‘I am X’ are true if 
and only if produced by X, every person X would have to be both I and not I, which no 
one can be.”31 In other words, a given person would be “I” with respect to the tokens of 
some personal beliefs (those stated by the person in question), and “not-I” with respect to 
the tokens of other personal beliefs (those stated by other people). For Mellor, then, the 
arguments against tense and the arguments against subjectivity are not merely 
compatible, and not merely suggestive of one another, but in fact are exactly the same. 
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Going with the Flow: Key Philosophical Arguments for the A-Theory 
 We have seen several kinds of arguments from philosophers who agree with 
McTaggart that the tensed, A-theory of time is incoherent, but who break with McTaggart 
by concluding that the tenseless, B-theory of time must therefore be correct. Now we 
must turn to the arguments of the philosophers who agree with McTaggart that the B-
theory fails to describe what we experience as time, and so assert against McTaggart that 
the A-theory must be correct. At the root of much A-theoretic argument is the conviction 
that no a priori argument against flowing time could be strong enough to counter the 
overwhelming impression we receive from our basic, everyday experience that time does 
indeed flow. To assume that the qualia of human perception can carry indispensable 
information about the world we perceive is necessarily to presume that philosophy ought 
to take such qualia into account. It is not unnatural, therefore, that those scholars who do 
rely explicitly on this conviction that time flows tend to emphasize the importance of 
subjectivity and personhood in their epistemologies, and even in their ontologies. This 
conviction is often formulated less as an argument than as a simple assertion, which can 
make it difficult to explicate or interrogate. Still, some philosophers have made the effort 
to argue explicitly that we cannot afford to neglect the human mind in our descriptions of 
the world and its workings, and particularly in our description of time.  
 A-theoretic philosophers have mostly dismissed B-theorists’ linguistic arguments. 
Arthur N. Prior, for example, flatly denies the claim at the core of McTaggart’s paradox, 







landing on the moon was present on July 20, 1969, and that it will be past on July 20, 
2019, without fear of logical inconsistency, because “was” and “will be” denote different 
modes of being. Applying tense descriptors to those modes of being, which McTaggart 
calls superimposing a second A-series on top of the first, results in propositions that may 
be cumbersome to state, but are nonetheless perfectly well formed.32 The paradox that 
McTaggart and his intellectual descendants fear is no paradox at all. Prior’s estimate of 
Smart’s token-reflexive B-theory is no higher. Attempts to translate tensed sentences into 
tenseless ones by reference to their time of utterance break down, to name only one case, 
when applied to sentences in the future perfect tense: 
[…] when the analysis requires us to relate the events to other utterances, of which 
there may very well not have been any (or not going to be any) at the time at which 
they would be required, it becomes quite obviously wrong. How are we to analyse, for 
example, ‘Eventually all speech will have come to an end’? What Smart’s recipe 
would give is ‘The end of all utterances is earlier than some utterance later than this 
one’, which translates something empirically possible into a self-contradiction.33 
 
Moreover, if tensed statements can convey truth that cannot be expressed in tenseless 
form, as we have seen that even Mellor admits, then it is hard to see what philosophical 
advantage tenseless language provides over tensed language. For A-theorists, then, the 
linguistic arguments for the B-theory amount to circumlocution in order to solve a non-
problem. 
 The A-theorists, of course, construct systems of their own. Arthur Eddington 
offers one positive argument in favor of the A-theory, one that states its dependence on 
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human subjectivity more clearly and explicitly than most. “We have direct insight into 
‘becoming,’” Eddington says, “which sweeps aside all symbolic knowledge as on an 
inferior plane. If I grasp the notion of existence because I myself exist, I grasp the notion 
of becoming because I myself become. It is the innermost Ego of all that is and 
becomes.”34 Eddington admits that we ought to be cautious in interpreting the forms of 
our experience as insights into the true nature of the world outside our heads, but he still 
insists that “if there is any experience in which this mystery of mental recognition can be 
interpreted as insight rather than image-building, it should be the experience of 
‘becoming;’ because in this case the elaborate nerve mechanism does not intervene.”35 
So, whereas in the course of sensation our eyes transform electromagnetic radiation into 
shape and color, and our ears transform vibrations into pitch and timbre, there is no 
obvious organ in the body that seems to transform timeless events into tensed 
experiences. So, Eddington reasons that, if our experience of time as flowing really is 
more a matter of the structure of our minds than the structure of our bodies, then that 
experience is more likely to reflect a truth about the way the world is in itself.  
 Since Eddington was an eminent physicist in his own right, it is hardly surprising 
that his defense of the A-theory draws extensively on physics36. Eddington proposes that 
our brains can perceive the passage of time ultimately because the Second Law of 
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Thermodynamics requires that the total entropy of any closed system can never decrease. 
Entropy in physics is defined in terms of the number of possible states in which a system 
might be found to exist, and is often taken as the measure of the system’s disorder or 
randomness. Eddington allows that time as we use it in mathematical physics is a 
quantity without direction, a line upon which one point is in itself no different from any 
other. However, he finds significance in the fact that, within any closed system, entropy 
tracks monotonically with physical time, and so establishes an unambiguous difference 
between the two directions in which we could theoretically follow the timeline. This 
difference is typically called the “arrow of time,” and by convention we assume that this 
arrow points in the temporal direction that we perceive as the future. Physical time, then, 
provides all that we need to establish the size of the temporal interval between two given 
events, but we must also consult the thermodynamic arrow of time if we also wish to 
determine which of these events is earlier and which is later. So, to make a complete 
evaluation even of a B-theoretic temporal relationship, physical time is not enough.37 
Eddington suspects that our brains keep time by means of an “entropy clock,” and thus 
that our time-sense is more closely linked to the thermodynamic arrow than to physical 
time in the classical sense. 
 Eddington draws two greater lessons from the necessity of the thermodynamic 
arrow for our understanding of time. First, he calls attention to the fact that the consistent 
increase of entropy means that narratives about the development of physical systems 
                                                          







make sense in one temporal direction, but not in the other.38 We know that a mug may fall 
off a counter and shatter on the floor, but that scattered pieces of ceramic on a floor will 
not assemble themselves into a mug and then rise up onto a nearby counter, even though 
a Newtonian account of the interactions among particles technically permits both courses 
of events. Eddington takes this to mean that there is a real difference between future and 
past, and so that true becoming, and not mere difference in state along a temporal axis, 
can take place. Reality is dynamic, and not only static.39 The other lesson that Eddington 
takes from the importance of entropy is that a reductionist approach to the universe is not 
sufficient for understanding time. Entropy is a property of systems; to ask about the 
entropy of a single particle makes no more sense than to ask about the grammar of a 
single word. An approach to physics that considered the interactions among fundamental 
particles to be the only reality, and all else to be only an imaginative structure that we 
impose on that reality, would miss at least one crucial feature of existence—the arrow of 
time. Moreover, that feature is one to which the subjective character of our experience 
gave us access long before we were able to account for it in mathematical terms. This 
suggests to Eddington that the distinction between the solid and reliable phenomena to 
which physics professes to confine itself and the supposedly murky realms of meaning 
and value is not as easily drawn as some have claimed. The question of the human 
significance of physical phenomena is not one from which we can prescind easily or 
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without cost, and one of the important things that ignoring that significance can cost us is 
our innate knowledge that time flows.40  
 Henri Bergson charts another route through human consciousness to the A-theory 
of time, less physical and more philosophical than Eddington’s. He begins by inviting us 
to consider the process of counting. If we are confronted with a fairly small number of 
discrete physical objects, we can usually grasp the number of those objects immediately 
without needing to think.41 If I find four apples in a bowl, for example, I can know that 
the number of apples is four at first glance, without counting. However, when we 
assemble in our minds the elements that we mean to place into a longer sequence or add 
into a larger sum, each of those elements must occupy a kind of mental space and endure 
for some time:  
For though we reach a sum by taking into account a succession of different terms, yet 
it is necessary that each of those terms should remain when we pass to the following, 
and should wait, so to speak, to be added to the others: how could it wait, if it were 
nothing but an instant of duration? And where could it wait if we did not localize it in 
space?42 
 
Bergson goes on to assert that the time of physics is an imaginary space-for-counting of 
this kind, and the things being counted are our mental impressions of events.43 Though 
this space distinguishes among terms that come earlier or later in the sequence, it is 
necessarily uniform, and thus has no room for the kind of qualitative difference among its 
elements that tense requires. In short, it is a perfectly B-theoretic view of time. 
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 However, the time of physics is not the only kind of time in Bergson’s philosophy. 
Bergson also posits a psychological time, which he calls durée, or “duration,” and which 
he supposes to be truer than the time of physics. Duration is successive, but its 
component moments, while distinct, are not isolated from one another: “Pure duration is 
the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself 
live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states […] but 
forms the past and the present states into an organic whole.”44 This whole is not merely 
one of inseparable influence or causation, but one of synthesizing affect and emergent 
meaning. Among its affective properties are the different, directly-experienced natures of 
past, present, and future time. So, while the B-theory works well enough to model 
physical time, it cannot describe time as it really is, because the side-by-side enumeration 
of events that it requires can only be done in retrospect, after those events have already 
been perceived. We must resort to the A-theory adequately to describe the more 
fundamental duration, in which context those initial perceptions take place. 
Bergson allows that duration may indeed have little to do with the workings of 
conservative physical systems, but cautions that leaving it out of our description of the 
world on these grounds leads to serious misconceptions.45 To calculate, for instance, the 
path of a planet by means of mathematical physics is to “put several years, even several 
centuries of astronomical time” into “a psychological duration of a few seconds.” If an 
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astronomer “foresees a future phenomenon, it is only on condition of making it to a 
certain extent a present phenomenon, or at least of enormously reducing the interval that 
separates us from it.”46 For the purposes of the astronomer’s calculations, that flattening 
out of the affective aspect of time, the aspect that involves a meaningful difference 
between present and future, makes little difference: one might make an analogy with the 
common technique of treating a faraway object as a point for the purposes of studying its 
electromagnetic or gravitational effects. However, just as we cannot afford to ignore the 
shape of an object when modeling the forces it exerts on nearby objects, so we cannot 
ignore the conscious character of our experience when we examine things that are 
emotionally close to us.  
 In order to defend the B-theory and to be content with physical time alone, 
Bergson argues, one must ignore the effects of consciousness in this way. As we have 
seen, the belief that all events in time are equally existent tends to go hand in hand with a 
particularly tight interpretation of causality, in which all states of existence, including 
mental states, are strictly determined by the states that precede them. Bergson has it that 
to speak of a state of the self as determined solely by previous states is to make a 
category error. To describe a mental state completely one must discuss its meaning, which 
will be determined in part by later events: “to ask whether, the antecedents being known 
as well as their value, one could foretell the final act, is to beg the question; it is to forget 
that we cannot know the value of the antecedents without knowing the final act, which is 
                                                          







the very thing that is not yet known.”47 Truly to have “enough information” fully to 
understand a person’s decision before it is taken would mean knowing every detail of the 
person’s experience prior to the decision, not merely as clumsily expressed in symbols, 
but as it actually was, in all its affective and personal character. That is to say, we would 
have to live the person’s life just as she lived it, and at that point we could no longer 
sensibly distinguish between the person making the decision and the person asking about 
its potentialities. For Bergson, then, we cannot understand the self without 
acknowledging a distinction among past, present, and future, and vice versa:  
In whatever way, in a word, freedom is viewed, it cannot be denied except on 
condition of identifying time with space; it cannot be defined except on condition of 
demanding that space should adequately represent time; it cannot be argued about in 




Looking Beyond: Modern Religious Approaches to Time 
 Time was, of course, a critically important subject for Western religious thinkers 
long before the physical and philosophical upheavals of the 20th century. Augustine’s 
considerations in the Confessions of what it might mean for time to have a beginning 
juxtapose the cosmology of Genesis 1 with the physics of Plotinus, and they still resonate 
today with those who ask what it might mean to think of God as creator. A B-theorist 
theologian, for example, might think of the act of creation as encompassing all moments 
of history equally, while an A-theorist might emphasize the difference in character 
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between a temporal beginning and a spatial edge. Aristotle’s philosophy moved thinkers 
in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam to grapple with the questions implied by conceiving of 
God as eternal, timeless and changeless. A B-theorist theologian could see symmetry 
between a tenseless creation and a creator living in timeless eternity. An A-theorist, on the 
other hand, might push back against this tradition in favor of a view of eternity that 
incorporates temporality, or else attempt to reconcile changeless eternity with flowing 
time. Religious scholars from Augustine to Calvin, and from Hasan al-Basri to  
al-Baqillani, have asked whether God’s knowledge of future events places limits on the 
ability of human beings freely to shape those events. B-theorist theologians would be 
comfortable with the idea that God is the sole author of history, and that people only play 
the parts God has assigned to them from eternity. A-theorists would be more likely to 
associate an open future with a human ability to make free choices, and to be responsible 
for those choices.  
 Even to summarize the history of religious debates about the nature of time, and 
about the consequences of that nature, would be a vast undertaking. For now, suffice it to 
say that some of the most important themes of those debates are the ones mentioned 
above: the nature of time as indicative of the character of God’s creative act (e.g., as 
either once-for-all or progressive, and as either with or without beginning or end), the 
character of eternity both in itself and in its relationship to created time, and the way in 
which temporality might either limit or support human and divine personhood and 







thinkers who have dealt with these themes. Though, as we have briefly seen, B-theoretic 
interpretations of Western religious traditions are possible in principle, in practice the vast 
majority of theologians assume that time flows. 
 Thomas F. Torrance, as one might expect from a Christian theologian influenced 
by Karl Barth, centers his discussion of temporality on the incarnation of God in the 
person of Jesus of Nazareth. He begins, however, with classical Greek philosophy. 
Torrance describes Plato’s view of space as a kind of bridge between the forms and 
sensible objects; a shapeless container in which events occur. Without this container, 
events could not take on the configuration that they take, and so we could not apprehend 
them or reach the rational structure behind them. Aristotle’s notion of space, in contrast, 
is explicitly volumetric. An object’s place is a kind of mold of the object itself, and by 
definition it does not move with respect to the stationary center of the cosmos. In 
Aristotle’s words, place is “the innermost unmoved limit of the container.”49 Torrance 
notes that this implies a marked contrast between space and time. Finally, for the Stoics, 
place was formed not by the inner boundary of containing space but by the outer 
boundary of a body (soma), and is fundamentally “room forged for itself by an active 
agency.”50 Space, then, is the sphere of action for logos, and beyond space there is only 
void—absolute absence of being. Nicene Christianity drew more on Plato and the Stoics 
than on Aristotle. In the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo we see “the absolute priority of God 
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over all time and space,” so, “space and time, and indeed all the structured relations 
within the universe, have to be understood dynamically, through reference to the creative 
and all-embracing power and activity of God.”51 The Incarnation stands at the center of 
God’s activity within creation, as the point of intersection between such normally 
disparate categories as humanity and Deity, logos and matter, and time and eternity.  
 As Torrance would have it, the advent of Newtonian physics at the beginning of 
the 18th century upended many of these theological assumptions. Newton’s idea of 
absolute space gives a boost to Aristotelianism and its Christian successor, Scholasticism, 
emphasizing a static rather than a dynamic God. Newton’s association of time with space 
as the twin parameters of God’s sensorium, together making an “infinite receptacle” for 
objects and events to fill, lends history what Torrance calls a “static and necessary 
quality,” especially because Newton believes that that “infinite receptacle” was not 
merely created but was in fact identical with some aspect of God.52 The suspicion with 
which Torrance regards the concept of “static and necessary history” highlights his 
unstated sympathies for an A-theoretic view of time. Moreover, Torrance argues, this 
“infinite receptacle” view of time and space causes problems for Incarnational theology, 
since a receptacle (such as God becomes as the source of space and time) cannot contain 
itself53 (as it would have to do if God became incarnate within space and time). Torrance 
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also charges that Newtonian space and time strengthened a dualism latent in Augustinian 
and Lutheran thought, and thus led to the Enlightenment’s embrace of “rational religion,” 
and thence ultimately to deism, Rudolf Bultmann’s divorce between the content of faith 
and truth claims about the world, and ultimately the rise of atheism.54  
 What Newton’s conception of time and space destroyed in theology, Torrance 
believes that Einstein’s theory of spacetime has restored. Torrance reads Einstein as 
supporting a Platonic, relational view of space and time rather than an Aristotelian 
“receptacle” view, one in which space and time are defined by objects and events rather 
than ontologically prior to them. This is in accord with the philosophy of the Church 
Fathers, who, like Plato, believed that “the basic problem [of space and time] was more 
an epistemological one than a cosmological one.”55 Furthermore, the dependence of 
space and time for their structure on created things implies that, contra Newton, space 
and time are themselves purely created rather than being in any way divine. This suits 
Torrance, who declares that the relation between God, even as incarnate, and the created 
world “cannot be spatialized or temporalized.”56 
 Having rejoiced in general terms over the implications of relativity for the 
theology of space and time, Torrance faces the question of how such theology should 
proceed in detail. He offers four possibilities.57 First is the one proposed by Luther, inter 
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alia, that in the Incarnation God enters into space and time as into a finite receptacle. 
Torrance suggests that this approach must unacceptably call into question either the full 
divinity or the full humanity of Christ in order to allow the infinite to fit into the finite. 
The second possibility depends on the Newtonian view of space and time as a divine 
emanation, so that God is an infinite receptacle containing space and time, and thus also 
God’s own incarnate self. As discussed above, Torrance has already rejected this 
possibility. Next Torrance considers the argument, based in Origen’s theology, that space 
and time, like all of the laws of nature, are the form of God’s own rationality as applied to 
created existence. Torrance objects that this fails to reflect the contingency of nature, and 
also unduly limits God (by making God’s creative act an unfree one, for example). Here 
again, we can see A-theoretic assumptions at work: in order for nature to be contingent, it 
cannot be the case that every event is strictly entailed by both prior and subsequent 
events, as a block view of the universe would require.  
The final theology of space and time that Torrance proposes is that space and time 
are part of a purely created rationality that God takes on in becoming incarnate. This is 
the formulation that Torrance prefers, since it allows maximum room for divine freedom. 
As Incarnate God, Christ does not merely fit into “the patterns of space and time” but 
“organiz[es] them round Himself and giv[es] them transcendental references to God in 
and through Himself.”58 Space and time are thus infused with teleology and eschatology, 
and history by its very nature becomes salvation history. This history is not one that is 
                                                          







foreordained in detail, but rather one that God and created beings write collaboratively: 
God’s openness to the world, with its “creaturely freedom and spontaneity,” makes “God 
invariant in love but not impassible, constant in faithfulness but not immutable.”59 This 
language emphasizing freedom and spontaneity rather than determinism strongly implies 
an A-theoretic understanding of time once again, with an open future that is ontologically 
distinct from the set past. What is more, Torrance’s reference to God’s free response to 
the free acts of creatures presumes a view of eternity that is at least in some way 
analogous to time as the A-theory conceives of it.  
Wolfhart Pannenberg offers another theory of time based in orthodox Christian 
theology, but where Torrance’s theology of time focuses on incarnation, Pannenberg’s 
focuses on eschatology. For Pannenberg, the place of God within created time is in the 
future. At the moment of ultimate fulfilment at the end of history, God judges created 
beings and completes the work of redemption, and thus gives to temporal things the 
forms and meanings they are to have in eternity. This eternal meaning proleptically 
makes things what they truly are, and imposes continuity upon all events that come 
before.60 One might compare this moment of sense-making to the one that takes place 
when, in the midst of what had seemed to be an aimless wander in the woods, one 
unexpectedly finds a kitten. The walk in the woods is thereby transformed from an event 
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of no special significance to “the time when I first met my cat,” a memorable moment in 
the history of one’s life. By virtue of this change in meaning, the spot at which the kitten 
waited becomes the destination of the walk; the fact that one did not explicitly choose 
this destination beforehand, or even have complete knowledge of the circumstances that 
would condition the walk, does not alter the fact that one arrived at it only because of the 
choices one made. A time-bound human being can therefore only appreciate the full 
significance of those choices from a historical perspective. 
Pannenberg emphasizes that the Biblical idea of the divine/human relation is 
historical; not oriented toward mythic “primal time”61, but rather toward known history. 
God characteristically acts in the Bible as one who first makes promises and then fulfills 
those promises, and the structure of a promise is necessarily and irreducibly temporal: it 
unites the moment when the promise is made, which looks forward to a future that is not 
yet, with the moment when the promise is fulfilled, which looks backward to a past that is 
established in memory. Furthermore, most theophanic events in Scripture happen not 
“once upon a time,” but rather explicitly in continuity with events in personal, family, and 
geopolitical history. God’s actions in time thread these events together and make sense of 
them as a narrative of salvation history, albeit one that will only fully be understood once 
it has fully been lived.62  
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Our knowledge of God is also historicized in another way: it is time-bound, 
incomplete and always anticipating God’s ultimate eschatological self-revelation, in 
which we shall “know as we are known.”63 Again, this final revelation is to be understood 
as an event in history; one which is certain to come, and in that limited sense is “already,” 
but which crucially has not yet taken place. In sum, “History will thus be a demonstration 
of God,” Pannenberg says, “though only at its end.”64 Indeed, Pannenberg argues that the 
proper definition of he’emin, the Hebrew word we typically translate as “faith,” is 
something more like “knowledge of a future truth,” implying this historicized view of 
knowledge of God,65 and that, in contrast to classical arguments about God’s 
immutability, the Bible really refers to God’s faithfulness and constancy through time.66  
For Pannenberg, what we are normally inclined to speak of as “eternal truths” appear 
most clearly by means of temporality: what is true is that which endures over time, not as 
“an eternal present behind the flux of time.” 
Pannenberg’s description of eternity bears some resemblance to Boethius’ 
“complete possession all at once of interminable life,” but Pannenberg emphasizes that 
eternity is not strictly timeless in the way Augustine thought.67 He suggests that the term 
in the Hebrew Bible that we typically translate as “eternity” more properly means 
                                                          
63 1 Cor. 13:13 NRSV. 
64 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology vol. 1, 245. 
65 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 3, tr. Geoffrey W. Bromley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
    1997), 136ff. 
66 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology vol. 1, 437-8. 







“sempiternity,”68 but that this need not mean that the God of the Hebrew Bible is within 
time as we are: “all time is before the eyes of God as a whole.”69 Pannenberg compares 
the existence of moments before God with the way yesterday exists today,70 which, 
though past, is not “lost in the past,” but rather exists in a broader present. This broader 
present bears a strong resemblance to the present in Bergsonian durée. In eternity, as in 
durée, events in time are brought together without losing their distinctness or even their 
sequentiality. Here again, the A-theory of time is essential: sub specie aeternitatis, as 
events receive their ultimate meaning and find their true nature, relations among events 
are tensed.  
It comes as no surprise, then, that Pannenberg explicitly wishes to avoid the 
determinism that plagues Augustinian theology. He cites Heidegger and Bergson to argue 
that temporality is a phenomenon of subjectivity, and that freedom arises from 
temporality rather than the other way around.71 In fact, Pannenberg argues that time is “a 
condition of the independent existence of creatures, especially of their formation by self-
organization.”72 Time in this sense is not exactly the time that physics describes; physics 
only measures time and space, and does not define them. Pannenberg strongly criticizes 
of any definition of time that flows out of measurement, citing Plotinus’ objection to “the 
Aristotelian thesis that defined time as the enumerating of movement (Phys. 219b.1.f.), 
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the unit whereby movement is measured being itself a movement. Plotinus argues that 
here time is always presupposed, so that this description does not explain its nature or 
constitution.”73 Pannenberg sees the B-theory as dependent on measurement in this way, 
and thus vulnerable to the same criticism, along with its “fall[ing] short of the everyday 
experience of time.” Instead, and in contrast to Torrance, Pannenberg hypothesizes that 
time and space may be divine emanations, as per Newton, and therefore that they have 
properties that go beyond what experimental science can measure. Divine space and time 
must be “different from geometrical space and time, prior to all measurement, if the 
distinction between God and the world is to be observed.”74 In this way Pannenberg 
hopes to bypass some of the problems that relativity causes for flowing time. 
Robert Neville’s theology requires flowing time no less than Torrance’s or 
Pannenberg’s do, but it proposes rather a different view of eternity, and a radically 
different view of God.  Neville insists that eternity and time must be considered together 
in order for either of them to be understood. Time here once again resembles Bergson’s 
durée in that the three modes of temporality, while identifiably distinct from one another, 
also come together in every moment in order to give each moment its particular character. 
Neville defines this togetherness of past, present, and future at every instant as eternity, 
“in which [past, present, and future] are all equally real and in which each allows the 
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others to be what they are precisely in their temporal difference.”75 Again, as with 
Bergson and against McTaggart and Mellor, the coexistence of past, present, and future 
involves no contradiction, and guarantees the flow of time rather than refuting it.  
Personal, subjective experience provides the context for much of Neville’s 
discussion of the particulars of eternity. Present experience, for example, has three 
modes, each of which also involves the past and the future: action, enjoyment, and 
engagement. Action comes out of a person’s previously developed character, and is 
directed toward some future goal. Enjoyment integrates diverse sensations into a felt 
whole, and thus it depends on past causal chains to produce those sensations, and also 
“compose[s] conditions with trajectories into the future.”76 Engagement is a mixture of 
the previous two, consisting of “being with things in the natural and social environment, 
interacting with them according to previously directed trajectories.”77 As a mixture, it 
incorporates past and future insofar as its components do. Once again recalling Bergson, 
Neville supposes that the considerations of value that play an essential role in making an 
event what it truly is are bound up in the event’s past and future as well as its present 
being. For instance, in order for me to say the sentence “I am now married” in a 
meaningful way, the following things must be true. First, my wedding day must have 
existed in potentia as one possible element of my future during the time before my 
marriage. Otherwise, I cannot be considered to have entered into my marriage vows 
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freely, and without such freedom my concept of the obligations that vows impose 
becomes nonsense. Second, my wedding day must have existed as a present moment for 
me at some time. Otherwise, I cannot sensibly say that the wedding took place. Third, my 
wedding day must have existed as a moment in my past during the time between the day 
itself and the present moment. Otherwise, I cannot be the same person who stood in front 
of the altar on that day.78 Not only is Neville’s view of temporality an A-theoretic one, 
then, but it is also tied to an assumption of human freedom at the most fundamental level. 
So far we have spoken of the ways in which the three modes of temporality 
interpenetrate one another under Neville’s theory. In order for time to flow, each mode 
must also have its own distinct identity. Neville calls an identity of this kind the 
“timeliness” of a particular mode. The timeliness of present time is “spontaneous 
creativity, change, and actualization,” including intention and will in a human context. 
The timeliness of past time is “fixed, objective everlastingness,” in which “no more 
spontaneous creativity” exists, though the meaning of a past event can be altered by 
subsequent events. The timeliness of the future is “pure form and value,” which Neville 
admits is hard to understand without the context of the future’s conditional features with 
respect to the present and the past. The future is as it is anticipated to be, says Neville, 
and anticipation is extrapolation from past and present events toward future possibilities. 
Form, in turn, integrates these possibilities, and “[t]he future is the harmony of what 
                                                          







essentially makes form formal with the conditional elements to be formed.”79 To sum up, 
things happen in the present through the working out of creative processes whose 
potentialities are constrained by past events, and whose value and meaning are 
determined by future events.  
Once Neville has established his theory of time, he turns to the question of what 
more can be said about eternity, particularly as it relates to the divine. He begins by 
noting what eternity is not like. First, it is not pure form, as with (for instance) 
mathematical truths, nor is it pure goodness, which amounts to much the same thing, but 
with ethical truths instead. Both of these kinds of truth are perhaps atemporal or 
supratemporal, but they are not eternal in the sense that Neville means, in that they 
cannot knit the different temporal modes together into a whole. Second, eternity is not a 
position outside of time that bears the same relationship to all moments within time, as 
Augustine’s theory of eternity proposes, because that would imply an essentially B-
theoretic divine experience of time. For the same reason, eternity cannot be reduced to a 
block universe view of time, as the B-theorists themselves suggest. Finally, eternity is not 
an Aristotelian Unmoved Mover, because the Unmoved Mover contains within itself all 
of its future results, so that no real change worthy of the term ever takes place, and we 
find ourselves left with the B-theory once again. So, the eternity in which God can be 
found is not static, and its essence cannot be understood in terms of conscious perception, 
goodness, or even the totality of being. One important conclusion that Neville draws from 
                                                          







this apophatic reasoning is that God cannot be an individual being, because in order for a 
God-as-individual-being to relate to the world, there would need to be some external 
context relating God and the world to each other, and which would necessarily be greater 
than either.80 Instead, Neville’s God is nothing but pure creative act, “the source of 
everything determinate […] the ground of all things.”81 Where we have spoken of 
“spontaneous creativity” unfolding in the present, or past actuality shaping what can 
potentially happen now, or the future determining the meaning of what happens, we have 
been speaking of God all along. Insofar as we use the word “time” to describe the 
particular way events come into being and interrelate with and give value to one another, 
we might go so far as to say that God is not other than time. For Neville, then, the A-




 As we finish this chapter, the position of the A-theory seems fairly strong. A-
theorists can offer serious rebuttals to the key linguistic arguments for the B-theory. Even 
among B-theorists, a consensus has formed that we cannot avoid thinking or speaking in 
terms of flowing time under some circumstances without irreparable loss of meaning, so 
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that even if the B-theory of time really is closer to the truth, it must remain remote from 
the way in which we actually go about our lives. The mainstream of religious thinking 
reflects the apparent strength of the A-theory, and tends to assume human free will, 
contingency and novelty in nature, and the openness of the future as a matter of course.  
However, a critically important factor in the modern philosophy of time is still 
missing from our analysis: Albert Einstein’s special and general theories of relativity. 
These theories have worked a sea change in the way physicists understand time, so that 
the Newtonian assumptions that tend to underlie the philosophical programs we have 
explored above are no longer tenable. Unfortunately, relatively few philosophers, and 
even fewer religious theorists, have mastered the physics of relativity to such a degree 
that they are able to deploy it in service of their arguments. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, most of the thinkers who know relativity best have concluded that it offers 
extremely powerful evidence for the block theory of time. The state of the A-theory is 






















“The Past is All Deception, The Future Futureless”: 
Relativity and Its Consequences for Philosophies and Theologies of Time 
 
 
When the 20th century began, views of the physical nature of time had changed 
little since Newton wrote his great treatises on physics at the turn of the 18th century. 
Scholars and laypeople alike assumed as a matter of course that time was the same 
throughout the universe, a uniform stage upon which all phenomena could play their 
parts. Philosophers might debate about the precise nature of the past, present, or future, 
but they could at any rate agree about which of those three a given event belonged to at a 
given moment. Religious thinkers might disagree about what relationship God bore to 
time, but at least they could be certain that all human beings bore the same relationship to 
it.  
In 1905, however, this seemingly self-evident consensus was upended by a young 
patent clerk in Bern, Switzerland, named Albert Einstein. That was the year Einstein 
published his first paper on what he called “special relativity,” which proposed radical 
reformulations of physicists’ conceptions of time, space, and the relationship between 
them.  Where Newton saw space and time as two distinct qualities that together formed a 
uniform, unchanging divine sensorium, special relativity introduced a system in which 
temporal and spatial measurements are deeply intertwined with one another, and in which 
both of these depend on the measurer’s frame of reference. In an Einsteinian universe, 







what action they are performing at the moment. Two years after the publication of that 
first paper, Einstein began to develop general relativity, in which he moved beyond 
special relativity’s discussion of motion at constant velocities to cover accelerated motion 
as well.1 General relativity proposes that gravity is not a “force” in the classical physical 
sense, but rather a curvature in the space and time (knitted together into a whole called 
“spacetime”) through which things move. Since massive objects are themselves the 
source of this gravitational curvature, our actor/stage model of space and time must 
change further: under general relativity, not only do different actors experience the stage 
differently, but each actor’s behavior also causes changes in the stage. Indeed, since these 
alterations in the stage of space and time go on to affect the actors’ behavior, it becomes 
difficult to sustain a clear distinction between a passive stage and the active players upon 
it. General relativity makes the “stage” of spacetime into an actor in its own right. 
 
Changing the Rules: Understanding Relativity 
The seed from which of all of these wholesale changes eventually grow is 
Einstein’s realization that the speed of light (abbreviated “c”) is constant for all 
observers.2 It is a matter of everyday experience that, if two cars are moving at the same 
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speed in the same direction, each car’s occupants will see the other car as motionless with 
respect to their own. Similarly, if Alice and Bob are driving in adjoining lanes down the 
same highway, and if Alice’s speedometer reads 55 miles per hour, and Bob’s reads 50 
miles per hour, then Bob can say that Alice is traveling at five miles per hour with respect 
to him. As a physicist would put it, Alice’s speed is five miles per hour in Bob’s frame of 
reference, where a “frame of reference” is defined in terms of a particular velocity and 
acceleration with respect to some point or object chosen ad hoc. Under Newtonian 
physics, one could presumably perform the same trick with a light beam—accelerate to 
the speed of light, and then find oneself at rest with respect to the beam. Special relativity 
renders this impossible. So long as they are not accelerating (so that their frames of 
reference are “inertial,” in the language of physics), all observers, no matter what their 
velocity (that is to say, in every frame of reference), will observe light traveling at the 
same speed. Even if Alice’s speedometer reads “95 percent of c,” she will measure the 
velocity of a light beam one lane over not at five percent of c, but rather at a full 100 
percent of c, just the same as she would if her car were parked. This is all the more 
notable because relativity regards no other velocity or state of rest as absolute: contra 
Newton, who supposed that some “real” state of rest must exist that is valid for all 
objects, no matter how they are moving, for Einstein motion and rest can only be 
identified relative to some reference point. 
The absolute constancy of the speed of light requires that we account 







turns out to have far-reaching consequences for time and space. According to relativistic 
physics, given some event E that takes place over time, an observer at rest with respect to 
E will arrive at a different figure for E’s duration than an observer in motion with respect 
to E (although their figures will differ only minutely unless the velocity of the motion in 
question is an appreciable fraction of c). What is more, provided that both of their frames 
of reference are inertial, neither observer will be more correct than the other: as far as the 
laws of physics are concerned, both measurements are equally valid within their 
respective frames of reference. There is no matter of fact about E’s duration that is 
independent of any observer’s point of view.  
This also means that observers in different inertial frames of reference may 
disagree on what events are simultaneous with one another. Suppose that I turn on the 
lights in my apartment when my clock reads 6:30PM, and my neighbor independently 
turns on her lights at the time when my clock reads 6:35PM. It is possible to construct a 
reference frame (that is, to specify a particular velocity with respect to our two 
apartments, which are normally at rest with respect to one another) in which both of us 
turn on our lights simultaneously.3 Again, an observer in that reference frame would be 
no less correct in reckoning that our lights come on simultaneously than my neighbor and 
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I would be in reckoning that our two apartments light up five minutes apart from one 
another.  
McTaggart did not engage with these new developments in the physics of time 
anywhere in his body of work, whether in “The Unreality of Time” or his later writings; 
this despite the fact that Einstein’s anni mirabiles had already begun by the time 
McTaggart wrote, and McTaggart’s argument that any phenomenon must be dubious if its 
characteristics depend on one’s point of view gave him ample reason to refer to relativity. 
McTaggart’s B-theorist successors, however, have made much of Einstein’s discoveries, 
arguing that special relativity raises serious doubts about any account of time that 
depends on a distinction among past, present, and future. The relativity of simultaneity 
calls into question our ability to assign events into these three categories in a consistent 
fashion. Furthermore, if special relativity tells us that observers in motion are bound to 
disagree both about what time it is and about what events are taking place at the same 
moment, then it seems very difficult to arrive at a satisfactory definition of “now” in the 
first place. Some B-theorists have developed this argument still further, building the 
confusion about “nowness” that we have briefly discussed into a much broader attack on 
flowing time in general. Responses to this line of criticism from A-theorist philosophers 
have been notably thin on the ground, and applications of relativity in service of A-







Among the most powerful and detailed scientific defenses of the B-theory was 
made by Hilary Putnam in 1967. It rests upon five important assumptions.4 The first, 
which Putnam articulates fourth, is that special relativity is an accurate description of the 
physical universe. The second assumption is equivalent to Descartes’ cogito: that a 
thinking observer is entitled to believe that she herself is real, or at least that she is so in 
the particular moment when she chooses to consider her own existence, even if she 
cannot extend that assumption of reality to other putative moments of her life. The third 
assumption combines a rejection of solipsism with a rejection of Zeno of Elea: it asserts 
that at least one person other than this original observer exists, that this second person can 
move relative to the first person, and furthermore that the second person is capable of 
observing the first. Putnam then assumes what he calls “the principle that There Are No 
Privileged Observers,”5 which states that, if the aforementioned original observer can call 
“real”6 those things that she observes as meeting a certain specifiable set of criteria, then 
the second observer can equally well designate as real the things that she observes as 
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meeting that same set of criteria.7 Putnam, for his part, chooses criteria that hinge on 
simultaneity: for A to be real to B, A and B must co-occur in the same moment.  
It is in Putnam’s last assumption, however, that our interest really lies. This final 
proposal is that claims of reality are transitive—that is, if you are real to me and some 
event E is real to you, then E is real to me.8 Given the transitivity of reality, special 
relativity quickly leads us to counterintuitive conclusions. The key factor here is the 
relativity of simultaneity. Classical physics accorded with a commonsense understanding 
of reality in positing a universal, invariant timeline, and consequently an order of events 
upon which everyone could in theory agree. For classical physics, then, there existed an 
absolute present, a moment that all observers could correctly call “now.” Special 
relativity upended this consensus. As we have seen, it showed instead that two observers 
in inertial frames, depending on their separation from each other in spacetime and their 
velocity relative to one another, might disagree about the ordering of a pair of events. For 
example, one observer might consider some event E1 to be happening in the present (at 
some moment t1, say), and then might observe some second event E2 taking place later, at 
a moment (call it t2) that she would have located in the future from the perspective of t1. 
So, according to the commonsense way of thinking about temporality, at t1 the event E1 
would be real to this first observer, whereas E2 would not be real to her yet. A second 
observer, however, could in principle observe these two events as happening 
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simultaneously, so that E1 and E2 were both real to her at the same time. Putnam’s No 
Privileged Observers principle, when combined with the transitivity of reality, would 
therefore imply that under some circumstances E2 could be real to the first observer at t1, 
even though at that time E2 still lay in her future.   
Perhaps the most effective way of investigating the consequences of Putnam’s 
assumptions is by means of a series of thought experiments. Suppose, for instance, that 
we have a human subject (we’ll call her Sarah) living on a space station orbiting the 
Earth. Suppose further that, in Sarah’s reference frame, today happens to be her 30th 
birthday, and that Sarah blows out the candles on her cake at a particular time that she 
thinks of as t1. Also at t1, Sarah sees her friend Alice rocketing by in her spaceship just 
outside the window of Sarah’s living quarters. Alice, who rarely pays much attention to 
posted speed limits, is traveling at a considerable fraction of the speed of light with 
respect to Sarah, so that relativistic effects undoubtedly apply. Let us assume finally that 
Alice, daredevil that she is, flies by at an inconsiderable distance from the window, so 
that Alice and Sarah are effectively in the same place at the moment t1 when they see 
each other. Under such conditions, Sarah and Alice would presumably be considered real 
to one another at t1 by anyone but the most hardened of solipsists, whether in the classical 
or the relativistic realm.   
For combinations of events much more complex than this, however, matters 
become considerably less certain. For example, suppose that Sarah’s other friend Bob is 







Earth by a distance of fifteen light minutes (that is, at such a distance that light takes 
fifteen minutes to travel from one planet to the other). Naturally, Sarah is unable to 
observe either Bob or his flag until light has had a chance to get from his position on 
Mars to her position in Earth orbit. So, suppose that at some time t2, fifteen minutes later 
than t1 from Sarah’s perspective, Sarah looks toward Mars through a powerful telescope 
and sees Bob and his flag. From her knowledge of the distance between Earth and Mars 
she can deduce that the flag-planting took place fifteen minutes ago, at t1, even though 
she only sees it at t2. What can we say, then, about the reality-to-Sarah of Bob’s act of 
planting the flag? Since in retrospect Sarah would judge the flag-planting to have been 
simultaneous with her own act of blowing out her candles at t1, does it follow (1) that the 
flag-planting was real to Sarah at t1, even though at that time she did not yet know that it 
was taking place? Or (2) did the flag-planting become real to Sarah only when she 
became aware of it at t2?  If the latter is the case, (2a) is this process of becoming real 
proleptic, so that the observation has the retroactive effect of causing the flag-planting to 
have been real to Sarah at t1? Or (2b) should we judge the event on Mars to be real to 
Sarah only at t2, when she observes it? Further analysis of Putnam’s arguments will 
provide answers to some of these questions. 
Let us return to Alice the daredevil, who is flying by Sarah’s window at t1. Since 
Alice is moving at a relativistic velocity with respect to Sarah, Alice and Sarah will judge 
simultaneity differently. To make matters more concrete, let us suppose that Sarah has yet 







unexplored world, located an astronomically considerable distance away from Earth. The 
relativity of simultaneity makes it possible for Carol’s landing to happen at t1 in the 
reference frame of Alice the speedster, and at some time later than t1 in the reference 
frame of Sarah the homebody. From this Putnam would argue that Carol’s landing must 
be real to Alice at the time of Alice’s flyby, because in Alice’s reference frame both 
events are simultaneous at t1.
9 Furthermore, according to Putnam, Carol’s landing must 
also be real to Sarah at the time of Alice’s flyby, since Alice is real to Sarah at that 
moment and reality is transitive. This is true even though Carol’s landing has not yet 
taken place in Sarah’s reference frame!10   
In fact, by drawing on an argument first made by C. W. Rietdijk, we can make this 
claim stronger (and stranger) still. Suppose that one last person, Dave, is aboard a 
starship traveling through deep space, many light years from Earth, and that Dave’s ship 
is traveling at a large fraction of the speed of light with respect to Sarah. Let us say 
further that we catch Dave checking his instruments at a moment that Sarah would 
describe as being simultaneous with her blowing out the candles on her 30th birthday cake 
at t1. If we were to take a strong interpretation of Putnam’s criterion of simultaneity for 
“reality-to,” this would mean that Dave’s checking of instruments and Sarah’s blowing 
out of candles would be real to each other. Now, given the right distance between Dave 
and Sarah and the right speed of Dave’s ship, it is possible that Dave could consider some 
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future event in Sarah’s life—say, her 40th birthday—to be simultaneous with the moment 
at which he checks his instruments.11 Bringing the transitivity of reality once again, this 
would mean that Sarah’s 40th birthday is real to her on her 30th birthday! Indeed, we 
could construct a similar scenario for each fraction of a second of Sarah’s existence, 
implying that her entire life would have to be real to her at every particular moment of it. 
Every instant of her experience, every choice she would ever make, would always 
already be laid out for her, so to speak.   
From these results Putnam draws the conclusion that, as he puts it, truth is a 
“tenseless predicate”12: events are what they are no matter when in time they are located, 
and no ontological difference exists among past, present and future. In short, the universe 
is a block, and the B-theory is correct. To say otherwise, Putnam argues, is to contradict 
special relativity, because an event that was truly not yet determined (i.e., not yet real to 
any observer) could not be simultaneous with any existent event in any reference frame. 
Instead, it would have to exist in an “Absolute Future,” which would imply a 
relativistically abhorrent privileged status for some particular point of view.13  
Putnam’s reasoning on these points leads to an answer to the questions about 
presentness and “reality-to” that we raised after our thought experiment with Sarah in her 
space station and Bob on Mars. Putnam suggests that events can be real to an observer 
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even if in her reference frame they exist in the future, and in particular that they are real 
to her not only once she becomes aware of them, but rather whenever it is theoretically 
possible to construct a reference frame in which they are simultaneous with her present. 
This implies that the first possibility we proposed about the relationship between Bob’s 
flag-planting and Sarah’s telescope-viewing is true: two events are real to one another if 
they are simultaneous in some reference frame, regardless of their knowledge of each 
other or lack thereof. This has the effect of collapsing the distinction between “real to” 
and simply “real.” Putnam even addresses the problem of observation from a distance 
directly, and comes to the conclusion that requiring a signal from an event E to reach an 
observer O before E can be real to O also violates the principle that there can be no 
privileged observers, since, as we have seen, the transitivity of reality implies that there is 
no difference between “reality-to” and reality tout court, and no greater privilege for an 
observer can be imagined than to condition the reality of an event on its being noticed by 
that observer.14 So, from Putnam and Rietdijk’s arguments we may conclude that all 
events are simultaneously real to all observers, so that no meaningful distinction can exist 
between a present that is happening now and a future that has yet to happen. The A-
theory, with its assumptions of different ontological status for different moments, is 
untenable. 
As much as special relativity strengthens B-theoretic arguments, a subsequent 
discovery of Einstein’s would go on to make them stronger still. Special relativity is 
                                                          







“special” in that it refers only to unaccelerated or “inertial” reference frames, that is, the 
frames of observers who are not experiencing changes in speed or direction. Einstein 
would later go on to promulgate his theory of general relativity, which originally arose 
out of his desire to deal with accelerated reference frames in greater detail. However, as 
general relativity developed, it brought Einstein to some quite unexpected conclusions 
about acceleration and gravity. We will begin to discuss this broader theory with yet 
another thought experiment. Suppose that you wake up in your windowless cabin aboard 
a spaceship. You notice immediately that your weight feels just as it did on Earth, and, 
after a quick experiment, that a dropped object falls to the floor of the cabin at exactly the 
rate that is familiar from your terrestrial existence. Does this mean that your ship has not 
yet taken off, and that it is sitting motionless on its launch pad? On the other hand, you 
recall the pilot telling you when you came aboard that the ship’s ride was absolutely 
smooth and silent. Could it be, then, that the ship is in fact underway, and that its 
acceleration is pressing you into the floor at the same 9.8 meters per second squared that 
the Earth’s gravity produces near its surface? As much as the answer to this conundrum 
might matter to you as a traveler, Einstein proposes that it makes no difference to you at 
all as a physicist. This is the “principle of equivalence,” which states that the force of 
gravity is equivalent for all physical purposes to the push you feel because of the 
acceleration of your frame of reference, and it is one of the foundations of general 
relativity. This principle works in the same way in the absence of apparent gravity. For 







have been the case that your ship was in deep space, far from any gravity well, or else 
that it was in orbit around the Earth: pulled by Earth’s gravity, but with enough forward 
motion that its free fall would not bring it down to the ground. Again, there would be no 
difference between these two situations as far as the laws of physics were concerned.  
Now, by definition, an object in motion that does not accelerate moves in a 
straight line. In geometry, such a path is called a “geodesic,” where a geodesic is defined 
as the shortest distance between two points. A curve in an object’s path requires a change 
in direction, which, in the language of physics, counts as an acceleration. However, if we 
think back to our spaceship in orbit around the Earth, it certainly seems as though its path 
is curved. This makes perfect sense from a Newtonian perspective: a curved path requires 
an acceleration, and an acceleration can only come about because of the action of a force, 
which in the case of an orbiting body would be gravity. But how can the closed path of an 
orbit be equivalent to a straight line?  
Einstein’s solution to this problem was to treat gravity as a distortion in the space 
and time through which objects move. The analogy that physicists usually draw to 
illustrate this move is with a sheet of rubber. The sheet is naturally flat, but when heavy 
objects are placed on it, their weight pulls the sheet downward, creating depressions in its 
surface. A ball rolling along a geodesic on the surface of the sheet will travel in a straight 
line where the sheet is flat, but if it enters a region in which the sheet curves downward, 
the ball will follow that curve. The geodesic paths that unaccelerated objects follow are 







globally. Much as heavy objects curve a rubber sheet with their weight, according to 
general relativity, the presence of matter and energy15 curve space and time. These 
deformations are what classical physicists since Newton had called “gravity.” What 
Newton considered to be an attractive force, then, accelerating massive objects together 
much as opposite magnetic poles attract each other, Einstein reimagines as a change in 
geometry that alters the way objects move, causing them to “roll downhill,” as it were, 
toward each other. Our spaceship moving in a closed orbit around the Earth is thus 
following a geodesic around the lip of the Earth’s gravity well, just as a ship traveling 
through flat interstellar space would follow an obviously straight geodesic. It would take 
the action of a true force, such as an impact with another body, to push the ship along a 
path that was curved with respect to local space.  
Like special relativity, general relativity is well supported by experimental data. 
One fairly straightforward consequence of Einstein’s model of gravitation is that massive 
objects bend the paths that beams of light follow. As we have discussed above, the speed 
of light is a universal constant; light can never accelerate. So, a light ray must always 
follow a geodesic. In the deeply curved space near a very large mass, such as that of a 
star or a black hole, these geodesic paths will also be noticeably curved. The observable 
result is called “gravitational lensing”—deep gravity wells bend light much as a lens 
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does. Astronomers routinely observe gravitational lensing in the neighborhood of the 
largest objects they see through their telescopes, and the degree to which these “lenses” 
bend light is in close agreement with what general relativity predicts. 
Thus far our discussion of general relativity has had a great deal to say about the 
movement of objects through space, but little about the nature of time. It turns out, 
however, that the two topics are inseparable. In 1908, the physicist Hermann Minkowski 
promulgated his geometric interpretation of relativity, which would go on to become an 
important stepping stone between special and general relativity. As part of this 
interpretation, Minkowski defined a quantity called “spacetime separation,” which 
incorporated both the physical distance and the temporal expanse between two events 
into a single whole that is the same for all inertial observers. Moreover, Minkowski’s 
formulation showed that, much as the definitions of the left-right and forward-backward 
axes of space depend on one’s orientation, an observer’s relative motion powerfully 
affects how that observer breaks a spacetime separation down into spatial and temporal 
components. For example, Alice might consider two events to be simultaneous (that is, to 
have zero temporal separation) but also to be separated by some given distance in space. 
On the other hand, Bob, moving at a different velocity relative to the two events, might 
find them to be separated from one another in time, but would also find that their 
separation in space was correspondingly less. Alice and Bob would disagree about the 
spatial and temporal distance between the two events, but would agree about the total 







and time for itself shall completely reduce to a mere shadow, and only some sort of union 
of the two shall preserve independence.”16 Physicists have used the term “spacetime” to 
refer to this union. Drawing on Minkowski, general relativity interprets the shape of 
spacetime in a particular volume as a mathematical expression called a “metric.” The 
metrics that successfully describe our universe have four components, three for space and 
one for time. While these components are not mathematically identical with one another, 
certainly they are not taken as fundamentally distinct either. In fact, just as we saw with 
Minkowski’s geometrical interpretation, there is no unique way for a given expanse of 
four-dimensional spacetime to be “sliced” into successive instants of three-dimensional 
space and  one-dimensional time. Different observers can experience orderings of events 
that are different from one another, but that are each internally consistent and physically 
well behaved. This adds further weight to the argument from special relativity that, since 
simultaneity is relative, observers may not agree about what events take place in the 
present, the past or the future, and thus that a B-theoretic view of time that does not 
include pastness, presence or futurity as categories is more plausible.17 Given this 
geometrical picture of spacetime as an almost literal block that can be bent, and that 
shapes the motion of objects through it, it is tempting to regard spacetime as a kind of 
physical substance: a medium of sorts in which objects sit, but that has a well-defined 
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existence of its own apart from those objects. Many philosophers have defended just such 
a view, under the name “spacetime substantivalism.” 
In 1949 the mathematician Kurt Gödel employed general relativity to advance yet 
another argument against flowing time. Gödel discovered that Einstein’s equation, the 
formula that relates the distribution of mass and energy to the curvature of spacetime (i.e., 
gravity) in general relativity, permits the construction of a universe in which time behaves 
in ways incompatible with any conventional notion of flow. In a Gödel-style universe, an 
observer traveling in a sufficiently large circle would find herself arriving at times that 
she would have called “past” from the standpoint of the start of her journey, perhaps even 
meeting her past self.18 Such a meeting would then exist in both the traveler’s past and 
the traveler’s future; this state of affairs is hard to square with a flowing view of time in 
which past and future events are ontologically distinct. Gödel acknowledges that we do 
not observe this phenomenon in our everyday lives, but notes that doing so would require 
travel at a fraction of the speed of light that is difficult (albeit not impossible) to attain. 
Thus, he observes, we cannot conclude on an empirical basis that his solution of 
Einstein’s equation does not apply to our own universe. Moreover, even the fact that the 
laws of physics theoretically permit this kind of universe makes Gödel doubt that flow 
can be a feature of the objective nature of time. If possibility of objective temporal flow 
depends upon “the particular way in which matter and its motion are arranged in the 
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world,”19 as the existence of Gödel’s solution to Einstein’s equation suggests, then that 
does not inspire much confidence that such flow is fundamentally real. 
 
Using New Tools: Relativity and Philosophical Arguments for Block Time  
The special and general theories of relativity, then, offer powerful new sets of 
tools for describing time as a physical phenomenon. The particular character of this new, 
relativistic description of time seems flatly to contradict the usual, “common sense” view 
of tense: Einstein does not permit the existence of a single present moment in which all 
observers can exist together, and so the bright line between a set past and an open future 
is considerably dimmer to say the least. Certainly Einstein himself believed that his 
scientific work excluded the possibility of flowing, A-theoretic time. After his friend 
Michele Besso died, Einstein wrote a letter to Besso’s family in which he sought to 
provide comfort by saying that, although Besso had died, he had not ceased to be, 
because the times during which he had lived still existed. For physicists, Einstein wrote, 
“the separation between the past, present and future, holds nothing more than the value of 
an illusion, however strong it may be.”20 The arguments from relativity that Putnam, 
Rietdijk, Gödel, and other B-theorists make compound the difficulties that Einstein’s 
purely scientific theories create for flowing time. These more philosophical challenges 
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are all the greater for the fact that they draw upon physics rather than remaining strictly 
within the realm of philosophy, as the linguistic arguments for the B-theory that we 
examined in the last chapter did. There exists a broad consensus that the empirical basis 
that science provides for its truth claims renders them uniquely solid and reliable, so 
much so that science is typically seen as producing another order of knowledge than that 
which other modes of inquiry (philosophy and religion included) can provide. Physics, 
which deals with the most basic properties of matter and energy in the most thoroughly 
quantitative fashion, carries with it a still stronger aura of solidity even than other 
scientific disciplines do.  
The hierarchy of knowledge that is assumed here, with science at its top and 
physics at its absolute pinnacle, has a bottom end as well: the opposite number of 
maximally reliable science is minimally reliable subjective knowledge. This hierarchy is 
apparent throughout the literature of the B-theory of time. As we began to note in the 
previous chapter, the frequent appeals to science to support a block theory of time have 
gone hand in hand with positivistic assumptions that first-person experience is unreliable 
at best and illusory at worst. We have already seen Bertrand Russell, writing without 
explicit reference to relativistic physics, appeal to an intuition that the B-theory is the 
more scientific view of temporality precisely because it does away with the merely “felt” 
differences between past and future. Other B-theorists have joined Russell in that 







is, true thoughts, is only possible because “the truth of a thought is timeless.”21 Moreover, 
this truth must be timeless because the only things fit to serve as a “firm foundation of 
science” are those that do not depend on “[human beings’] varying states of 
consciousness.” Later B-theorists typically have taken as powerful corroborating 
evidence for their point of view relativistic ideas about both the dependence of time 
measurements on reference frame and the connection between time and space, while 
continuing to place those scientific findings in opposition to subjective perception. W. V. 
O. Quine pronounces that, for Einstein, “space and time are distinguishable only relative 
to a velocity,” and that “[t]his discovery leaves no reasonable alternative to treating time 
as spacelike,”22 that is, treating time in such a way that all points in time have the same 
ontological status, just as all points in space do. Quine also argues that the absence of 
physical evidence should lead us to treat minds as unreal: “ […] those who posit the 
mental states and events have no details of appropriate mechanisms to offer nor, what 
with the mind-body problem, prospects of any. The bodily states exist anyway; why add 
the others?”23 J. J. C. Smart, too, considers relativity to have demonstrated that we must 
treat time as only another dimension of a four-dimensional geometric space, not much 
different at the root from the dimensions we call “up/down” or “left/right.”24 This 
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conviction influences Smart’s philosophical work, as well: he describes his efforts to 
render tensed statements into tenseless form as an attempt to “[fit] our ordinary way of 
talking […] to our scientific way of looking at the world.”25 Smart also believes that 
science forces us to consider mind and self as mere epiphenomena of the matter of which 
brains are made: “[S]cience is increasingly giving us a viewpoint whereby organisms are 
able to be seen as physico-chemical mechanisms: it seems to me that even the behavior of 
man himself will one day be explicable in mechanistic terms.”26 Adolf Grünbaum 
interprets relativity to mean that “point-instant-particles, i.e., events rather than things 
[are] the basic entities of nature,” the originals of which our sensations are only more or 
less flawed images.27 Furthermore, Grünbaum continues, the relativity of simultaneity 
means that no agreement is possible about what collection of these fundamental events 
take place together in the present, calling the past/present/future trichotomy as a whole 
into serious question.28 Indeed, Grünbaum maintains that this trichotomy is purely a 
phenomenon of human psychology, and thus has no relevance to inquiries into the 
fundamental, purely physical nature of time.29 Hans Reichenbach, in addition to 
accepting the B-theory, lauds Einstein for having solved by “physico-mathematical 
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analysis” questions of time that philosophers could not untangle using their own methods, 
and hails relativity as a victory for positivism.30 Reichenbach’s positivism has no room 
for real personhood; he describes our sense of “I” as an “abstractum,”31 a construct with 
no existence beyond its usefulness as a signifier for a certain class of concrete 
happenings.32 Reichenbach approvingly cites G. C. Lichtenberg on this point, arguing 
that, rather than saying “I think,” we ought to use the impersonal form “it thinks,” just as 
we say “it is raining” or “it is too hot outside.”33 
So, although Mellor is perhaps more explicit than most in arguing that a block 
model of time implies that human personhood is unreal, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, we can see that this claim is well within the mainstream of B-theoretic thought. 
Thinkers who deny that time flows typically go on to deny that our sense of “I” is 
anything but an illusion; an illusion that, while it may be of interest to some specialized 
scholars, can and should be ignored for the purposes of trying to understand the real 
nature of existence. Thought is rigorous and reliable precisely to the extent that it purges 
itself of the illusion of personality and all that depends on it, including the notion that 
time flows.  
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Furthermore, the fact that it is physics that has apparently refuted A-theorists’ 
arguments for flowing time powerfully shapes B-theorists’ expectations for philosophy’s 
present and future.34 If advances in physics have indeed succeeded in settling a question 
that exercised philosophers for centuries, then who knows what other philosophical 
debates science might one day obviate? Certainly the thinkers quoted above appear to 
believe that future scientific advances will solve the problems we face in trying to 
understand the human condition, in many cases by defining them out of existence. In the 
meantime, these B-theorists assume the absolute supremacy of science as a source of 
answers about the nature of the world, and reason that, in order for philosophy to be 
successful, it ought to hew as closely as possible to “scientific” ways of thinking. In 
doing so they draw a strict opposition between objective, dispassionate science on the one 
hand and unreliable, emotion-tainted subjectivity on the other.  
This positivistic model replicates within philosophy many of the characteristics of 
what John Hedley Brooke has described as the conflict thesis of the relationship between 
science and religion.35 It presumes that impersonal scientific thought, whether in the form 
of literal science or in the form of a positivistic philosophy that aims to imitate science as 
much as possible, has rendered personalistic worldviews (including by implication 
religious ones) obsolete, revealing them as relics of a more primitive way of thinking. 
Maintaining that subjectivity has some indispensable role to play in our understanding of 
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existence, then, takes on the flavor of a “God of the gaps”-style argument, in which one 
appeals to something outside the comprehension of science as a rearguard action in order 
to account for an ever-shrinking domain of phenomena. As Reichenbach puts it, “For the 
philosopher such concepts as time order and simultaneity [prior to Einstein] were 
primitive notions inaccessible to further analysis. But the claims that a concept is exempt 
from analysis often merely springs from an inability to understand its meaning.”36 For 
Reichenbach, any analysis worthy of the name must be scientific analysis: 
[Modern science] has refused to recognize the authority of the philosopher who claims to  
know the truth from intuition, from insight into a world of ideas or into the nature of 
reason or the principles of being, or from whatever super-empirical source. There is no 
separate entrance to truth for philosophers. [ … ] Theory of knowledge is analysis of 
science.37 
 
If rigorous thinking and credible truth-claims fall by definition within the domain of 
science, and science by definition rejects all attempts at explanation that do not rely 
exclusively on empirical, objective criteria, then it follows quite naturally that science 
does not merely refute certain details that religious systems assume, but in fact that 
science contradicts as a matter of principle the truth-claims of the entire, subjectively-
focused realm of religion. Religion becomes at most an interesting anthropological 
phenomenon to be studied in others, but one that disciplined, scientific minds must reject 
for themselves, along with all the other trappings of personalistic thinking.  
Even if we do not follow these B-theorists in their rejection of subjectivity, 
however, we have not escaped the earth-shaking implications for Western religion of the 
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triumph of the B-theory of time. As we noted briefly in the previous chapter, the block 
universe precludes key Abrahamic theological tenets that depend upon an open future that 
can be dynamically shaped by present events. Under any Abrahamic understanding of 
deity, God would necessarily interact with created reality on its deepest, truest level, 
which would be timeless according to the B-theory. There is no reason to assume that 
God is temporal if even the created universe is not, and it is hard to imagine why a 
timeless God would interact with a timeless universe in even a superficially tensed 
fashion. In the same way, if the flow of time is an illusion to be disregarded, any human 
perception of history as involving changes in religious conditions would also have to be 
abandoned. If we look back to the image of the poker in the fireplace from the previous 
chapter, we will remember that true change does not occur in B-theoretic time. Instead, 
there is only variation between one point in spacetime and another: conditions at earlier 
times do not cease to exist, and conditions at later times do not supersede earlier ones. All 
times have eternally equal claims to existence, and so all states of being are eternal and 
unchanging. 
Without flowing time, the theological arguments involving temporality that we 
have discussed are reduced to nonsense. First of all, a person’s eschatological condition 
cannot be contingent, dependent upon her freely chosen actions and changeable if she 
changes her life, if all temporal events exist timelessly in a mutually-determining fashion. 
Her conduct after the moment of “change” would have no greater claim to importance 







in Abrahamic religion would thus lose all of their force. For example, take this passage 
from the Hebrew Bible: 
But if the wicked turn away from all their sins that they have committed and keep all my  
statutes and do what is lawful and right, they shall surely live; they shall not die. None of 
the transgressions that they have committed shall be remembered against them; for the  
righteousness they have done they shall live.38 
 
According to the block model of time, both the sins of the wicked person before his 
reformation and his righteous deeds thereafter would have the same degree of eternal 
existence, much as different points in the same space coexist. It would thus be pointless 
to distinguish between the “remembrance” of his past transgressions and the presence of 
his current righteousness—both the transgressions and the righteousness would exist in 
the same way and to the same degree. For God to base judgment of such a person on 
actions later than his decision to behave differently rather than on earlier actions would 
be as logically indefensible as to ascribe to the left half of a person’s body a different 
moral importance than the right half.  
 The idea of salvation history, likewise, would be vitiated. Why should the 
relationship between God and humanity have a narrative character, unfolding through 
time, in a block universe? After all, narrative implies a direction in time: the story of a 
person getting a job and then leaving town is quite different from its reverse, the story of 
a person coming to a town and then losing the job, even if the relationships of entailment 
between one moment and its temporal neighbors are the same in either case. If the 
pervasive human sense that one moment succeeds another is false, then there is no good 
                                                          







reason to interpret events in time as a sequence at all, much less as one that runs in a 
particular direction. Without such a sense of direction, a way to identify which temporal 
relationships to call “earlier” and which “later,” we cannot even order our stories in terms 
of cause and effect. G. J. Whitrow points out that, if we abstract from our intuition of the 
direction of time’s flow, reasoning about which of two causally-related events is the 
cause and which is the effect risks circularity if we assume that the cause must be the 
earlier event and the effect the later one.39 If we accept a B-theoretic model of time, then, 
we cannot make sense of designating Muhammad the Seal of the Prophets, that is, the 
prophet who brings God’s final and definitive revelation, supplying all that was missing 
in the prophets who came before. The very word “final” presupposes a distinction 
between past and future: without such direction, there is no essential distinction between 
beginning and end or last and first.  
With all events, including all human decisions, always-already existing, and no 
beginning of time, what we are left with amounts to occasionalism: the idea that God is 
the cause of all events that take place. If we maintain the near-universal Abrahamic 
doctrine that God creates the universe, then from the timelessness of both the universe 
and God it follows that God creates all moments, not serially, but as a single whole, with 
all of their causal interconnections always-already in place.40 We cannot follow the Deist 
assumption that God sets the laws and initial conditions of nature and then stands back to 
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allow the history of the world to play out, because in block time no conditions qualify as 
“initial.” If God creates, then God’s degree of responsibility for the state of the universe 
at the instant of the Big Bang cannot be distinguished from God’s responsibility for its 
state at any other instant. Assuming any degree of divine freedom whatsoever in the form 
that creation takes, this raises tremendous difficulties for theodicy, as it makes God the 
causal agent of every instance of suffering that ever occurs. Under this view God is also 
responsible, not only for human beings’ eschatological judgment, but also for every one 
of the human actions and decisions that are to be judged. This would cause tremendous 
difficulties for Christian doctrines of justification, because it would preclude any 
distinction in kind between God’s salvific work and sin’s destructive power. Christian 
theologians from Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to Luther and Calvin have taken pains 
to maintain such a distinction, drawing a line between God’s action to save and God’s 
refraining from action to allow sin to take its course unimpeded. If God causes all events 
equally directly, however, this line is erased. God must cause sinful actions no less than 
virtuous ones. Moreover, if God does indeed punish or even condemn people for sin, then 
the people punished have no way of avoiding punishment or damnation. All of their 
actions, sinful or otherwise, are eternally present, and they can no more avoid them than a 
train can steer around a particular station. Block time, then, leads us to a particularly strict 
doctrine of double predestination, which all but a relative few Abrahamic theologians 








Making Distinctions: Psychological Time and Physical Time After Einstein 
It seems, then, that A-theorists, and especially A-theorists who subscribe to the  
Abrahamic theological positions we have outlined above, face some serious difficulties. A 
prima facie interpretation of modern physics, promulgated by many eminent physicists 
and philosophers, seems to rule out any flowing interpretation of time. The fact that first-
person human experience contradicts this apparent truth gives reason for radical doubt in 
the reliability and even the intellectual relevance of personal experience generally. As 
with the linguistic arguments for the B-theory that we explored in the previous chapter, 
however, these scientific arguments for block time have not gone without a response from 
A-theorists. Such responses vary in their particulars, but many seek to defang arguments 
from physics by drawing a distinction between the time that relativity describes and the 
time that we experience. This latter, mental time is often presumed to be a non-physical 
phenomenon, so that it can have tenses without being subject to the restrictions that 
physics imposes.  
One important manifestation of this divorce of mental time from physical time 
can be found in phenomenology. Edmund Husserl establishes the foundation for the 
phenomenological treatment of time by drawing a bright line between what he calls 
“objective” time, that is, “world-time, real time, the time of nature in the sense of natural 
science,”41 and time as we are directly conscious of it. Phenomenologists interest 
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themselves primarily in the latter; assumptions about the nature of the former must be 
bracketed for their purposes. Husserl emphasizes that direct consciousness of time is 
unavoidably tensed. A distinction among, past, present, and future is fundamental to the 
human experience of events: we perceive phenomena which are extended in time 
progressively, with a certain phase of the phenomenon apprehended as taking place now, 
earlier phases retained in the mind as past, shading from direct perception into memory,42 
and later phases anticipated (or “protended”) as future. The way time may exist in itself, 
independent of the way all human beings always perceive it, is outside the scope of 
Husserl’s project: “One cannot discover the least trace of objective time through 
phenomenological analysis.”43 Since the time that physics describes is by its nature 
maximally objective and minimally subjective, it bears little relevance for Husserl, or for 
most later phenomenologists such as Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
As valuable as Husserl’s analysis of our perception of time may be, then, it does 
not at first glance seem to bring us any closer to resolving the disjunction between that 
perception and the apparent consequences of relativistic physics. Yuval Dolev sees in this 
decision to prescind from the question not a gap to be filled, but rather a potential way 
forward. Dolev begins by assuming a stance of temporal neutrality, aligning himself with 
neither the A- nor the B-theory. He takes pains to emphasize that, as different as they may 
seem, the physical time of Einstein and Putnam and the human time of Augustine and 
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Husserl do indeed refer to the same phenomenon.44 Furthermore, he maintains that both 
tensed and tenseless views of time capture something true and important about 
temporality: the former is motivated by the fact that much of time, i.e., the parts that A-
theorists would call the past and the future, is inaccessible to us, while the latter is 
motivated by the “intangibility” of the passage of time, our inability conclusively to 
locate it outside of our own minds.45 Still, for Dolev, neither of these views can ultimately 
be accepted.  He concedes the correctness of B-theoretic arguments that it is incoherent to 
assign a special mode of existence to a moment we call the present, pointing particularly 
to the paradox that James McTaggart noticed.46 However, Dolev also maintains that, 
because our sense of time as tensed is so deeply rooted, we cannot really proceed as 
though this sense were a mere illusion, even if our philosophical system claims that this 
must be the case. We can never attain a “real,” tenseless perspective to replace our 
“illusory” tensed one, and we cannot meaningfully say that a given perception is an 
illusion if we can never perceive (and not merely posit) it as an illusion.47  
As a resolution to this seeming contradiction, Dolev proposes that we can hold on 
to the truth of flowing time by abandoning the assumption that this truth says anything 
about ontology.48 We ought instead to content ourselves with speaking of pastness, 
presence, and futurity as characteristics of certain experiences that we have, rather than of 
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the past, the present, or the future as real things in themselves. Indeed, we must let go of 
our desire to know whether our experience of time corresponds to “reality.” As Dolev 
puts it,  
[T]he conditions obtaining on a certain Tuesday are always the conditions that obtain on 
that Tuesday. […] [A]s it becomes Wednesday […] a new set of conditions become 
present, namely those of Wednesday. Tuesday’s conditions remain as they are; they only 
cease to be present and become past. They do not cease to exist, nor do they continue to 
exist. […] Changes in tensed facts cannot be reduced to ontological categories, or framed 
by reality claims.49 
 
The trouble with this point of view is its strange passivity. Dolev describes our 
being in the world fundamentally in terms of observation; for the purposes of his theories, 
to be human is to register and log perceptions, and then to reflect on them. Certainly 
Dolev’s emphasis on grounding our philosophy in the perceptions of human minds is 
welcome, particularly when contrasted with B-theorists’ pursuit of an impersonal view 
from nowhere, but it still misses a crucial point: human beings are actors, and not only 
spectators. Dolev acknowledges that we cannot really treat a given way of seeing the 
world as an illusion if we have no choice but to perceive things in that way, but this is 
only half the story. In the same way, if we habitually act on a given perception, then we 
cannot meaningfully claim to stand aside from questions about whether it is real. In fact, 
people universally do act in a particular way with regard to the present moment: we treat 
it as the time in which to make decisions and to undertake tasks. This gives the present a 
special status, and it is hard to know what to call this status if not “ontological.” Surely 
one distinguishing characteristic of real situations is that they demand responses from us, 
                                                          







whereas unreal situations categorically do not. To use Aristotle’s famous example, if I am 
a ship’s captain, and I am asked whether the events of a sea battle tomorrow are already 
real and determined today, then I may well be able to consider the problem with a certain 
detachment. However, if I find that my ship is in the midst of a sea battle right now, then 
I will immediately set about the business of giving my crew their orders, no matter how I 
might describe my position on the philosophy of time in calmer moments. Once we admit 
that accurately describing tense takes us into ontological territory, we must reckon one 
way or another with physics’ claims to describe what is real. We cannot avoid addressing 
the powerful arguments that relativity seems to offer for the B-theory by staking out a 
perceptual time that physics cannot touch.  
Paul Ricoeur’s analysis makes this point clearly and forcefully. He breaks 
somewhat from other phenomenologists in that, although he maintains a distinction 
between the time of physics and the time of thought, he is unwilling to grant these two 
their own, non-overlapping magisteria. As crucial as it is to take mind into account when 
trying to understand time, no such understanding is possible without reckoning with 
cosmology as well. Ricoeur illustrates this by contrasting Augustine’s treatment of time 
from Aristotle’s, broadly identifying the former with mental, phenomenological time and 
the latter with cosmological time. Though he does not cite McTaggart, Ricoeur’s 
summaries of these two points of view bear striking similarities to McTaggart’s 
descriptions of the A- and B-theories of time, respectively. Ricoeur describes the 







before/after relationship.50 It is particularly concerned with the numerical measurement of 
time in terms of instants, which have no special significance of their own, but rather can 
be designated at need for the purposes of counting. For Aristotle, time arises out of 
physis, the nature of things, and not out of any human perspective. This is in every 
respect a perfectly B-theoretic point of view, one very much in line with what Mellor or 
Putnam would endorse. On the other hand, as Mark S. Muldoon puts it in his discussion 
of Ricoeur,  
The Augustinian present […] is an instant designated by the speaker as the “now” of his  
or her utterance. The spoken “now” implies an intention that lives within the slippage of  
a past, present, and future; it is not reducible to just a before and after.51 
 
This is a quintessentially A-theoretic definition of time, as one might expect from a view 
of temporality that takes consciousness as its point of departure. However, Ricoeur argues 
that neither Aristotle nor Augustine manage to capture time in its fullness. Augustine fails 
in his attempt to decouple time from physical motion, with which Aristotle had identified 
it, and to define time instead as a “distention of the soul [distentio animi 52],” because his 
theory does not do justice to the sense that we are within time rather than the source of it, 
as we tacitly affirm with the references we constantly make to events in the physical 
world when we try to understand what time is.53 Aristotle, for his part, everywhere 
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presumes the necessity of human thought in order to make his theory work, but he never 
directly acknowledges that presumption.54 At every point in his analysis, whether he 
speaks of perceiving instants or of comparing the intervals between them or of assigning 
numerical values to those intervals, he speaks in terms of reasoning, of the action of 
minds. He cannot hope to prescind from his own means of understanding the world. Thus 
we find that neither the purely cosmological nor the purely phenomenological theory of 
time can account for the other, or even lead to the other, yet both uniquely describe 
important aspects of time as we understand it: 
Not only must we make a jump to pass from one perspective on time to the other, it seems 
as though each is doomed to occlude the other. And yet the difficulties peculiar to each 
perspective demand that these two perspectives be reconciled […] the problem of time 
cannot be attacked from a single side only, whether of the soul or of movement.55 
 
Ricoeur charges that modern phenomenologists have not had much more success 
than Augustine either in isolating their accounts of mental time from the time of the 
physical world or in reconciling the two.56 By the same token, modern B-theorist 
philosophers of time cannot escape their own human point of view any more than 
Aristotle could, and yet we have seen that they show little interest in trying to 
accommodate their theories of physical time to human perceptions. It seems, then, that 
the only way to understand time in all its fullness is to hold both the importance of first-
person experience and the importance of the external world firmly in mind. We cannot 
come to grips with the time of the external world, and with all of the ways that it 
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conditions and imposes itself on the time within our minds, without paying close 
attention to what modern physics has to tell us about it. Keeping physics in one box and 
psychology and religion in another, as Dolev’s program would suggest, will not do.57  
 
Conclusion 
  Reconciling relativistic physics with an A-theoretic philosophy of time, not to 
mention the religious truth claims that depend on such a philosophy, is a difficult task. It 
involves interdisciplinary work that relatively few have felt qualified to undertake, 
requiring both a thorough command of the history and methods of philosophy and firm 
grasp of often abstruse physics. Most experts on each of these two subjects complete their 
entire educations without seriously engaging with the other. Nevertheless, enough 
scholars have made the attempt that two major schools of relativistic, A-theoretic thought 
exist, each with its own conclusions about the ultimate nature of time, and consequently 
its own implications for the relationship between God and the physical universe. Over the 
course of the next two chapters, we will explore these two possible solutions to the 
problems that have been posed in this one. In chapter 3, we will see how John R. Lucas 
and William Lane Craig refer to the thought of Hendrik Lorentz, a physicist 
contemporary with Einstein, to argue that an absolute, universal frame of reference is still 
possible under relativity. According to Lucas and Craig, this allows for an absolute 
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distinction among past, present, and future, and refutes Putnam’s argument for the block 
universe by permitting an absolute standard of simultaneity. It also implies a God who 
takes on temporality in interacting with the universe, and who thus perceives time much 
as human beings do. In chapter 4, we will examine the way Robert John Russell and 
Howard Stein have found a space for flowing time within the schema of traditional 
Einsteinian relativity. They locate fundamental truth not in the universal, timeless sum 
over all reference frames that Putnam assumes, but rather in the individual temporalities 
each of those particular reference frames. In doing so, Stein and Russell bring scientific 
development and mathematical rigor to a perspective on time that began with Bergson 
and Whitehead’s contemporaneous responses to Einstein. Russell ties this model to the 
future-centered theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, and, since God transcends all physical 
frames of reference, he also defends a timeless view of God’s eternity in line with 
Augustine and Boethius. Both of these theories have consequences for philosophy and 
religion that may seem bizarre, but as Craig notes, no view of the reality that incorporates 
the consequences of modern physics can help but be counterintuitive in places.58 There is 
now no returning to a pre-Einsteinian world. 
                                                          









“It Is What It Always Was”: 
The Universal Present and the Neo-Lorentzian Interpretation of Relativity 
 
Even if, as we saw during the previous chapter, it is not now possible to undo the 
changes to the physics of time that Einstein began, it is not necessarily the case that 
Einstein was perfectly correct in the philosophical conclusions that he drew from his 
physical discoveries. In this chapter, we will examine an A-theoretic view of time that 
proposes that Einstein was indeed seriously mistaken in these conclusions. According to 
this view, much of what we now think of as the consequences of relativistic physics arise 
from philosophical arguments masquerading as physical ones, and, what is more, the 
positivistic philosophy that underlies these arguments is no longer tenable. Instead, as 
John R. Lucas suggests and William Lane Craig argues still more forcefully, we ought to 
follow the lead of physicist Hendrik Lorentz, who himself contributed a great deal to the 
theory of special relativity, and who is responsible for much of its mathematical 
formalism. Under a Lorentzian interpretation of relativity, the simultaneity of distant 
events is not relative in quite the same way that Einstein proposed, and thus Putnam and 
Rietdijk’s argument from the relativity of simultaneity to the B-theory of time cannot be 
made in the first place. Craig develops this interpretation into what he calls a neo-
Lorentzian relativity, one that he holds is perfectly compatible with flowing time, and is 
more philosophically defensible into the bargain. Furthermore, Craig suggests that his 







God’s relationship to time, in which God also experiences time as flowing, and in which 
God’s present is the foundation for the present in created time. This, he believes, allows 
us to retain all the essential elements of the classical Abrahamic idea of God and of God’s 
relationship to human beings. 
 
Recovering the Measure: Arguments for a Universal, Divine Reference Frame 
The starting point for the argument Craig and Lucas make in favor of this neo-
Lorentzian system includes both philosophical and religious elements. Like many if not 
most A-theorists, Craig asserts that our experience of past, present and future is so 
fundamental that it cannot be denied without overwhelming evidence, and so that any 
theory of temporality that denies that time is tensed is ipso facto implausible. On this 
point he refers to Alvin Plantinga’s concept of “properly basic beliefs,” which lie at the 
very roots of our cognitive structure, and are deeply grounded in our everyday 
experience.1 Our belief that time flows is properly basic in this way, says Craig, and is 
furthermore so deep and so universal that it acts as what Plantinga calls an “intrinsic 
defeater-defeater”: it is so much more plausible than any argument that could be brought 
against it that it is effectively irrefutable.2 In this way, it resembles the belief that the 
physical world itself is real rather than an illusion. Even if, on purely logical grounds, we 
cannot refute skeptical arguments that nothing can ever really be known to exist, we are 
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justified in retaining our belief that physical objects are real. No argument, no matter how 
well formed, can be more solid than the chair I am sitting on, and so it is reasonable for 
me to assert the chair’s reality in the face of any conceivable argument that the chair does 
not exist. 
This is not to say that Craig makes no effort to blunt the force of the arguments 
we have seen that the flow of time is unreal. Indeed, in order to escape the consequences 
of the paradox that J. M. E. McTaggart identified, and that we examined in chapter 1, 
Craig endorses a “presentist” model of flowing time, that is, one in which only the 
present exists, and the future and the past are both nonexistent.3 In this way, Craig 
believes that he counters McTaggart’s objections to the coexistence of multiple times 
with mutually contradictory properties. The present as Craig sees it is not the vanishingly 
small border between past and future that Augustine describes, however. Craig rejects the 
assumption that history must be the sum of an infinite number of infinitely short instants, 
and describes himself as agreeing with C. S. Peirce that “a line exists primarily as a 
whole rather than as a collection of ordered points and so is only potentially infinitely 
divisible, instants being merely ideal points.”4 Furthermore, Craig finds that “regarding 
instants and particularly the present instant as a degenerate interval [i.e., a mathematically 
singular one with a duration that is so infinitesimal as to be effectively zero] seems to 
create insuperable problems for temporal becoming” on the model of Zeno’s paradoxes 
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for motion. The B-theorist Adolf Grünbaum’s doctoral thesis was organized as a critique 
of an argument from Whitehead and William James to that effect, but Craig charges that 
Grünbaum is begging the question: his objections have force only if one already assumes 
a B-theoretic, timeless existence of all moments. 
Craig’s own preferred view is what he calls the “non-metrical present,” in which 
“now” is closely analogous to “here.” Under this view, asking how long the moment 
called “now” lasts faces exactly the same problems as asking how big the place called 
“here” is.5 Thus the present is simply the time in which we find ourselves, and has 
whatever length is relevant for our purposes. We may use the word “now” to mean “the 
present century” quite as correctly as we use it to mean “the present moment,” just as we 
use “here” to mean “in this country” as well as “on this particular square meter of 
ground.” This way of thinking avoids Zeno’s paradoxes because it does not assume that 
time proceeds by instants, though instants may of course be designated ad hoc. The 
common factor that distinguishes the particular time “now” and the particular place 
“here” from the generic mass of times and places is the presence of a particular person 
“I” to identify them as such. Thus we could define “here” simply and completely as the 
place where “I” am “now,” and “now,” in turn, as the time when “I” am “here.” So, we 
cannot speak in terms of “now” and “here,” Craig points out, without implying “the 
reality of the transcendent ego, or self.”6 This ought to look familiar to us—Craig 
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acknowledges that his non-metrical present “is essentially Bergson’s doctrine of durée 
réelle.”7 Still, Craig distinguishes (though not always with perfect clarity) between saying 
that a given event occurs “now” and saying that it is present: “Hence, we should not 
speak of a mind-independent property of ‘nowness’ of temporal entities […] but rather, 
like McTaggart, of presentness. An event’s occurring now will depend on its relation to 
some sentient subject, but its being present will be mind-independent and objective.”8 We 
will learn more about what Craig means by this objective present, and about how he 
proposes to reconcile it with relativity, in the pages that follow. 
John R. Lucas, whose view of time closely resembles Craig’s, adds another basis 
for this view, one just as important for him as these philosophical considerations: that is, 
his belief that God’s existence has the character of personhood. For Lucas, personality, 
whether human or divine, requires flowing temporality: “Traditional theologians and 
modern Deists try to account for all God’s actions as the temporal consequences of a 
timeless decision. Apart from its inherent implausibility, such an account cannot 
accommodate God’s responding to the actions, and especially the petitions, of free human 
agents,” because if human wills are free then their thoughts and deeds are unforeseeable 
in detail.9 Thus Lucas, too, affirms that time in its deepest nature must be described by 
the A-theory. Lucas allows that a “deep theory of time” may account for time in terms of 
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something atemporal, but maintains that “[t]ime may be explained, but it cannot be 
explained away […] we could not accept as satisfactory an explanation that made out that 
au fond time was unreal. It would not save the phenomena […]”10 Craig, for his part, 
allows that it is metaphysically possible for a personality to be timeless, but asserts that 
God must experience temporality because God’s omniscience requires knowledge of 
tensed facts about the temporal universe.11 God is therefore not temporal by nature, but 
rather has freely put on temporality in order to create the universe and thereafter interact 
with it.12 Still, Craig considers God’s temporality to have been firmly established by 
argument, and uses compatibility with divine temporality as a metric for judging the 
adequacy of different theories of created time. 
For these reasons, then, Lucas defines eternity not as timelessness but rather as 
the name for God’s way of being temporal. He charges that Augustine’s vision of an 
eternity outside time is more appropriate to a Neoplatonic idea of God, an impersonal 
“Form of the Good” or “Ground of Being,” than to the personal, interacting God of the 
Abrahamic religions.13 Lucas also disputes Boethius’s account of eternity, which states 
that God is not in space or time, but rather that all of space and time is equally and 
simultaneously present to God.14 Instead Lucas highlights the distinction between spatial 
and temporal presence, and suggests that Boethius fails to recognize the import of this 
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distinction. Lucas supposes that all time is present to God not as a set of pointlike 
instants, as one might imagine space as being the sum of a set of points, but rather as an 
interval with duration, a period that could be divided into smaller parts but that is in 
practice united by an “I” to whom it makes up an extended present.15 Here again, just as 
with Craig, we see the influence of Bergson’s durée. Furthermore, if God’s existence is 
by its nature as temporal as our own, Lucas reasons that it cannot be the case that time is 
a created thing. He affirms that time arises out of God’s nature, but “prefer[s] to express 
the ontological dependence of time on God by saying that time stems from God rather 
than was created by God.”16 
In order to accommodate Abrahamic assumptions about God’s response to human 
beings, Lucas supposes that we must be able to speak of moments in this temporal 
eternity as contemporaneous with events in the created universe. Thus, although all of 
time is included in God’s extended present, “so that there is no time that is for Him in the 
remote past or the remote future,” it must also be the case that God’s time has an 
exclusive, instantaneous present that can coincide with instants of human time: 
If God heeded St Augustine’s prayers, He heard them and responded to them in St 
Augustine’s lifetime, centuries after He spoke with Moses in the burning bush, and 
centuries before he was moved by the prayers of John Wesley. […] God’s knowledge of 
the present and past is immediate and fresh, but not, in the case of the past, 
contemporaneous.17  
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Lucas acknowledges that classical theology does not look favorably upon 
ascribing such an exclusive present to God, and that some contemporary theologians 
appeal to special relativity in defense of a more traditional, atemporal eternity. However, 
Lucas sees two problems with these alternatives.18 First, on an astronomical scale, all 
human beings on Earth vary little from one another in terms of position and velocity, so 
that we all share much the same physical reference frame. Therefore the variation due to 
relativity among our respective definitions of the present moment is negligible, so that we 
face no real difficulty in establishing a “now” that would include the perspectives of 
everyone on the planet at a given time, and with which a divine present could also be 
supposed for the sake of argument to be simultaneous. Second, God’s infallible 
knowledge of the placement of events in time would necessarily establish some as truly 
simultaneous with one another, regardless of apparent variation due to special relativity. 
While it would seem that to posit such a universal reference frame would flatly contradict 
special relativity, Lucas argues otherwise. He claims that “Einstein’s principle of 
relativity is concerned only with electromagnetic phenomena [a category that includes 
light], and tells us that, so far as those phenomena are concerned, all inertial frames of 
reference are equivalent,” so that we need not be afraid to posit absolute simultaneity or 
preferred reference frames should we find it theologically helpful to do so.19 Besides, 
Lucas argues, even Newton allowed that no empirical means could distinguish between 
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absolute and relative motion. Absolute space and time are not physical concepts, but 
metaphysical ones, referring to the fundamental nature of things and not to our imperfect 
measurements of them. The proper tools for discussing the fundamental nature of space 
and time are philosophy and pure mathematics, and not the applied mathematics of 
physics.20  
Craig agrees with Lucas that affirming a traditional Abrahamic view of God 
leaves us no choice but to adopt a view of temporality in which God experiences time’s 
flow, and that such a God’s-eye-view of time requires an absolute frame of reference. 
Thus he takes up the task of exploring in detail the physical consequences of absolute, 
flowing time, and in particular of explicating Lucas’s assertion that it does not require us 
to abandon what modern physics tells us about time.21 In this he takes two physicists as 
his guides: Hendrik Lorentz, as we mentioned above, and Isaac Newton. Craig sets out 
the bases in Newton’s own writing for many of the conclusions that Lucas reaches about 
time and eternity. In particular, Craig cites Newton’s De gravitatione, which describes 
space as “as it were an emanent effect of God,” and thus neither a created substance itself 
nor an accident of another substance.22 Newton also places time in this same ontological 
category: “Space is a disposition of being qua being. […] And the same may be asserted 
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of duration […]”  In Newton’s view, this fundamental temporality that God experiences 
is specifically not an Augustinian nunc stans; indeed, Newton sees such a thing as “a 
contradiction in terms,” since it is “a moment wch always is & yet never was nor will 
be.”23 If God is to experience a moment called “now,” then that moment must move from 
future to present to past, just as moments do in human experience. Craig is careful to 
specify that, even for Newton, this divine moment is not an instance of physical time, but 
of the metaphysical time that underlies it. He suggests that, for Newton as for Bergson, 
metaphysical time is that against which all physical temporal processes are compared, 
that is, the real, underlying time that physical clocks of one kind or another may keep 
either more or less well,24 and to which our personal experience corresponds far more 
directly. Whereas metaphysical time is an uncreated consequence of God’s nature, 
physical time is indeed a created thing, just as Augustine says. This, incidentally, leads us 
to a point upon which Craig differs from Newton and Lucas: whereas Craig agrees that 
God’s nature involves a metaphysical, divine temporality, he disagrees that this implies a 
corresponding metaphysical, divine spatiality. As Kant observed, time applies to mental 
events as well as physical ones, but there is no obvious mental counterpart to physical 
space, so neither is there any need to assume a metaphysical space for a bodiless God to 
exist in.25  
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Craig holds that, since God interacts with the created universe, God’s absolute 
metaphysical time must necessarily have as a counterpart an absolute reference frame 
from which to perceive physical time.26  That requirement raises no problems for a 
Newtonian view of time, but it flies in the face of the traditional Einsteinian view of 
relativity. Having argued that Newton’s description of time is fundamentally correct, 
then, at least as it applies to the metaphysical time upon which physical time depends, 
Craig’s next task is to reconcile this Newtonian physical time with the special theory of 
relativity’s overwhelming success in describing physical time. He proposes to do this by 
distinguishing between the mathematical formalism of special relativity, whose 
effectiveness he does not dispute, and the philosophical interpretation that imputes 
physical meaning to the results of physicists’ calculations. As we saw in the last chapter, 
the dominant interpretation of the special theory of relativity has indeed changed over 
time: Minkowski’s geometric interpretation of relativity has displaced Einstein’s original 
conception of the theory. Craig borrows the terminology of Graham Nerlich in referring 
to these as the “spacetime interpretation” and the “relativity interpretation” of special 
relativity, respectively.27 These two interpretations also differ from one another with 
regard to their consequences for general relativity. Whereas the dominant spacetime 
interpretation construes gravity as a distortion in spacetime, as we described in the last 
chapter, Craig describes subscribers to the “relativity” interpretation as committed to the 
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idea that gravity really is a force in the usual sense rather than a curvature in spacetime. 
The spacetime interpretation, then, seems even less hospitable to the Newtonian time 
Craig prefers than the relativity interpretation. 
Still, between these two, Craig allows that the spacetime interpretation has greater 
consistency and explanatory power. For one thing, he suggests, the relativity 
interpretation implies a “fantastic fragmentation” of reality, since two observers may well 
disagree about the temporal status of a given event, and therefore (assuming presentism, 
as Craig does) about its very existence.28 Furthermore, according to the relativity 
interpretation, many of an object’s physical properties (its mass, dimensions, duration, 
and so on) are only relational, and no causal explanation exists for the changes that 
special relativity predicts moving observers will see in those properties. These changes 
include the celebrated “time dilation” and “length contraction” effects of special 
relativity: suppose that I am standing on Earth, and my friend’s spaceship is moving 
across my field of view at what I measure as a large fraction of the speed of light. Special 
relativity shows that, while the spaceship is moving in this way, any measurement I make 
of its length along its direction of travel will come out shorter than a measurement of that 
length taken while the ship is on its launch pad, at rest with respect to me. Similarly, 
while my friend’s ship is traveling at near the speed of light, I would perceive time as 
moving more slowly aboard it: from my point of view, the second hand of my friend’s 
watch would take more than a minute to make a complete revolution. While the relativity 
                                                          







interpretation supposes that there simply is no frame-independent matter of fact about 
how long my friend’s ship is or how fast her watch keeps time, the spacetime 
interpretation explains these apparent changes as consequences of my choice of 
coordinate systems. As Minkowski would have it, length contraction and time dilation 
arise from different observers’ different ways of fitting a four-dimensional spacetime 
separation, upon which everyone can agree, into their various three-dimensional 
sensoria.29  
However, in the end Craig also finds the spacetime interpretation untenable. 
Craig’s first objection involves the interpretation of mathematics. In Minkowskian 
language, we say that the spacetime separation between two events is “timelike” when 
those two events are situated in space and time in such a way that it would be possible for 
a signal sent from one event to affect the other. Two events have a “spacelike” 
separation, on the other hand, if a signal from one event would have to travel faster than 
light in order to reach the other. The mathematical formalism used to calculate spacetime 
separation is such that timelike separations take an imaginary value: that is, the value of 
any timelike separation is a multiple of the imaginary unit i, defined as the square root of 
negative one. Craig finds this suspicious: observable physical quantities are traditionally 
not supposed to be able to take imaginary values. It would simply be nonsense to say that 
I had 15i more kilometers to travel until I reached my destination, or that I was meeting 
my friend for lunch in 30i minutes. If we are willing to treat spacetime as merely an aid 
                                                          







to calculation, then we can shrug off imaginary separation values as a mathematical 
quirk. If we are committed to the proposition that the spacetime separations among events 
describe fundamental reality, though, and that our measurements of the spatial and 
temporal parts of those separations are only conditionally derived from that deeper 
reality, then we have no such recourse.30 Craig also objects that assuming spacetime is 
more fundamental than either space or time impels us to take a philosophical position 
called “perdurantism,” which construes objects as four-dimensional, extending across 
time in the same way that we typically view things as extending through space. To Craig 
this is an intolerable concession to the B-theory of time, suggesting as it does that past 
and future moments are always-already there to contain the temporal parts of the four-
dimensional objects that exist in them. Indeed, he claims, “commitment to an A-theory of 
time, and thus to the objectivity of tense and temporal becoming, is itself sufficient for 
the rejection of spacetime realism,”31 since spacetime ontology does not permit the 
existence of “a global, absolute separation of past and future,”32 the only mode of such a 
separation that Craig considers compatible with flowing time. 
Having rejected both the relativistic model of Einstein’s early writing and the 
spacetime model of Minkowski, Craig moves to describe the third model that he prefers 
to either of these, one that depends on the ideas of physicist Hendrik Lorentz. Unlike 
Einstein, Lorentz does not presume that relativity rules out absolute ideas of motion and 
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rest, but only that it reaffirms that the reference frame needed to establish them cannot be 
identified empirically, which even Newton admits. For Craig,  
A theory may be classified as Lorentzian just in case it affirms (i) the round trip vacuum  
propagation of light is isotropic [that is, the same in all directions] in a preferred 
(absolute) reference frame R0 [...] and independent of the velocity of the source, and (ii) 
lengths contract and time rates dilate in the customary special relativistic way only for 
systems in motion with respect to R0.33  
 
Lorentz’s original theory involves certain pre-quantum ideas about the behavior 
of electrons that are untenable in the light of present-day science, so Craig prefers to call 
his own interpretation of relativity “neo-Lorentzian,” because it abandons these ideas. By 
assuming the possibility of absolute motion, a neo-Lorentzian interpretation allows for 
absolute simultaneity, and thus a strict, simple set of rules for what events are 
simultaneous with one another that is not vulnerable to the arguments of Putman and 
Rietdijk. Under such an interpretation, to say that two events coexist is not simply to state 
that an inertial reference frame exists in which the two events are simultaneous. A 
coexistence that does not involve a mutual relationship, says Craig, is not worthy of the 
name.34 Furthermore, as we will see, Craig’s neo-Lorentzian interpretation establishes an 
absolute reference frame that can be identified as the one from which God perceives the 
physical universe, thus both lending credence to the flowing divine time that Craig 
considers necessary in order for God to interact with the Creation and properly 
privileging that time over all others. 
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Though a neo-Lorentzian interpretation proposes radical changes to orthodox, 
Minkowskian relativity theory, it should be emphasized that such an interpretation does 
not require any change to the physical formalism itself. All calculations may be 
performed in precisely the same way under neo-Lorentzian special relativity, and they 
should in theory render precisely the same numerical results—only the interpretation of 
those results is different. For instance, take the phenomena of length contraction and time 
dilation mentioned above. As we discussed, an orthodox, Minkowskian interpretation 
explains these phenomena by reference to differences in observers’ respective coordinate 
systems. While the spacetime separation between two events is invariant, inertial 
observers moving at different velocities with respect to these events will reckon the 
spatial and temporal components of that separation differently, requiring different 
measurements of length and duration. This account will not do in a neo-Lorentzian 
context that rejects Minkowski’s spacetime geometry. Instead, Craig cites physicist S. J. 
Prokhovnik’s explanation of length contraction and time dilation in a neo-Lorentzian 
framework.35 Prokhovnik suggests that these phenomena are at their root electromagnetic 
effects, caused by the anisotropy in the electric fields of charged particles moving with 
respect to the absolute inertial frame of reference. Only an object stationary with respect 
to the absolute frame is truly in electromagnetic equilibrium; once it begins to move with 
respect to that frame, the motion of its constituent particles causes their electric fields to 
compress in order to maintain their electric potentials. At sufficiently large velocities, this 
                                                          







can cause a macroscopic compression in the shape of the object as a whole, which we 
observe as length contraction.  
Likewise, if an object is at rest with respect to the absolute reference frame, then 
the ordinary, microscopic motions of its particles will take place along shorter routes than 
they will if the object is in motion. By way of illustration, imagine that two children are 
tossing a ball back and forth across the aisle of a school bus. When the bus is parked, the 
ball only travels the width of the aisle between being thrown and being caught. When the 
bus is moving, however, a person standing by the side of the road will note that during 
that same interval the ball travels not only across the aisle, but also down the road with 
the bus. Prokhovnik argues that what we call time dilation results from the fact that the 
particles that make up a moving object must travel greater distances to go about their 
business, slowing down all of the processes in which that object is engaged.36 Craig finds 
traditional Minkowskian explanations lacking when compared with Prokhovnik’s (or at 
least when compared with explanations of the kind Prokhovnik offers—he professes to be 
less interested in the details of Prokhovnik’s particular theory than in the fact that such a 
theory can be constructed at all). The latter, Craig says, “appeal to some sort of causal 
explanation for the physical effects” that Minkowski just takes to be a consequence of the 
universe’s geometric structure.37 Craig concedes that Minkowski’s spacetime geometry is 
a boon to physicists performing calculations, but he maintains that a mathematical tool’s 
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usefulness does not necessarily imply its truth. Minkowski spacetime “says absolutely 
nothing about ontology,” and so we cannot rely on it if we are seeking ontological 
explanations rather than mere mathematical results.38 
The longer we discuss neo-Lorentzian relativity, the clearer it becomes that its 
every detail depends on the existence of a fundamental, absolute frame of reference, by 
which we can determine which things are absolutely in motion and which are absolutely 
at rest. In an orthodox view of relativity, this is simply an impossible requirement. No 
such absolute frame can exist. Indeed, when popular histories of physics lay out the 
milestones on the road of relativity’s ascent, they consistently cite the Michelson-Morley 
experiment and its failure to detect the ether. The ether was assumed throughout the 18th 
and 19th centuries to be the universal medium through which light waves propagate, 
much as ocean waves propagate through water, and the reference frame of this universal 
medium was typically taken as absolute. However, a series of experiments, beginning 
with that of Albert Michelson and Edward Morley in 1887, found no evidence that the 
ether exists in the first place, and early champions of special relativity took this as 
powerful circumstantial evidence that all motion was indeed relative. Still, Craig believes 
that subsequent developments in astrophysics and cosmology have reopened the door to 
an absolute reference frame, in the guise of the concept of “cosmic time.” 
The root of cosmic time is the insight that the shape of the universe is not static. 
Craig notes that early general relativistic models of the universe were already 
                                                          







contemplating this possibility on a purely theoretical basis. Gravity pulls massive objects 
together, and it pulls more strongly the closer together these objects get. Given time and 
free rein, it would eventually concentrate all of the mass of the universe into one spot. 
This is obviously not the distribution of matter that we in fact observe. So, to explain the 
fact that matter is actually spread out as far as we can see, and presuming that it must 
always have been spread out in this way, in 1917 Einstein proposed a “cosmological 
constant” which would weakly counteract the effects of gravity. This constant would be 
too small to make much difference to objects on the scale of stars and planets, but it 
would suffice to counterbalance the relatively tiny attraction that acts on the scale of the 
universe’s overall structure. Other physicists quickly noticed that the mathematical 
formalism that describes this gravity-plus-cosmological-constant model of the universe 
effectively restores a Newtonian-style distinction between space and time on a cosmic 
scale.39  
Soon after Einstein made his proposal, physicist Willem de Sitter constructed a 
mathematical model showing that a universe that possessed a cosmological constant but 
effectively no matter would actually expand over time. Over the decades that followed, 
physicists further refined their cosmological models, gradually arriving at a picture of the 
universe (typically called the “Friedmann-Robertson-Walker metric,” or “FRW metric” 
for short) that is basically homogeneous in its distribution of matter and energy, that 
appears more or less the same in every direction one cares to look, and that is expanding 
                                                          







over time. These properties allow us to imagine “fundamental observers,” defining 
reference frames that are at rest with respect to the overall substrate of matter in a 
particular neighborhood of the universe. An observer in such a reference frame would be 
moving with the expansion of the universe, but could neglect both the motions and the 
gravitational influences of the individual bits of matter within it—from specks of 
interstellar dust up to clusters of galaxies—as just so much random noise. As with 
Einstein’s original steady-state model of the universe, a fundamental observer would find 
that the mathematical expressions defining time and space would separate neatly from 
one another. The result would not be the block of spacetime that Minkowski envisioned, 
with spatial and temporal components inextricably entangled with one another, but rather 
something more like a stack of frames from a movie.40 In this stack, which we call a 
“spacetime foliation,” there is a single, readily identifiable time axis, and it is clear what 
events are simultaneous with one another (that is, which ones are in the same movie 
frame). What is more, all fundamental observers will in principle agree about what time it 
is, so that a universal “cosmic time” can be identified. With absolute simultaneity 
restored and past, present, and future once again clearly distinguishable, this view of time 
lends itself to the A theory quite as well as the Newtonian one does.  
As Craig notes, from the point of view of the theoretical physicist, a hitch arises 
here: if we start from the mathematics of the FRW metric alone, we can define any 
                                                          







number of cosmic time functions.41 We begin not with a stack of pre-defined movie 
frames, but with a solid block of celluloid, and what we call a frame will depend on how 
we slice that block. We cannot identify a single, true cosmic time a priori. However, the 
theorist does not have the last word. As it happens, astronomers’ observations of the 
universe allow us to prune this list of potential cosmic time functions considerably by 
checking which functions fit the empirical data. We need only consider functions that 
show a homogeneous universe expanding isotropically, with an overall shape that is 
nearly flat, and in which about 13.8 billion years have passed since the Big Bang. In 
practice, only one cosmic time parameter will fit the facts, and align with the history of 
the universe that our measurements indicate to us.   
The word “history” is significant here. Craig’s extended analogy comparing 
spacetime foliations to a stack of cels for an animated film is revealing: for him, the 
correct perspective on universal time reveals not just cosmic evolution, but cosmic 
history, in the same way that one temporal ordering of the frames of a movie reflects the 
story the director wanted to tell. Thus the changes by which the universe has arrived at its 
present structure make up a narrative and not merely a process, and so a proper 
description of those changes will show not just factual truth, but also meaning. With 
cosmic time, we have arrived at the God’s-eye-view of time that Craig considers 
necessary, and so it is only natural that, from this absolute reference frame, the unfolding 
of the universe should reflect God’s creative purpose.  
                                                          







It is worth repeating that Craig maintains that physical time must not be confused 
with the metaphysical time that it attempts to describe. Thus the cosmic physical time of 
the FRW metric only reflects divine, metaphysical temporality, and is not identical with 
it. Craig holds that, “since the inception of the universe and the beginning of physical 
time, this cosmic time plausibly coincides with God’s metaphysical time, that is, with 
Newton’s absolute time. It therefore provides the correct measure of God’s time and thus 
registers the true time, in contrast to the multiplicity of local times registered by clocks in 
motion relative to the cosmological substratum.”42 So, we can associate every moment of 
cosmic time with a corresponding moment of God’s time, but we cannot naively assume 
that every property of God’s time will also be a property of cosmic time and vice versa.43  
If, as Craig argues, the neo-Lorentzian interpretation of relativity fits the scientific 
facts as well as the Einsteinian one does, then it is natural to ask why Einstein’s 
interpretation is so much more popular among physicists and philosophers of science. 
Craig proposes an answer for this question, too. We have seen that many exponents of the 
B theory of time espouse a positivistic model of knowledge, and fault A theorists for 
basing their arguments on subjective experience rather than on impersonal, 
intersubjective measurement. Positivist B-theorists thus reject on principle any distinction 
between time as measured by physics and time as it really is. Craig suggests that the 
dominance of positivism among the physicists of the early 20th century, and particularly 
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positivism’s influence on Einstein himself, accounts for Lorentz’s failure to gain a 
foothold, and more generally for the unfashionableness of a Newtonian-style affirmation 
of metaphysical time. This is ironic, given the highly philosophical and even 
metaphysical character that many debates in fundamental physics have taken on since the 
mid-20th century, as physicists’ mathematical toolsets have given birth to grand 
hypotheses beyond the power of present-day technology to test, not to mention the 
considerable decline in positivism’s fortunes among philosophers. 
Craig describes in particular detail the influence of physicist and positivist 
philosopher Ernst Mach over Einstein’s thought.44 Mach called Newton’s concepts of 
absolute time and space “blunders” and “conceptual monstrosities” that “cannot be 
produced in experience.”45  Though Einstein moved toward critical realism later in life, 
as he worked on general relativity, special relativity is formulated in a solidly positivist 
intellectual milieu.46 As Craig puts it,  
There is perhaps a natural tendency to regard time dilation and length contraction, not as  
facts about time and space themselves, but merely about our measurements of time and 
space, and thus many writers feel constrained to emphasize to their readers that these 
phenomena are not just appearances, but real. But what such authors often fail to explain 
is that the reason that they are real and not merely apparent is because in Einstein’s 
theory time and space are defined in terms of the measurements themselves. The 
measurements are the reality; there is no metaphysical or privileged time or space lurking 
behind the measurements. Hence, an object has no length other than its relativistic length; 
an event occurs at no time other than relativistic time. That is why the phenomena are not 
merely appearances due to measurements; reality has been re-defined to be what the 
measurements say.47 
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Craig charges further that positivists betrayed their own principles by preferring 
Einstein’s theory over Lorentz’s, when, given that the two theories give identical 
empirical results, a good positivist ought to regard them as indistinguishable. “If we take 
a positivistic line, then we cannot say that [Einstein-Minkowski special relativity] is 
incompatible with an A-Theory of time, since it is equivalent to Lorentz’s theory. Only 
by recognizing the metaphysical differences between the two theories can we say that 
[special relativity] constitutes even prima facie support for a B-Theory of time.”48 Since 
Einstein, says Craig, the philosophy of space and time has been and continues to be a 
subfield particularly given to logical positivist assumptions, including the insistence on 
criteria of verifiability, anti-realist/conventionalist assumptions about simultaneity and 
spacetime geometry, and a “reduction of spatiotemporal relations to causal relations.” 
Given that logical positivism is in full retreat in other philosophical domains, says Craig, 
it is odd that these assumptions stand, and it is especially desirable that they be 
challenged. Indeed, “It is only by a positivistic collapse of ontological time into measured 
time that absolute simultaneity is called into question” in the first place.49 Embracing a 
neo-Lorentzian theory of time will thus not only serve physicists’ requirements just as 
well as the dominant model, but will also free us from outdated philosophical 
assumptions about what is real. 
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Knowing the Future: Religious Implications of the Neo-Lorentzian Theory of Time 
Now that we have described Craig’s theory of physical time in some detail, let us 
further examine its theological consequences. We will begin by restating what we have 
already discussed: Craig considers God to have been atemporal by nature, but to have 
taken on temporality in order to interact with the time-bound created universe. Craig also 
insists that the only workable theory of flowing temporality is presentism, in which only 
the present moment exists. In a neo-Lorentzian framework, this true present moment is 
universal, the same throughout space, and it is at its root a metaphysical phenomenon, 
which physics measures but does not fully capture. In fact, Craig holds that each present 
moment as created beings experience it corresponds on a one-to-one basis to a moment in 
God’s temporal life.   
For all that Craig breaks with the mainstream of Christian tradition by arguing 
that God’s life is temporal, he is committed in every other important respect to a fairly 
conservative Protestant view of God’s nature and God’s salvific plan, as rooted in a 
traditional Protestant interpretation of the Bible. For example, Craig rejects the B-
theoretic account of time in part because he finds it incompatible with the doctrine of 
creatio ex nihilo, arguing that, despite John Polkinghorne’s arguments, it is not enough to 
say that “God created the universe” means only “the universe is ontologically dependent 
on God,” because the creation stories in the Book of Genesis assume a temporal 
beginning of the universe.50 He also holds that the B-theory vitiates the idea of God’s 
                                                          







ultimate triumph over sin and evil, which in a B-theoretic view would continue to exist 
timelessly, no matter what eschatological fulfillment might eventually take place.  
One of the points of traditional Christian belief that Craig defends is that God is 
omniscient. Craig considers that, in order to be faithful to Biblical descriptions of God, 
we must include knowledge of future events within omniscience, even though Craig’s 
presentist convictions imply that future times do not yet exist: 
Thus, in the New Testament as well as the Old, God is conceived as knowing not only all  
present and past events, but all future events as well. This foreknowledge would seem to  
extend to future free acts, events which could not possibly be inferred from present 
causes and which in any case are not so represented by the biblical authors. We have seen 
examples throughout Scripture of God’s foreknowledge of such events, including even 
the thoughts that individuals shall have. It does not, therefore, seem possible to deny that 
the biblical conception of God’s omniscience includes foreknowledge of future free 
acts.51 
 
Craig is keenly aware of the tension between his characterization of God’s omniscience, 
on the one hand, and his presentism and his commitment to human freedom of action, on 
the other. He is arguing both that God knows future events in perfect detail and that those 
events do not exist before they happen, and likewise both that God knows precisely what 
we will do before we do it and that we decide freely what to do. Tracing the steps by 
which Craig seeks to reconcile these apparently conflicting stances will reveal much 
about his theory of time, and about its shortcomings.  
Though he holds that future events do not exist prior to their coming about, Craig 
maintains that statements about such future events still possess a truth value. The key 
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point is that such statements are tensed: while a statement about what is now true can 
only be made about what now exists, statements about what will be true can be made 
about events that will exist, even if they do not now exist. As Craig puts it, “In order for 
[a] future tense statement to be true, all that is required is that when the moment 
described arrives, the present-tense version of the statement will be true […] That the 
concept of truth as correspondence requires that the things or events described by the 
statement must exist at the time the statement is true is a complete misunderstanding.”52 
Craig protests that, if we deny this, saying instead that statements about nonexistent 
future events have no truth value, absurdities result.  He cites as his example the 
(paraphrased) statement “Candidate C either will or will not win the next presidential 
election.”53 Since this is a statement about the future, Craig supposes that it should have 
the same status with respect to truth value as the statement “There will be a sea battle 
tomorrow.” Now, it is certainly the case that Craig’s statement about the next election is 
true as constructed, and that to deny this would lead to absurdities. However, the 
equivalence that Craig draws between the statement about the election and the statement 
about the sea battle is a false one. The truth of Craig’s example statement follows directly 
from the law of the excluded middle and the definition of the word “election,” and thus it 
is tensed only in form. It could be restated in a tenseless form without any loss of 
information, because it is necessarily true that a given candidate must either win or not 
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win a given election, no matter when or indeed whether that election takes place. There is 
no reason to suppose that the present existence or non-existence of future events should 
bear on the truth of logical necessities.  
Craig’s other arguments that presentism is compatible with knowledge of the 
future fare little better.  For one, he suggests that statements about future events rely on 
the same truthmakers as statements about present and past facts: for example, if it rained 
on Tuesday, the statement “it will rain tomorrow” made on Monday is rendered true by 
the same facts as the statements “it is raining today” made on Tuesday and “it rained 
yesterday” made on Wednesday. “If ‘it is raining today’ is now true,” asks Craig, “how 
could ‘it will rain tomorrow’ not have been true yesterday?”54 This bears some 
uncomfortable similarities with the argument the B-theorist D. H. Mellor advances that 
superficially tensed statements depend on tenseless truthmakers,55 which we examined in 
Chapter 1. If it is already true today that some event E will happen in a particular way 
tomorrow, and if furthermore the statements “E will happen in this way tomorrow” and 
“E is happening in this way now” are true at the same time, in the same way, and for the 
same reason, then in what meaningful sense can we say that the future E does not yet 
exist? Surely it would be more accurate simply to say that we are now ignorant of E than 
that E is not already an established fact. Craig’s third argument that presentism cannot 
forbid knowledge of future events supposes that, if the non-existence of future events 
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denies a truth value to statements about the future, then the non-existence of past events 
must also deny a truth value to statements of past events, which is clearly absurd.56 This 
point, however, relies upon a strictly presentist ontology, in which existence is a strictly 
binary proposition, and collapses the moment we allow for a difference between the no-
longer-existing of the past and the not-yet-existing of the future. Thus it works at least as 
well as an argument against presentism as it does as an argument that God can know facts 
about nonexistent events.  
Even if we follow Craig in assuming that God can foreknow the future in a 
presentist universe, however, the task of harmonizing Craig’s theory of divine knowledge 
with human freedom still remains. Defending the possibility of human freedom is, after 
all, one of the reasons Craig embraces the A-theory in the first place. He begins by 
identifying one potential solution that he considers unacceptable—one that J. R. Lucas, 
Craig’s colleague in neo-Lorentzianism, embraces. Lucas suggests that God does not 
really possess foreknowledge in the strict sense of the actions that human beings freely 
choose to perform. If human wills are free, says Lucas, then human thoughts and deeds 
are unforeseeable in detail: “the actual decisions of particular individuals are not there to 
be known, unless and until they are actually taken.”57 So, for Lucas, when Biblical 
authors ascribe to God statements about what people will do, then these statements ought 
to be understood as God defeasibly predicting what people will do based on God’s 
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perfect knowledge of their character, just as you or I might be able to predict the actions 
of a close friend or family member. For Craig, however, this will not do. Craig appears to 
consider attributing any lack of knowledge to God as a species of lèse majesté, and 
indeed suggests that “explain[ing] biblical prophecies as mere inferences from present 
states of affairs denudes them of any theological significance.”58  
Instead, Craig champions a version of “middle knowledge,” a concept pioneered 
by Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina in the sixteenth century. Before we can discuss 
middle knowledge in detail, however, we must say a word about Craig’s conception of 
divine knowledge, and of how it differs from human knowledge. Whereas human minds 
acquire knowledge of the world by looking out and perceiving what is there, or by 
drawing inferences from what we perceive, Craig believes that God inherently knows all 
true propositions by the very nature of divine cognition: “As an omniscient being, God 
has essentially the property of knowing all truths; there are truths about future events; 
ergo, God knows all truths concerning future events.”59 Unlike the perceptual and 
inferential knowledge to which human beings have access, conceptualist divine 
knowledge of this kind does not have a causal relationship with what is known. An action 
that I perform, for example, does not cause God’s foreknowledge of that action. Rather, 
the action simply entails God’s foreknowledge: “For God’s knowledge, though 
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chronologically prior to the action, is logically posterior to the action and determined by 
it.”60 
Within this general framework, Craig identifies three “logical moments” in God’s 
knowledge. The first, “natural knowledge,” includes God’s knowledge of all necessary 
truths, which are true by virtue of God’s nature rather than by virtue of any exercise of 
divine will. Craig includes under this heading God’s knowledge of every possible action 
that God could take, such as “all the possible individuals he could create, all the possible 
circumstances he could place them in, all their possible actions and reactions, and all the 
possible worlds or orders which he could create.”61 Because this knowledge depends only 
on God’s nature, it is essential to God. The third logical moment is “free knowledge,” 
God’s knowledge of the particularities of the actual created world. This knowledge does 
depend on free acts of divine will, hence the name, and so God “has control over which 
statements are true and which are false in this [logical stage]. […] For example, if God 
had created a world in which George Washington never existed, then all the true 
statements about things [Washington] did would be false.”62 Craig says that God must 
necessarily have this kind of knowledge considered as a class, but that God’s knowledge 
of any particular fact about the created universe is contingent, just as the fact itself is. In 
between these two is “middle knowledge.” Craig defines this as God’s knowledge of 
“what every possible creature would do (not just could do) in any possible set of 
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circumstances.”63 Furthermore, “God’s middle knowledge is like his natural knowledge 
in that it is logically prior to his decision to create a world. Indeed, God’s decision to 
create a world is based on his middle knowledge and consists in his selecting to become 
actual one of the possible worlds known to him [by means of this middle knowledge].” 
So, God innately knows how the history of any possible world would play out, and so, by 
choosing which possible world to create, knows how each event in history (free acts 
included) will in fact take place. Craig uses this same argument to explain providence: 
God chooses a world to create in such a way that all events play out so that God’s plan 
will be fulfilled. Craig attributes a great deal of specificity to the divine plan for history: 
he cites the passage of the Lend-Lease Act of 1941 as an example of an outcome that 
God specifically engineered.64 
Craig’s argument that God’s knowledge does not compromise human freedom 
depends upon the logic of possibility. Craig agrees that it is clearly true that, if God 
foreknows an event, then that event will occur according to God’s foreknowledge. 
However, says Craig, this does not imply that the event will necessarily occur in this way.  
Now since God foreknows that Jones will mow his lawn [on a given date], we know that 
Jones will in fact mow the lawn rather than go golfing. But it does not follow that Jones 
must mow the lawn or that he lacks the power to go golfing. He can go golfing, but he 
merely will not. If he were to go golfing, then God would have foreknown that instead.65 
 
In other words, even if it can be known with perfect certainty what a given person will do 
in a given situation at a given time, we can still judge that person’s actions to be free, 
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because it is not logically impossible for them to act otherwise. From this point of view, 
God’s knowledge of the future is much like human knowledge of the past. I may know 
that my friend did something on a particular occasion, and that knowledge may reflect the 
way things really did happen, but it does not follow from this that my friend was not free 
to act as she liked. If she had chosen to act differently, then my knowledge of her actions 
would reflect that difference. This has much in common with a classically compatibilist 
view of free will, in which it is the lack of external constraint that makes for freedom, 
rather than the live possibility of making different choices. The major difference between 
Craig’s view and the compatibilism of Hobbes or Hume is that Craig is not a determinist: 
for Craig, even though all of my choices tomorrow may already be faits accomplis in 
God’s reference frame of perfect knowledge, there is at least no causal chain of events 
that leads me ineluctably to make those choices.  
 At least, that is how Craig represents his own position. The implications of his 
theory of divine cognition, however, point in a somewhat different direction. Our 
knowledge of others’ past actions depends on memory, of course. God’s knowledge of 
people’s future actions, argues Craig, depends on middle knowledge. According to 
Craig’s definition of that term, this means not only that God knows how everyone would 
act in any possible circumstance, but that God has specifically chosen to create the 
universe such that we would act in those ways. It is one thing for Craig to say that all 
statements about what will happen have a truth value, but it is quite another to say that all 







particular set of circumstances, a given person would respond in one and only one way, 
then could we really describe that person’s actions as free? Under the system of divine 
middle knowledge that Craig describes, a human personality resembles a tremendously 
complex if/then decision tree, with the outcomes at each fork determined by a series of 
choices that God has made in the process of creating the universe. Even if we grant 
Craig’s argument that God’s foreknowledge of our future actions does not cause those 
actions, we are left with the conclusion that, in order for God’s middle knowledge to be 
as complete as Craig requires, God’s creative activity must cause our actions in every 
detail. According to Craig, I do A at t because God has created me to be the sort of person 
who would do A under the circumstances that obtain at t. God’s act of creation thus has 
priority in determining God’s knowledge of my actions, not the actions themselves. Craig 
has denied physical determinism only to embrace occasionalism. For those interested in 
making intellectual space for human freedom of action, this is not much of an 
improvement.  
An occasionalist position also opens the door to intractable problems of theodicy. 
Craig describes God as ordaining good acts but only permitting evil ones,66 but it is 
difficult to see how these two modes of divine action differ beyond the mere stipulation 
that they do, given that Craig imagines God as planning out even the fine details of 
history. Even Craig himself presumes that the divine plan also makes use of evil acts in 
                                                          







order to fulfill God’s purposes.67 Craig confidently proclaims that God’s benevolence 
must mean that we are living in the best possible world,68 but only those who were never 
interested in theodicy in the first place are likely to be convinced by this Panglossian 
reassurance.  
Not all neo-Lorentzian theories need fall into these philosophical traps. As we 
have seen, Lucas, unlike Craig, is not committed to presentism,69 and is perfectly willing 
to consider that God’s knowledge of the future may be conditional or incomplete.70 
However, the neo-Lorentzian program also faces a more fundamental difficulty. Craig 
claims that the his slightly modified Lorentzian interpretation of relativity has at least as 
much explanatory power as an Einsteinian-Minkowskian one. Yuri Balashov and Michel 
Janssen throw considerable doubt on that claim. To recapitulate, both interpretations 
agree on the mathematical formalism of relativity, notably including what are called the 
Lorentz transformations: the mathematical expressions used to convert a measurement of 
space or time made in one reference frame to the equivalent measurement made from 
another reference frame in unaccelerated motion with respect to the first. So, for example, 
if I time two events as happening an hour apart, and I want to know how much time 
separates them from the point of view of my friend in her spaceship, I simply plug my 
measurements and my friend’s constant velocity with respect to me into the Lorentz 
transformations, and I have my answer. Craig’s interpretation supposes that the form of 
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these transformations arises from the physics of electromagnetic waves. This is 
reasonable enough when one is dealing with the motion of light, as is often the case in 
relativistic contexts, but in fact all kinds of moving objects obey these same 
transformation laws, which under neo-Lorentzianism is only an “unexplained 
coincidence.”71 For Minkowski and Einstein, however, the structure of the Lorentz 
transformations is a consequence of the structure of space and time itself, so it is only 
natural that they should apply to all kinds of objects. The same argument applies to 
Craig’s complaints that a Einsteinian-Minkowskian relativity fails to give full 
explanations for length contraction and time dilation: these phenomena arise from 
considerations of geometry, and are no more in need of further explanation than the way 
in which receding objects appear to shrink due to the effects of perspective.72 Even if 
Einstein’s arguments were inspired in part by a positivism that is no longer tenable, as 
Craig charges, the conventional Einstein-Minkowski interpretation does after all have 
more explanatory power than the neo-Lorentzian interpretation. Moreover, though Craig 
asserts that his interpretation is independent of Prokhovnik’s explanation for length 
contraction and time dilation, it must at any rate have some physical explanation for these 
effects: in physics, unlike philosophy, demonstrating that a conceivable solution exists 
does not suffice. These factors constitute sufficient reason for physicists to hold on to the 
Einstein-Minkowski interpretation, whatever opinion they may hold about positivism. 
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 John R. Lucas and William Lane Craig marshal arguments of great physical and 
philosophical sophistication in favor of a new interpretation of relativity that allows for 
flowing, A-theoretic time, and with it the possibility of human free will and all the 
theological structures that rely on such freedom. This interpretation is compatible with 
the facts of physics as we observe them, and, for all its unorthodoxy, it is coherent on its 
own terms. It does, however, require its adherents to shrug off as a tremendous 
coincidence (or at least a major unsolved problem) a fact that the orthodox interpretation 
of relativity explains perfectly well. Given the centrality of tense to our experience of 
time, and the importance of free will to many of our religious beliefs, we might be 
inclined to make that trade if it were the only one on offer. However, an alternative exists 
that allows for flowing time within the bounds of orthodox relativity theory. In the 
bargain, this theory avoids some of the problems that Craig makes for himself with his 
embrace of presentism, and it offers some intriguing philosophical side benefits. The next 



















“The Still Point(s) of the Turning World”: 
The Relativized Present and the Observer-Centered Theory of Time 
 
 The second method of reconciling flowing time with relativity that we will 
examine is in a sense the older one—philosophers began to propose variants of it within 
Einstein’s lifetime. However, while the general thrust of the theory is nearly a century 
old, its particulars have changed markedly over the decades. Its exponents begin from the 
presumption that Einstein and those who followed him are fundamentally correct about 
the nature of physical time, and, incidentally, that presentists like Craig are not correct: it 
is not the case that times other than the present have no existence. From there, rather than 
trying to recover the universal present of classical physics, the partisans of this second 
method lean into the special relativistic idea that time varies from one observer to 
another, and propose instead that each observer has their own temporal flow. Unlike the 
B-theorists whose thought we examined in earlier chapters, the supporters of this 
relativized A-theory do not reason that, since time’s flow is inextricably bound to 
individual perception, it must be an illusion. Instead, seeing that first-person perception is 
deeply linked to such a fundamental phenomenon as time, they take this apparent fact as 
evidence that we ought to make mind and personhood part of our account of the 
fundamental nature of existence. Needless to say, this idea has profound consequences 
for religion.   







interpretation of relativity: one proposed by Henri Bergson, one proposed by Alfred 
North Whitehead, and a third espoused by Howard Stein and Robert John Russell. 
Bergson’s and Whitehead’s proposals, as important as they are for the development of the 
ideas involved, bear certain concrete implications for physics that turn out to be false. For 
this reason, we will examine these two philosophies of time, and in particular the way 
they both point toward a personalistic view of existence, but we will not explore in detail 
the links between these philosophies and Bergson’s and Whitehead’s respective ideas 
about the nature of divinity, which would in any case require far more space than one 
chapter can provide. Instead, we will focus on the religious dimensions of the 
Stein/Russell model, as Russell establishes strong links between his philosophy of time 
and the theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg. 
 
Establishing a Position: Bergson’s Relativized Present 
 One early attempt to accommodate flowing time within a relativistic context 
comes from Henri Bergson himself. Bergson defends his concept of durée, the personal, 
non-mathematical time more fundamental than the time of physics, by responding 
directly to the relativistic arguments for the B-theory that were already being made 
during his lifetime. Indeed, so far from considering Einstein’s new conception of physical 
time a threat to his ideas about duration, Bergson contends that his philosophy 
accommodates Einsteinian time just as well as Newtonian time. The first pillar of 







physics, motion can only be reckoned from the point of view of a particular observer, and 
so any picture of the way things are is relative to the observer’s frame of reference. The 
second pillar is Bergson’s belief that time as such cannot be understood without reference 
to a conscious observer to correlate events. As we have seen, Bergson posits that time in 
its deepest nature involves duration and succession1, and that the ostensibly impersonal 
measurements that we take of time in scientific contexts lack these crucial felt qualities, 
because we can only measure time by projecting it onto an imaginary space.  
Taken together, these two pillars support Bergson’s argument that we err when 
we try naively to reconcile the contradictory measurements that observers in different 
reference frames make of the same phenomena. So, Alice, on a spaceship moving away 
from the Earth at near the speed of light, and Bob, at rest with respect to the Earth, may 
make different estimates of the length of some object, or of the duration of some 
phenomenon, or of which of a set of events are simultaneous with one another. This by 
itself poses no problems for Bergson’s interpretation of relativity: according to him, Alice 
and Bob are each entitled to consider themselves at rest and the other as moving, and thus 
to assume that their own measurements are the correct and undistorted ones. Thanks to 
Einstein and Lorentz, each of our two observers is even able to calculate how relativistic 
effects would cause the other to measure a given phenomenon. However, Bergson 
cautions, the instant Alice ceases to look at events from her own point of view, she runs 
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into problems. If she uses the mathematical frameworks that physicists have provided to 
compare the measurements she makes in her reference frame, assumed by definition to be 
motionless, with the ones Bob would make in his reference frame, moving with respect to 
her own, in so doing she steps outside of her own lived experience. Instead, she enters an 
imagined time and space in which she can see through both her own eyes and through 
Bob’s at the same moment: that is to say, a time and space which no real observer could 
possibly inhabit. Bob thus becomes for Alice’s purposes a mere “puppet”2 of Alice’s own 
mind, rather than the independent observer with a viewpoint of his own that he truly is, 
and that he must be acknowledged to be in any ontology adequate to the purpose. 
According to Bob’s independent viewpoint, says Bergson, Bob must necessarily be at rest 
himself.3 Alice cannot compare her own perceptions with those of the real Bob, as 
distinct from the imaginary, calculated one, without treating both him and herself as 
motionless, which their respective situations on the Earth and aboard the ship do not 
permit.  
This leads Bergson to distinguish between simultaneity proper, which is 
“intuitive” or “innate simultaneity,” and simultaneity as mathematical physics considers 
it, or “learned simultaneity.”4 The distinction depends entirely on the way events in these 
two categories are perceived by a conscious observer. In order for two events truly to be 
simultaneous, a particular and concrete person, and not merely a hypothetical observer, 
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must grasp them as part of the same sensation, “in one and the same mental act.”5 It is not 
enough for such an apprehension merely to be possible in theory. From Bergson’s point 
of view, then, the simultaneity relations upon which an argument like Putnam’s depends 
are questionable at best. It will not do to declare that events are either simultaneous or not 
based only on calculation. In Bergson’s words: 
the universe of Einstein is no more than a collection of relations. The invariant 
elements that are taken as constitutive of reality are [mathematical] expressions 
into which parameters, which are all that one requires, are introduced, which no 
more represent time or space than they do anything else. This is because it is the 
relation between them that exists alone in the eyes of science, because there is no 
more time or space than there are things, when the universe is without form. To 
restore things, and consequently time and space (as one is obliged to do every 
time it is necessary to understand a physically determined event, perceived in 
points determined spatially and temporally), one needs to return to the world a 
form; but this entails choosing a point of view, adopting a system of reference. 
The system chosen becomes, by this world form, the central system.6 
 
The way physics reckons simultaneity is thus useful only for the post hoc 
purposes of physical time—true simultaneity is a phenomenon of durée. So, for Bergson, 
the whole apparatus of shifting points of view involved in our earlier discussion of the 
relativity of simultaneity expresses an important truth: the laws of physics are the same in 
every reference frame, and cannot be neglected if we are to predict the behavior of 
objects moving at or near the speed of light. Nonetheless, this abstract system is not to be 
confused with the deeper reality, which is irreducibly personal. No single person could 
exist in all of the relevant reference frames to compare them, and without such a 
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comparison of lived experience, the reference frames of which physics speaks have 
nothing to do with durée: “What, indeed, is a real time, if not a time lived or able to be 
lived? What is an unreal, auxiliary, imaginary time if not one that cannot actually be lived 
by anything or anyone?”7 Bergson is essentially arguing that a frame of reference in the 
physical sense must correspond with a human point of view in order to be valid. 
Since it is only by such comparisons across reference frames that we can conclude 
that the speed of light is invariant in all frames and in all durations, Bergson reasons that 
we need not export this assumption of invariance from physics, where it is frequently 
useful for the purposes of calculation, to philosophy, where it can be misleading when we 
are trying to determine the true nature of things. Moreover, since any observer will 
clearly distinguish between space and time as regards their own perceptions, Bergson 
concludes that relativity’s celebrated combination of space with time is likewise only a 
useful tool for calculation, with no ontological significance. Space and time as they truly 
are in themselves are “separate from one another, incapable of mingling,”8 and physicists 
can treat them as intertwined only by placing themselves in imaginary situations divorced 
from their own direct experience. The overall picture of time and space that results is not, 
for ontological purposes, radically different from the classical one. Bergson even 
tentatively suggests that, if it were possible to sum over the direct experiences of all 
concrete observers, we would arrive at a single “time common to all things.”9 The 
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apparent differences among observers regarding the size of objects and the duration and 
simultaneity of events could thus ideally be resolved, even if such a resolution remains 
out of reach for practical purposes. To use one of Bergson’s favorite analogies for 
differences in measurement due to relativistic physics,10 if you and I are standing two city 
blocks away from one another, then, due to the effects of perspective, from your point of 
view I will appear to be insect-sized, and you will seem similarly tiny from my point of 
view. However, neither of us will consider this difference in perspectives to amount to a 
real disagreement about the sizes of things, and we will agree that we both have real 
heights that are of the same order of magnitude.  
The core point to which Bergson returns again and again is that all motion is 
relative, so that all observers have equal and inalienable rights to consider themselves to 
be at rest and other objects to be moving with respect to them. This claim lies at the very 
heart of Bergson’s proposed philosophical interpretation of relativity. Indeed, Bergson 
assumes that observers cannot really take themselves as moving. To establish a real (as 
opposed to an imaginary) frame of reference is to hold that frame still: “One cannot move 
with respect to oneself; and consequently, the physicist-builder of Science, is motionless 
by definition, once the theory of relativity is accepted.”11 Bergson explicitly includes both 
accelerated and unaccelerated motion within this framework.12 So, just as a traveler 
moving at a constant speed with respect to some object has the right under relativity to 
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consider herself stationary, and to reckon that the object is instead moving toward her, 
Bergson assumes that a traveler accelerating toward some object may also take herself to 
be stationary, and to attribute the acceleration to the object. In effect, each observer exists 
immovably at the center of their own universe. 
When Bergson began his dialogue with relativistic physics early in the 20th 
century, the contention that absolutely all motion was relative enjoyed the support of 
eminent physicists. For example, in chapter 2, we briefly discussed the “principle of 
equivalence,” one of the foundational ideas of the theory of general relativity. According 
to this principle, if we find ourselves in a windowless room in which dropped objects 
accelerate uniformly toward the floor, we cannot tell whether those objects are falling 
because the room exists in a homogeneous gravitational field or because the room itself is 
accelerating uniformly upward. Einstein first formulated this principle as part of an effort 
to establish that accelerated motion is as relative as unaccelerated motion, following the 
lead of physicist and positivist philosopher Ernst Mach.13 So, when Bergson published 
Duration and Simultaneity, his response to Einstein, in 1922, his assumptions about the 
relativity of accelerated reference frames arguably agreed with the best contemporary 
physics. However, as Einstein refined his general theory of relativity over the following 
decades, he found this straightforward idea that accelerated frames of reference are as 
interchangeable as inertial ones increasingly difficult to maintain, as it gradually became 
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clear that the equivalence between gravity and inertia breaks down when we consider 
regions of space of macroscopic size. Einstein continued to defend more or less 
developed versions of the claim that general relativity involves some kind of expansion 
of special relativity’s equivalence principle through the end of his career.14 Still, 
physicists since the mid-20th century have not in general been willing to follow Einstein 
even in attempting to establish that accelerated motion is purely relative, much less in 
considering such a thing to have been established already.15 Even Bergson, in arguing 
that an accelerated observer must regard herself as being at rest, resorts to the odd 
assertion that a person thinking relativistically may take into account only what she sees, 
and must set aside any jolts she may feel, if she is trying to consider her own 
acceleration. As Bergson puts it, “science retains, and must retain, only the visual aspect 
of motion,”16 though this is hard to reconcile with the contributions that blind physicists 
have made to our understanding of the universe.17 
So we see that a key element of Bergson’s definition of a reference frame, as 
defensible as it may have been at the time when Bergson proposed it, is difficult to 
sustain in the present day. We must instead admit the possibility that an observer can 
affirm a point of view in which she herself is in motion, and if this is to be permitted for 
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accelerating observers, by what right do we forbid it to observers in inertial frames? Once 
we have made this admission, much of Bergson’s argument about the inability of one 
observer to put herself into the shoes of another falls apart. If we no longer consider a 
moving point of view to be an impossibility, then Bergson’s claims that a contradiction is 
involved between a physicist’s reckoning of her own point of view and her reckoning of 
another’s become much less convincing, and thus so does the absolute distinction he 
makes between relativistic and personalistic perspectives. If we wish to construct a 
personalistic philosophy compatible with the theory of relativity, it appears that we must 
look elsewhere.   
 
Living in the (Here-)Now: Whitehead’s Relativized Present 
 Another candidate for a personalistic interpretation of relativity can be found in 
the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Like Bergson, Whitehead distinguishes 
between time as we experience it immediately and time as we measure it. Also like 
Bergson, Whitehead sees the former mode of time as the more fundamental one.  
However, Whitehead offers a somewhat more explicit defense of his personalist leanings 
than Bergson does for his. To start with, Whitehead notes that our perceptions come in 
the form of affective impressions, which are separated from one another by certain 
distances in space and certain lengths of time. Impressions do not arrive before our minds 
pre-labeled as belonging to some particular object, but are in fact prior to the substances 







attributes. What we find in space are the red of the rose and the smell of the jasmine and 
the noise of cannon. We have all told our dentists where the toothache is. Thus space is 
not a relation between substances, but between attributes,”18 and the same can be said of 
time. Substances are deduced after the fact, and only then associated with the attributes 
that our sense impressions record. To propose that our qualitative, personal experiences 
are mere “psychic additions”19 to a purely quantitative objective reality is to fall prey to a 
“vicious principle of bifurcation”20 that cannot be sustained, and that Whitehead would 
later describe as the “Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness.”21 Furthermore, just as 
impressions are fundamental and substances are only derived from them, Whitehead has 
it that events—happenings with a particular duration in time—are fundamental, and 
objects are only derived from events.22   
 When Whitehead looks at time in this experientially-centered23 way, what he sees 
is a series of “durations”24: expanses of time with nonzero length, each of which may 
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comprise shorter durations, or join with others to add up to longer durations. A duration 
may be long enough to include both a cause and its effect, and can cover or even expand 
beyond the extended presents of conscious beings.25 For Whitehead, the pointlike 
moment is only a derived concept, arrived at by imagining a duration so short that it 
cannot be subdivided into smaller durations.26 In the same way, Whitehead says that two 
events are truly simultaneous if and only if they occupy the same perceived duration. 
What philosophers like Putnam call simultaneity, that is, the co-presence of events in the 
same pointlike moment, Whitehead calls “instantaneousness,” and he expresses doubts 
that its existence as a phenomenon can be reconciled with our observations.27  
Though a duration is similar to an expanse of space in that both are defined by 
perceptible separations between events, Whitehead insists that there remain crucial 
differences between them, and that these differences are most evident when we avoid the 
principle of bifurcation that would urge us to trust our logical constructs over our sensory 
experience. Unlike space, time involves succession, with one chunk of duration following 
another, and identifiable categories of past, present, and future. Even a depersonalized, 
scientific concept of time ought to retain this sense of passing, as Whitehead implies 
when he says that any such concept depends on the more fundamental fact of the 
“passage of nature.”28 Furthermore, extension through time is not the same as extension 
through space. An object may exist in an extended region of space, with each part of that 
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extension containing a part of the object, but objects are present wholly and without 
division at every instant of time in which they exist: a way of thinking about time that 
would later come to be called “endurantism.”29 This amounts to a rejection of the usual 
B-theoretic interpretation of Minkowski, in which spacetime is interpreted as the 
assimilation of time into space. First and most obviously, it affirms that time flows—the 
central claim of the A-theory. Furthermore, endurantist arguments have generally been 
taken to be friendlier to the A-theory of time than to the B-theory.30 Thinking back to our 
analogy of the fireplace poker, it is more natural to talk about things as changing from 
moment to moment if we suppose that those things are present in their entirety at each 
moment. If we presume instead that an object at one time and the same object five 
minutes later are only “temporal parts” of a greater, four-dimensional whole that we then 
identify with the object as it truly is (a point of view called “perdurantism,” mentioned 
briefly in the previous chapter), then we leave ourselves open to the charge that a 
difference between one part of a whole and another does not really amount to change, just 
as we do not describe as a “change” the difference in temperature between a fireplace 
poker’s cool handle and its hot tip.  
This is not to say, however, that Whitehead considers time and space to be strictly 
separate, as in the Newtonian model. Whitehead holds that “perception is always 
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‘here,’”31 that is, where the perceiver perceives herself to be, so tying a particular 
duration to a particular act of observation means that we also tie it to a particular place. 
Every “now” is in fact a “here-now.” As a consequence, we cannot speak in a 
straightforward fashion about what is happening there now. When we measure the 
distance between two points in everyday life, we implicitly assume that both points are 
present in the same moment—we separate extension in space from extension through 
time. However, measurement is an action, and thus in Whitehead’s view it must take 
place in time. For this reason it is better to imagine the distance being measured as 
between two temporal events, rather than between two points in a supposedly timeless 
space. The consequences of this are most obvious if we imagine measuring the distance 
to a moving point: the event we refer to as the taillights of a speeding car is not the same 
event at time t as it is at time t-plus-five-minutes. My perception of those taillights from 
the driver’s seat of my own car is yet another event, with its own location in time, and I 
can only draw conclusions about those distant events based upon the way the event of 
perception, in my own “here-now,” plays out.32 This does not mean, however, that I have 
any reason to project my own “now,” the time associated with my perception of “here,” 
onto the distant event that I am perceiving. Still less can I project my “now” onto some 
far-off event that I do not perceive, but that some other person does, so as to identify my 
“now” with someone else’s past or future “then.” That other person will have her own 
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succession of “nows” associated with her own locations: Whitehead goes so far as to 
suggest that I should consider her, and indeed all other observers, to have different “time 
systems” of their own, and not to be occupying the same time system by which I define 
“now” for myself.33 Thus, for Whitehead, the flow of time is a perfectly real 
phenomenon, but it can nonetheless only be described in terms of the perceptions of 
individual observers, and in such a way that different observers’ reckonings of past, 
present and future are not comparable with one another. 
In addition to being a philosopher, Whitehead was an accomplished 
mathematician, and he considered that his understanding of space and time was 
sufficiently different from Einstein’s as to require modifications to the mathematical 
formalism of relativity.34 In particular, Whitehead rejects general relativity, along with 
any definition of gravity in terms of the curvature of spacetime. He argues that, since 
space and time are properly defined in terms of the relationships between perceived 
events, in order for us to be able to make reliable generalizations about the world from 
our sensations, spacetime must be uniform.35 Without such uniformity, says Whitehead, 
the agreement that we observe among different people’s measurements of the same 
objects would be impossible. The specific details of Whitehead’s proposed equations of 
motion for particles in a gravitational field, and of their differences from Einstein’s 
equations, are beyond the scope of this study, and would in any case require a technical 
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discussion of the finer points of tensor algebra. It is enough for us to say that Whitehead’s 
model makes testable predictions about the behavior of massive objects in powerful 
gravitational fields, and about the distribution of mass in our galaxy. According to the 
best data now available to astrophysicists, the model decisively fails these empirical tests, 
“most of them by many orders of magnitude.”36 If we are to salvage any of Whitehead’s 
arguments for flowing time, we must find a way to reconcile them with more orthodox 
theories of relativity.  
 
Maintaining Relationships: The Relativized Present of Stein and Russell 
Howard Stein, writing some decades after Bergson and Whitehead, offers a basis 
for these two philosophers’ characterization of time as located in individual personal 
experience that nonetheless remains within the bounds of an Einstein-Minkowski 
interpretation of relativistic physics. To begin with, Stein’s vision of relativistic 
temporality is radically tensed, to the degree that he suggests that where possible we 
should speak in terms of relations between events of pastness and futurity, rather than in 
terms of time more generally.37 Stein emphasizes that these relations are not at all the 
same as the “earlier than” and “later than” relationships into which some B-theorists 
collapse temporality. These latter relationships conceive of time only as a coordinate 
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system, but “‘a time coordinate’ is not ‘time.’”38 Pastness and futurity carry ontological 
meaning that is absent from considerations of earlier and later. An event E’s past 
comprises those events that could have exerted influence on it, that is to say, those events 
from which a signal could reach E without traveling faster than the speed of light. In the 
same way, an event E’s future, comprises those events upon which it can exert 
influence—those events that can be reached by a signal that E transmits traveling no 
faster than light. 
To give an example, consider the Sun, which is about eight light minutes39 from 
the Earth. Suppose that I am sitting at my desk on the Earth’s surface at a time that my 
watch registers as noon. Only information that left the Sun no later than 11:52 by my 
watch has had time to reach me, so only those events on the Sun that took place earlier 
than the time I measure as 11:52 are part of my past as of noon. In everyday language I 
might speak of, say, 11:56 as a past moment, and so long as I am talking about what 
happened in my immediate vicinity at that time, not even the strictest physicist could 
fault me for doing so. However, though I may be confident that something was happening 
on the sun at a time I would call 11:56, those events, whatever they might be, would not 
be part of my past until information about them had time to reach me. Similarly, I may 
rest assured that something will be happening on the Sun at 12:05, but as I sit at my desk 
on Earth at noon, those events are not part of my future, because nothing I do here and 
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now would have time to affect them. Incidentally, according to special relativity, the set 
of events that an observer could judge to be simultaneous with some time t is precisely 
that set of events that are neither in the past nor the future of t. 
From this it would be tempting to conclude that the only information directly 
available to us is about the past events from which information can have reached us. 
However, Stein demurs on that point. We can know the past only by memory, which is 
famously unreliable, or by inference, which is limited by the imperfection of our 
information. Stein offers instead that “our truly current evidence, at any moment, depends 
only upon or is contained in the present state of the world.”40 In relativity, this all-
important present is spatial as much as it is temporal: “in Einstein-Minkowski space-time 
an event’s present is constituted by itself alone. In this theory, therefore, the present tense 
can never be applied correctly to ‘foreign’ objects.”41 Thus Stein is arguing that 
Whitehead’s contention that the present moment is not just a “now,” but a “here-now,” 
follows necessarily from the conventional interpretation of the special theory of relativity. 
For Stein, then, the objections that Putnam and Rietdijk offer to flowing time have no 
effect, because their project of constructing a single moment at which multiple distant 
events occur involves a category error. There is simply not a well-formed answer to the 
question of what is happening right this second on the Sun, much less on a planet orbiting 
a faraway star. At least, there is no such answer if we are the ones asking the question. If 
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identifying the present requires direct knowledge, and such knowledge is necessarily 
localized in space as well as in time, then associating a given present moment with a 
particular observer who possesses such knowledge is a natural move. Thus we can each 
identify our own “now,” but the now of some hypothetical being living on a different 
planet, out of contact with us, is incommensurable with our own. Multiple observers can 
be present to42 each other, but only if they can interact with each other43: since this 
requires enough time to signals to travel back and forth, the “presence” here described 
can only be a Bergsonian extended present. Stein himself, however, does not take up the 
project of exploring the consequences of this conclusion that lie beyond the philosophy of 
physics.   
 For that, we must turn to physicist, philosopher and theologian Robert John 
Russell. Russell synthesizes the above philosophical points with the theology of Wolfhart 
Pannenberg to create a general model of A-theoretic time, including scientific, 
philosophical, and theological dimensions, that fuses the personalistic tradition of 
Bergson and Whitehead with Stein’s orthodox relativistic physics. Russell begins by 
suggesting that, contrary to Craig’s presentist assumptions, the present is not the only 
time that exists: rather, the past, the present, and the future each have their own distinct 
modes of being.44 Furthermore, for Russell as for Stein, tense is strictly speaking not a 
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property of events in themselves, but rather of the relationship between events. So, in the 
usual way of talking about flowing time, we typically say that some event E begins as 
future, then becomes present, and finally becomes past. If three events D, E and F happen 
in succession, we might say that D becomes past earlier than E, which in turn becomes 
past earlier than F. Russell would urge us to say instead that, from the standpoint of some 
present moment t1, D is in t1’s past, E is in t1’s present, and F is in t1’s future. If we look 
at things from the standpoint of some other present moment t2, then we may find that D, 
E and F bear different relations to that moment—for instance, D and E might both be in 
t2’s past, while F is once again in its future.
45 As with Stein’s system, at first glance this 
may resemble the system of “before” and “after” relations to which Mellor sought to 
reduce tensed language, but, whereas Mellor conceived of all events as existing 
timelessly in the same way, Russell’s ontology of tense is more complex than a simple 
binary of existence and nonexistence.  
This ontology, which Russell calls “inhomogeneous,” has three components: 
actuality, determinacy, and accessibility.46 An actual event is one that has taken or is 
taking place; it exists in the simplest sense of the word. As a good A-theorist, Russell 
supposes that events in the past and present of a given moment t are actual, while events 
in t’s future are not actual. A determinate event, whether or not it has taken place from 
the standpoint of a given time, has a particular form that could in principle be known at 
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that time. Under Russell’s system, determinacy and actuality coincide. In contrast, under 
Craig’s temporal ontology, we might describe future events as determinate, because God 
knows in the present that they will take place, but not actual, because they have not in 
fact taken place yet. Russell repeatedly states that, even though events now in our future 
are neither actual nor determinate, it would be misleading simply to say that they do not 
exist in the same sense that, for example, unicorns do not exist. Instead, Russell cites Paul 
Tillich to argue for two distinct kinds of nonexistence: ouk on, or absolute nonbeing, and 
mé on, or relative nonbeing.47 An event that is in my future now has potential existence, 
with a vast variety of potential outcomes; when that event is present to me, it will not 
pass48 from nonexistence into existence, but rather from potentiality into actuality. An 
event that is present also has a third key characteristic. Unlike either future or past events, 
it is accessible, available to our awareness through direct perception rather than through 
memory or anticipation—in short, it possesses “nowness.” Russell writes that this 
ontology holds a distinct advantage over other non-presentist A-theories such as those of 
C. D. Broad, in that it blunts the force of McTaggart’s paradox because it does not 
construe tensed characteristics as changing with time. Rather than becoming present or 
past, an event always bears particular tense relationships to the same set of moments in 
time, so there is never a need to construct a secondary timeline in order to chart the 
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changes in tensed properties.49 
 With his interpretation of tensed time well in hand, Russell is now in a position to 
explain his A-theoretic interpretation of relativity. He begins by denying the very point 
that Craig takes such pains to establish: a universal present. The idea of such a thing is 
only an “anthropocentric illusion,”50 an invalid inference from the way time seems to 
behave on the small, slow-moving scales of our everyday lives. We ought rather to think 
in terms of the relational, inhomogeneous temporal ontology that Russell has developed, 
and so restrict ourselves to speaking of the present of a particular event, tightly 
circumscribed in space as well as in time—a here-now, in other words.51 It is true, just as 
Putnam and Rietdijk argue, that different observers will make different judgments about 
what events are simultaneous. However, Russell does not grant that one observer’s 
reckoning of simultaneity need carry over to any other observer. The relation “is real to” 
that we discussed in chapter 2 is thus not a transitive one: even if you are real to me in a 
given moment, what is real to you is not necessarily real to me in that moment. In any 
event, relativity prohibits you from passing along to me any information about events in 
my future before I could find out about them on my own. Relativistic physics defines an 
event’s future and past causally, just as Stein does, so by definition only events that are in 
my past at this moment can have a causal relationship with what I am seeing and doing 
now. If your reference frame is such that you see two events in my life as simultaneous 
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when I would perceive them as being separated by ten years, then you must be separated 
from me in such a way that a signal from you would take at least ten years to reach me, 
even traveling at the speed of light. So, even if we disagree about what events are 
simultaneous with a given here-now, by the time we are able to compare notes, we will 
agree that all such events are in the past, so our disagreements about their precise timing 
can only be of academic interest. You will never be able to tell me what I am going to do 
before I do it—you can only tell me what I have done, and that is something I already 
know.  
 Russell weaves his theology in with this interpretation of time at every step, 
drawing particular inspiration from the thought of Wolfhart Pannenberg. As we saw in 
Chapter 1, Pannenberg does not go quite so far as to suggest that God’s life is temporal in 
Craig’s sense of the term, but he does object to any strict opposition between time and 
eternity, such as the one that the Scholastics took from Aristotle. God and human beings 
relate to each other historically, through the passage of concrete time, rather than in the 
timeless realm of abstract ideas or the “once upon a time” of myth. Pannenberg therefore 
criticizes Eliade’s notion that eschatology represents a “flight from the world”52; rather, 
the eschatological fulfilment is in continuity with worldly history, and indeed bears on 
every moment of that history. For Russell as for Pannenberg, then, eternity bears a rich 
and productive relationship with time, and created time is closely tied to eschatology. In 
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this model, eternity in itself is as Boethius described it: “the simultaneous and perfect 
presence of unlimited life.”53 As Russell interprets it, this means that, in eternity, the 
distinction among events at various times is maintained, so that they retain their 
relationships of pastness and futurity to one another, but the separation of events from 
one another is overcome. So, the various temporal relationships remain the same with 
respect to actuality and determinacy, but they lose their inaccessibility to one another. 
The result is that to God all events are co-present with one another, whether they exist in 
the past, present, or future.54 The present that all of these events inhabit is of necessity not 
pointlike, but rather extended on Bergsonian lines: it is a duration (durée) in the fullest 
sense of the word, a personal phenomenon of God’s lived experience. From the human 
point of view, meanwhile, Pannenberg argues that the future is the best temporal 
analogue for eternity. Even after an event has finished taking place, its meaning may 
continue to evolve as time passes, as we saw with the analogy of the aimless walk in the 
woods that led to the adoption of a kitten. God is the supreme determinant of meaning, 
and the eschatological completion of God’s plan is the act by which God places all events 
in their ultimate context. Every event therefore has a teleological connection with this 
final, all-determining future moment, in which created time intersects with eternity.55 
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Pannenberg emphasizes that, under this Boethian view, eternity does not not simply exist 
outside time, as Augustine would have it: rather, eternity takes time up into itself. 
Pannenberg complains that too many interpreters have incorrectly lumped Boethius’s 
view in with Augustine’s.56 Indeed, Craig57 and Lucas58 are among those who have made 
this error. 
 Russell integrates relativity with this view of the theological dimension of time, 
starting from Pannenberg’s observation that “eternity is the presence of things in the 
world to God and omnipresence is God’s presence to things in the world,” and that the 
latter is the consequence of the former.59 Russell’s model, focused as it is on reality as it 
appears to particular events, localized in space and time, encourages us to think of created 
things as appearing to God as it were individually. Newton (and Craig after him) 
conceives of the expanse of space and time per se as God’s sensorium, a stage on which 
the drama of creation takes place, and upon which God looks down from the outside, as 
though from the theater’s royal box. Russell, on the other hand, holds that God sees the 
play through the eyes of each of the actors, because God’s eternal vantage point on time 
and space is so intimately tied in with God’s presence to created beings: “God’s relation 
to the world, including personal existence, historical experience, and natural processes, is 
always given to the particular global present, associated with each particular observer and 
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defined by her particular worldline through the present event P. It is to this world and for 
this observer that God is omnipresent—and this is true for all observers.”60 So, where 
Craig seeks to establish a single, universal divine view of existence that lies behind the 
shifting reference frames of relativity, Russell locates God’s knowledge of and presence 
to creation within those shifting reference frames themselves. There is for Russell no 
more fundamental created reality to be found underneath relativistic physics—the theory 
of relativity describes the physical universe as it really is in itself. The divine view of the 
world therefore does not resolve the disagreements among different observers about the 
dimensions in space of objects or the order in time of unrelated events. Instead, it simply 
affirms each observer’s interpretations as correct by their own lights, secure in the 
knowledge that no disagreement can arise about the causes and effects of events, and thus 
that the stories that different observers tell about physical happenings will vary only in 
fairly minor details.  
 Craig charges that attributing this kind of ontological validity to reference frames 
in special relativity creates a “fantastic fragmentation of reality.”61 He worries that the 
version of this interpretation that Stein puts forth falls prey to McTaggart’s paradox, but 
we have seen that Russell has a ready answer to that objection. Craig also echoes 
complaints, lodged earlier by D. H. Mellor, that relativizing the present to a particular 
observer means that some distant events will be part of that observer’s past without ever 
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having been part of their present.62 In the end, however, this objection amounts to an 
appeal to incredulity. Craig associates the relative present à la Stein and Russell with 
what he calls the “relativity interpretation” of special relativity, and Craig himself 
supposes that this interpretation’s counterintuitive nature is the real foundation of the 
skepticism it encounters.63 “[W]e have an intuitive sense,” says Craig, “that on the planet 
Neptune, for example, there are events occurring right now, simply simultaneously with 
events here on Earth.”64  
The temporal ontology that Russell proposes is inarguably strange and 
counterintuitive from an everyday human point of view, but, as Craig himself 
acknowledges in another context,65 no view of the world that incorporates modern 
physics can avoid including some phenomena that seem bizarre to us. While I readily 
agree that we cannot afford simply to ignore our intuitive sense of time as we experience 
it directly, it is not clear to me why our intuitions would be a valuable source of 
information about events that we do not experience directly. Even under a Newtonian 
view of time, it is only in quite an abstract sense that events far removed from me can be 
part of my present. Suppose that I am having a telephone conversation with a friend who 
lives in another city, and that my friend informs me that she had a party last Thursday. 
                                                          
62 D. H. Mellor, “Special Relativity and Present Truth,” Analysis 34 (1973-1974), 75, quoted in 
   William Lane Craig, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity (Boston: Kluwer Academic 
    Publishers, 2001), 82-3. 
63 Craig, Time and the Metaphysics of Relativity, 86. 
64 Ibid., 152. 
65 William Lane Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000), 







While this party in a faraway city was actually taking place it made no impression 
whatsoever on my consciousness—indeed, it is only with the benefit of hindsight and 
second-hand information that I can say that the party and my activities of that Thursday 
were simultaneous with each other. The party may have taken place at a time I would 
once have called the present, but it was never really present to me. Thus, even under a 
temporal ontology that Craig would endorse, I would not be abusing language overmuch 
if I said that, when my friend told me about the party, it entered my past without ever 
having been a meaningful part of my present. 
  Furthermore, for all that Craig endorses Bergson’s durée, Craig’s presentist 
ontology makes for a poor fit with the Bergsonian extended present. When taken 
together, these two ideas do not seem to permit a clear answer to the straightforward 
question, “Does the tea that I drank this morning exist?” As a presentist, Craig by 
definition believes that only present objects and events exist. However, he also says that 
presence is to be defined ad hoc, so that we should speak of “the present [interval]” rather 
than “the present” tout court.66 These two propositions combine strangely. They seem to 
suggest together that, for the purposes of talking about “now” as “the present day,” that 
time this morning when my tea had finished brewing but when I had not yet drunk it (call 
it ttea) is present, and therefore that that time and the tea that occupies it do exist. 
However, when I talk about “now” as “the present minute,” ttea is past rather than present, 
and so my tea has ceased to exist. Craig’s own insistence that only the present moment 
                                                          







exists, but that (as per Bergson) we can define and redefine the present as the needs of the 
moment require, takes much of the sting out of his criticism that a proposal like Russell’s 
“fragments reality.” If the existence of a given event depends on whether I choose to 
include it in the extended present, then surely reality is already quite fragmented. 
Russell’s temporal ontology, on the other hand, fits much more comfortably with 
Bergson’s durée, given its focus on the perceptions of an individual observer. 
 
Conclusion 
We now have our best candidate for a relativistic, A-theoretic model of time. This 
model succeeds at doing even what Craig requires of a description of time. It shows how 
time can flow in a universe accurately described by relativity, and in particular by 
relativity as physicists conventionally understand it. It assigns to God a unique place of 
primacy in time: rather than guaranteeing a unique, universal divine frame of reference, 
which raises awkward physical questions, God unifies from eternity the individual 
perspectives of created beings. In particular, it supposes that all events are present to 
God, God’s purposes are in a sense always-already fulfilled from God’s own standpoint 
beyond/at the end of time, and humans will need to arrive at that point themselves in 
order to grasp God’s purposes fully. It is compatible with divine knowledge of tensed 
facts, through God’s presence with and knowledge of the individual perceivers who 
establish “nowness.” Furthermore, it affirms a version of the Bergsonian durée, but does 







dimension by relating it to the joining of all times in eternity. Finally, it offers support for 
classical Abrahamic theological concepts, allowing for free will and emphasizing the 
historical character of the God/human relationship, in which people can only come to 
understand God’s actions through time, and can completely understand them only in the 
light of the eschatological fulfillment. 
The key to the success of Russell’s temporal ontology is that it is built on the solid 
rock of individual human first-person perception, which is the source of our claim that 
time flows in the first place. Generally speaking, Craig reasons about things that happen 
in the universe in terms of logical propositions about those things, whereas Russell 
reasons about things as events in the strict physical sense of the word: as perceptible 
occurrences located in space and time. Craig’s essential questions are mostly along the 
lines of “is this proposition well-formed?” and “is this proposition true?” Given that a 
particular proposition is true, Craig will sometimes ask what makes it true, but he always 
asks this from the point of view of abstract epistemology. Russell, on the other hand, is 
particularly interested in whether we can know things and whether we can observe them, 
and assumes a close relationship between those two questions. Certainly when we 
translate real-world happenings into events in the physical sense of the term, we lose a 
great deal in the process of translation. Still, when we are speaking of things that take 
place outside of human heads, we arguably lose less than we would by translating them 







 Moreover, Russell grasps the essential point which we need to learn from Hilary 
Putnam’s argument for the block universe: the real threat to flowing time comes not from 
any incoherence in the idea itself, but rather from the way that we try to reconcile the 
flowing timelines of different observers. Russell’s insight is that, in fact, we really need 
not try to reconcile them at all. If we simply abandon the idea of a global “now,” and 
focus our ontological interest on the perceptions of particular observers, we lose 
surprisingly little. In effect, though not in so many words, Russell denies what I have 
called the “transitivity of reality,” the premise that any events that are real to you must 
also be real to me, regardless of whether or not I receive any information about those 
events from you. Between this point and the affirmation that God experiences created 
reality from the point of view of each observer, Russell’s theory of time puts us in an 
excellent position to stake out a truly personalist position, with implications for 
philosophy, science, and religion. When we show that time can indeed flow, even under 
relativistic physics, we do more than merely refute the B-theorists who have reasoned 
from the illusory nature of flowing time to the illusory nature of personhood: we open the 
door to a worldview with personhood at its very heart. In our next and final chapter, we 














“The Point of Intersection of the Timeless with Time”: 
The Relativized Present and Personalism 
 
 
 With his relativized present interpretation of relativity, Robert John Russell has 
propounded a physically defensible, philosophically rigorous picture of time that really 
does flow, with actual ontological distinctions among past, present, and future, and in 
which the flow of time is linked with the individual points of view of particular 
observers. Given the key role that Pannenberg’s theology plays in inspiring Russell, and 
given that any observer who can reflect on their observations must be a person, it is not 
surprising that for the most part the observers Russell discusses while laying out his ideas 
are personal. However, when Russell uses the term “observer,” he means it in a broader, 
more technical sense, one that includes any point of view from which a physical frame of 
reference can be reckoned. For a physicist, a mote of dust floating in space can define a 
reference frame just as well as a human being can—all that is needed is a point from 
which to measure. Thus Russell’s relativistic system does not necessarily assign quite so 
crucial a place to subjective experience as it might seem to do at first glance. Certainly it 
raises questions about what personhood has to do with temporal flow in situations in 
which a human observer is not present—a condition which obtains for the overwhelming 
majority of events in the history of the universe.  
 Some personalistic schools of thought are in an excellent position to answer these 







from Russell. The term “personalism” includes quite a broad range of philosophies that 
differ from one another on many important points, but they agree that the personal subject 
who thinks and acts freely is the most important category by which we ought to 
understand existence. In this chapter we will discuss four important personalist thinkers.  
First, we will examine the existentialist Søren Kierkegaard, whose writings powerfully 
influenced Pannenberg, and through him, Russell. We will see how Russell’s 
inhomogeneous temporal ontology echoes Kierkegaard’s philosophy of time, and how 
Kierkegaard translated that philosophy into an ethic of freedom and responsibility. Next, 
we will turn to Borden Parker Bowne and Edgar Sheffield Brightman of the Boston 
personalist school. The Boston personalists, beginning once again from a view of time 
that has much in common with Russell’s, explain the tensed temporality of the universe 
by reference to the perceptions of a personal God. Finally, we will delve into the 
personalist epistemology of philosopher of science Michael Polanyi. Polanyi offers an 
alternative to the scientific positivism that has moved so many B-theorists to argue 
against flowing time and personhood, showing instead that we can do justice to science 
while keeping the freely-choosing, time-bound subject firmly in mind. Moreover, a 
personalist account of science like Polanyi’s, in the best traditions of Kierkegaard’s 
existentialism, can help to remind us that ethics bears on the production of scientific 









Getting Personal: Kierkegaard’s Existentialism and Boston Personalism 
Søren Kierkegaard, writing under his literary alter egos “Vigilius Haufniensis” 
and “Johannes Climacus,” defends a personalistic view of time in which the present 
cannot be separated from human subjectivity, but is nonetheless quite real. Kierkegaard 
places freedom squarely in the center of this view: time for him is chiefly that which 
gives us the opportunity to make the choices that define our lives, and therefore time 
cannot be separated from the individual, decision-making subject. The emphasis on 
subjectivity in Kierkegaard’s existentialism, it should be noted, does not lead to the 
navel-gazing philosophy that is the popular caricature of existentialist thought. A person 
does not assign value to an otherwise-meaningless universe by the mere act of making 
decisions. Rather, Kierkegaard recognizes that we are always confronted with that which 
is outside ourselves, with other creatures and with God, and that such confrontations 
impose undeniable ethical demands upon us. So, Kierkegaard’s thought focuses on the 
self as subject, but maintains that we must also look outward if we are to see clearly when 
we look inward. 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of time bears notable similarities to Pannenberg’s.1 
To begin with, Kierkegaard emphatically asserts that does flow: time is “correctly defined 
as an infinite succession2” including past, present, and future. However, he immediately 
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qualifies this statement from two directions. On one hand, when “represented,” 
temporality bears a close resemblance to what Craig calls physical time, in that it is 
treated purely as a numerical abstraction rather than according to direct experience. 
Kierkegaard writes more than sixty years before the special theory of relativity was 
published, but his description of represented time bears a remarkably close resemblance 
to the block universe that B-theorists describe. Represented time is not only “spatialized,” 
but is literally identical with space3: it loses its successive character, and becomes in 
effect a set of points on a number line that together define an extension. The present is 
thus only a point on the plot identified ad hoc; the past is the set of points whose upper 
bound is the present, and the future is the set of points whose lower bound is the present.  
“Before” and “after” become equivalent to spatial directions on the line, and like spatial 
directions they become symmetrical. Kierkegaard often characterizes this abstractly 
rational approach as “eternal,” in the Augustinian sense of being outside of time. In 
Kierkegaard’s view, then, if we treat the intuitive, qualitative human experience of time 
as irrelevant, we arrive at the block universe, just as we have seen among the B-theorists 
of the 20th and 21st centuries. Outside of the human context, there is no present and no 
future, and only the past, the domain of time without potentiality or choice, exists. 
On the other hand, Kierkegaard argues just as forcefully that we can lose track of 
the present by means of an excessive focus on the flow of time. If we fix our minds only 
on the sensation of time’s passage, we will reduce the present to a fleeting, infinitesimal 
                                                          







boundary between past and future. Indeed, since each of the successive instants that we 
call “the present” is always in the process of passing by, by the time that we can identify 
a specific time as “present,” that time is gone. The present becomes the past before it can 
even be named, much less considered. Thus there is no fixed jumping-off point at which 
the boundaries among past, present and future can be reckoned, and so the trichotomy 
cannot be sustained. Indeed, it collapses: “precisely because every moment, as well as the 
sum of the moments, is a process (a passing by), no moment is a present, and accordingly 
there is in time neither present, nor past, nor future.”4 Ironically, if we attempt to live 
solely “in the now,” we lose the sense of “now” on which A-theorists place so much 
importance.  
So, then, there are two equal and opposite ways for the present to disappear. The 
route that Kierkegaard charts between these two dangers will lead us into his 
personalistic way of interpreting existence. In order to maintain a usable concept of the 
present, says Kierkegaard, we must understand that the human experience of time is 
neither fleeting succession alone nor tenseless abstraction alone, but a synthesis of the 
two. For Kierkegaard, then, the human spirit requires a synthesis of time with eternity. It 
must possess both the immediacy of pure experience and the understanding that depends 
on atemporal reasoning, both the successiveness of the moving instant and the endurance 
of the pure concept, and yet it must also possess something that goes beyond either time 
or eternity. Kierkegaard calls this synthesis that both contains and transcends these two 
                                                          







poles “the moment” (in the original Danish, øiblikket, literally “the blink of an eye”): 
“The moment is that ambiguity in which time and eternity touch each other, and with this 
the concept of temporality is posited, whereby time constantly intersects eternity and 
eternity constantly pervades time.”5 In this model of temporality, past, present, and future 
take on definitions strikingly similar to those of Russell’s inhomogeneous temporal 
ontology. The past “as something bygone […] has actuality [presumably also including 
what Russell would call “determinacy”], for it is certain and trustworthy that it 
occurred,”6 but it is nonetheless inaccessible, separated from our experience by a gap that 
only thought can bridge. Indeed, when we speak of past events, we find that their 
remoteness from our experience inevitably introduces some uncertainty into our 
conception of them. Thus recalling the past has something in common with predicting the 
future, so that a historian is a sort of “prophet in reverse.”7 The future itself is the purest 
temporal expression of eternity, just as Pannenberg argues: “[T]he future is the incognito 
in which the eternal, even though it is incommensurable with time, nevertheless preserves 
its association with time.”8 This is because “[t]he possible corresponds exactly to the 
future,”9 and the eternal is the domain of possibility. For Kierkegaard as for Russell, then, 
the future possesses neither actuality, nor determinacy, nor accessibility, but instead 
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partakes of the qualified non-being that Tillich called mé on.  
 The moment, in turn, defines the present. It is the synthesis of the potentiality of 
eternity and the transience of time, and so it serves as a boundary between future and 
past, respectively. It is accessible to our senses; it is literally “present” before us. 
However, Kierkegaard points out that the present has another distinguishing feature, one 
that Russell does not particularly emphasize. In its character as “the moment,” the present 
is the time when free persons make choices, and thus transform the vast array of 
possibilities that the future had held into a single actuality. Such a choice is an irreducibly 
subjective event, and though it must inevitably have consequences in the external world, 
a choice is already fully itself when it is made within the mind of the person choosing: 
“The actuality is not the external action but an interiority in which the individual annuls 
possibility and identifies himself with what is thought in order to exist in it.”10 This 
means that the moment is present only to individuals, rather than being experienced in 
common by multiple people, because the interior mental space in which decisions are 
made cannot be shared. Kierkegaard’s moment is necessarily a relativized vision of the 
present. Although the physics available to him when he was writing in the 1840s gave 
him no reason to think of physical events in terms of the distinct reference frames of 
different observers, Kierkegaard’s focus on thinking subjects’ different inner worlds leads 
him to a description of the present moment that meshes well with Russell’s. 
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Kierkegaard defines the points of view that anchor his relativized present as 
belonging to actors rather than merely to observers, and this leads him to a deeper 
understanding of the present. Kierkegaard lays a great deal of stress on the point that, in 
the moment of decision of which he is speaking, the choice is not merely a thought 
considered abstractly—such a thought would be only an abstract possibility, and as such 
would belong to the future. Rather, we make choices, and thus live in the present in this 
fullest sense, when we commit ourselves to those choices, when we say, “this is what I 
am going to do.” A decision, even more than an idea, cannot exist on its own, as it were 
in the realm of forms, but only in the mind of a concrete person. Thus the present, in its 
truest character as the moment, is inseparably bound to particular human beings with 
distinct identities who are able freely to make their own decisions.  
Kierkegaard is not content to stop here, however. In fact, he suggests that the 
connection between block time and the lack of freedom on one hand and the connection 
between flowing time and freedom on the other run both ways. “If necessity could 
supervene at one single point,” he argues, “then we could no longer speak of the past and 
the future.”11 Foreseeing the future and “understand[ing] the necessity of the past” would 
be collapsed into the same thing: “If the past had become necessary […] it would follow 
that the future would also be necessary.12” So, the sameness and simultaneous existence 
of all time, as assumed by the block universe model, follow from determinism. If 
                                                          








determinism were valid and the past were what it is by necessity, then “freedom itself 
would be an illusion, and coming into existence no less an illusion […]”13  Without 
freedom, there is no becoming and no distinction between past and future; all things that 
are, equally are, regardless of their position in time; and what is not simply is not, and 
will never be. Therefore, it is not just that block time renders freedom impossible; a 
fortiori, a lack of freedom is identical with block time for Kierkegaard. It follows from 
this that, in order for time to be tensed, in order for true becoming and past-future 
asymmetry to exist, it cannot be the case that all events are determined, whether by 
physical law or logical necessity. Therefore, in Kierkegaard’s view, just as freedom 
requires flowing time, flowing time requires freedom.   
However, Kierkegaard forbids us from considering the nature of temporality and 
freedom as mere fodder for idle philosophizing. For him, properly understanding 
ourselves and our circumstances means considering ourselves as concrete and particular 
persons, rather than only as instances of an abstraction called “humanity,” and this in turn 
must lead to action. Ontology cannot be separated from ethics: “As soon as we begin to 
ask such questions [about our own existence], we are asking ethically and are maintaining 
the claim of the ethical upon the existing person, which cannot be that he is supposed to 
abstract from existence, but that he is supposed to exist […]”14 Both ontology and ethics, 
in turn, find their truest expression in religion. As we have seen, in practice, 
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Kierkegaard’s moment is the time in which people commit themselves and makes 
choices. Their freedom to make these choices depends on the interweaving of time with 
eternity. Only in the undetermined present can decisions be made, and we have seen that 
time without contact with eternity provides no real present, but either a static, settled past 
or a formless flux. The potential for action that eternity provides is needed to make 
choice possible. If true human temporality requires contact with eternity, then of 
necessity it requires contact with the God who dwells in eternity. Indeed, as divine 
freedom has eternity for its domain of action, and human freedom must partake of that 
eternity in order to exist, in the moment of decision, free human beings share in God’s 
freedom in our own limited way.  
Furthermore, in Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety, we find that understanding 
human freedom is intertwined at every step with understanding human sin. We bear an 
ambivalent relationship to the possibilities that freedom affords us, and this ambivalence 
arises from the simultaneous attraction and repulsion we feel toward the prospect of 
making evil use of those possibilities.15 Such evil use arises from what Kierkegaard calls 
“despair,” in which we will to be what we are not, and refuse to be what we are.16 The 
true nature to which we must align our wills comes from the God who makes us what we 
fundamentally are, so that despair involves turning away from God and falling into sin.17 
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Despair’s opposite is faith,18 whereby we know ourselves and know God, and act in 
accordance with our knowledge of our true needs, interests, duties and relationships with 
others. Thus if we begin from a Kierkegaardian view of time, which has so much in 
common with the relativized-present interpretation of relativity that Russell draws on 
Einstein and Pannenberg to describe, we find that it leads us to a person-centered view of 
existence as a whole. This personalist system of thought focuses on human persons in 
relationship with each other and with a personal God, and it understands persons not only 
as observers, who can reason and collate their perceptions, but also as actors, who can 
and indeed must make decisions for themselves and change the world in which they live 
with each other.  
*   *   * 
Kierkegaard presumes an “infinite qualitative distinction” between God and 
created beings,19 a separation which God miraculously overcomes through the work of 
salvation. However, this presumption is far from universal among personalistic thinkers. 
Another school of thought exists that, though it agrees with Kierkegaard in reasoning 
from the reality of time’s flow to a person-centered view of existence, disagrees with him 
in positing a much closer relationship between God and creation. Boston personalism, 
which takes its name from Boston University, where it came into being, supposes that 
conscious personhood is at the root of reality: existence ought to be understood as the 
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subjective experience of a personal God in which created persons such as ourselves 
participate. What we call “things” are fundamentally thoughts in the mind of God. Our 
own minds are distinct from God’s mind, but they depend on God for their existence, and 
the way they process ideas is analogous to the way God does. In what follows we will 
briefly sketch the philosophies of two of Boston personalism’s inventors, Borden Parker 
Bowne and his student Edgar Brightman, and show how they move from flowing time to 
personal freedom, purpose, and intention. 
Bowne begins his argument by stating that we know that we are selves, and 
indeed that no proposition can possibly be clearer to us than that one. There is no 
knowledge without a person to know it, and any intellectual program that does not at least 
assert that some things are known, and not only existent, cuts off the branch it sits upon. It 
is for this reason that Kant’s distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal selves 
collapses:  
A phenomenon which is not an appearance to somebody is a logical impossibility. It is 
possible to look upon things as phenomenal only; but to look upon the self which views 
these phenomena as itself phenomenal is altogether impossible. […] Of course many 
questions may be asked respecting the self which we are not able to answer, but the self 
itself as the subject of the mental life and knowing and experiencing itself as living, and 
as one and the same throughout its changing experiences, is the surest item of knowledge 
we possess.20  
 
The scientific positivism that motivates many of the B-theorists we have discussed 
wishes to draw conclusions from experience and from logic while abstracting away the 
                                                          







minds to which experience occurs, and in which logic has its existence, and this, as 
Bowne argues, “invert[s] the true order of fact.”21  
One of the ill effects of such an inversion is a mistaken understanding of time. 
Bowne and Brightman agree that the changeless always-already of the B-theory, far from 
being the natural concomitant of a scientific point of view, cannot be sustained under any 
philosophy that takes experience into account. Our every sensation of or interaction with 
the world, says Bowne, involves transience; changeless fixity occurs only in the realm of 
ideas, and ideas require a mind to think them into existence.22 Likewise, it is mind that 
associates ideas with the transient impressions that our senses give us, creating 
identifiable, meaningful wholes—that is, experiences of things—that endure through 
past, present, and future. The work of this association takes place in the present moment, 
which Bowne defines in terms of that which is present to a particular experiencing 
subject: “Time can be interpreted only from the side of experience, and more especially 
from the standpoint of self-consciousness. Experience, we have seen, cannot be in the 
present as a separate point of time, but rather the present is in experience.”23 The present 
is in effect the scope of our mental grasp and the sphere of our potential action. In turn, 
potentiality worthy of the name requires volition and freedom of action.24  
Brightman further develops Bowne’s theory of time by introducing what he calls 
“the shining present,” which is as important to his own philosophy as the moment is to 
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Kierkegaard’s. Like Kierkegaard’s moment, Brightman’s shining present is rooted in the 
particular experience of a concrete, individual person. Brightman has it that what we 
experience in our shining present points to the “illuminating absent,” the realities outside 
of ourselves that explain our perceptions. For all that Brightman makes the perceiving 
person the measure of all things, he is no solipsist: “[B]elief in myself requires me to 
believe in the absent.”25 In the style of a Bergsonian durée, the shining present has 
extension and succession within itself, flowing into the remembered past and the 
anticipated future.26 It is not a matter of a person’s perceptions alone, but it necessarily 
also includes intentions that a person expresses through action: “The experience of time 
is intimately related to, and involved in, the experience of purpose. Purpose is close to the 
very essence of selfhood […] It is there to some degree in every moment of the shining 
present.”27 Since it is tied in this way to a particular person’s impressions, goals, and 
choices in the moment, a shining present is irreducibly individual, and cannot be 
occupied by more than one person.28 So, with the Boston personalists as with 
Kierkegaard, we find a theory of time that lends itself quite naturally to Russell’s 
relativized present. Indeed, Brightman himself argues that relativity bolsters his 
personalistic temporality: 
Relativity, instead of undermining personal experience, re-enforces [sic] the basic 
importance of the shining present, reveals its complex structure and powers, emphasizes 
the observer and his frame of reference, and points out the inescapable relatedness of the 
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human experient to the whole objective universe revealed by scientific observation, 
experiment, and theory.29 
 
Far from reinforcing a view of physics that erases personhood entirely in the interests of 
“objectivity,” relativity opens the door for a greater role for subjectivity in the way we 
look at the universe. 
Having argued that time flows in a way that necessarily involves personhood, 
Bowne and Brightman go on to make a still stronger claim about the part that persons 
play in existence. While Kierkegaard has little to say about the implications of his ideas 
for the nature of God, the Boston personalists draw a straight line between their 
understanding of the way human beings interact with the world around them and their 
theory of God’s interaction with created existence. Bowne and Brightman agree that we 
must consider the things we perceive in light of the persons who perceive them, and in 
the same way, we ought to consider things in themselves in terms of their relationship to 
the divine mind. Bowne holds that “intelligence is the only foundation of uniformity of 
which we have any experience,”30 and thus he interprets the susceptibility of natural 
phenomena to human reason as evidence that those phenomena arise out of the mind of a 
rational God. He accepts Hume’s criticism of “mechanical causality” as substantially 
correct: if we consider physical events from a positivist point of view, then when we say 
that X causes Y, we can mean only that Y consistently happens after X does. We have no 
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solid basis upon which to infer a real connection between X and Y.31 However, says 
Bowne, we experience the reality of volitional causality every day, as we make plans to 
bring about certain results and then execute those plans, and indeed we assume the 
validity of this kind of causality in everything we do. If I decide to make tea, and then I 
do in fact go on to make tea, we all take it for granted that the tea really is the effect of 
my decision, and not merely subsequent to it. Bowne therefore reasons that it makes more 
sense to attribute the causation of events in nature to God’s volition, apparently working 
through secondary causes much as the Thomists argue, than it does to suppose that one 
natural event causes another.32 The world is God’s idea and God’s deed: “It is not merely 
a presentation to us which ends in itself, it is also a revelation of the cosmic activity of 
the Supreme Will.”33 
 Brightman reaches a similar conclusion about the importance of God’s personal 
nature to the created universe, but he arrives there by way of his beliefs about time and 
perception. Everything that is, he says, is either available to us directly in a shining 
present, or is part of the illuminating absent that bears on the shining present. The former 
category, as part of the present, is clearly temporal. Brightman argues that the latter 
category must be temporal as well, lest our philosophy fall prey to the bifurcation that 
Whitehead criticized, forcing us to adopt different and incompatible systems of reasoning 
for different phenomena.34 Therefore all of existence is temporal, whether we experience 
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it directly or indirectly. Since temporality necessarily involves duration in Bergson’s 
sense, this, in turn, means that all being is also personal: “Objective time, then, must 
either be the real duration of a real experience beyond our own, or else the existence of 
the time, which we experience as conscious unities with memories and purposes, must be 
left an unexplained and incoherent miracle.”35 Brightman identifies God as the person 
whose experiences constitute the reality of objective duration. Like Bowne, then, 
Brightman affirms that the universe exists within God’s mind, comparing most aspects of 
created existence to works of art in the mind of an artist or hypotheses in the mind of a 
scientist.36 Indeed, the material world is a part of God, and is constituted by God’s action. 
The exceptions to this rule are the minds of created persons, which, while dependent on 
God’s will for their being, are nonetheless distinct from God.  
 Boston personalism and Russell’s relativized present interpretation of relativity 
complement each other. Although Brightman argues that relativity strengthens the case 
for personalism, his theories about God’s perception of events in time do not reckon with 
the complications that relativity introduces to temporality at scales that are outside of 
everyday human experience, but which must be relevant to an omnipresent God. 
Moreover, Brightman insists that God must be temporal in order to be personal,37 and his 
emphasis on God’s experience of change suggests an interpretation of God’s temporality 
akin to the one Craig puts forward. As we have seen in the previous chapter, such a view 
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faces problems of its own, and at any rate it would sit uncomfortably beside Brightman’s 
praise of relativity’s emphasis on observers’ frames of reference. However, Russell 
neatly resolves all of Brightman’s difficulties, offering in the relativized present a 
detailed scientific grounding for the link Brightman sees between relativity and 
subjectivity. Meanwhile, the Boethian view of eternity that Russell takes from 
Pannenberg (and which Bowne endorses38) weaves temporality into the divine life, and 
attributes to God direct experience of the tensed character of time, without tying God 
down to a particular relativistic reference frame. In return, Brightman’s personalism 
further fleshes out Russell’s idea of God as present to all observers. We have discussed in 
some detail what this means for conscious human observers, but Boston personalism 
makes it explicit that, even when the reference frames with which physics deals have 
nothing to do with human beings, they still involve a personal observer, in that God 
perceives them. Every frame of reference in existence thus involves a here-now based in 
subjective experience, and not only those here-nows in the vicinity of the planet Earth 
over the past couple of million years. For this reason, even when we are discussing the 
behavior of objects in relativistic frames far from human perception, it remains entirely 
appropriate to use terms like “measurement” and “observation” that implicitly assume a 
thinking mind, because such a mind actually is always present.39  
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Seeing Ourselves: Michael Polanyi on Personalist Ways of Doing Science 
 We have observed that many prominent B-theorists have drawn a strict opposition 
between scientific thinking and subjective thinking, so that, the more a theory about the 
world is committed to honoring scientific truth, the more it must dismiss personhood as 
irrelevant, or even illusory. This has motivated much of their reasoning in favor of a 
block theory of time, on the assumption that, since flowing time depends so much on 
subjective perception, it must be fatally unscientific. However, personalist systems of 
thought need not assume any such opposition between science and personhood—a 
person-centered world view may ascribe deep importance to science without 
contradicting itself. Indeed, the philosopher of science Michael Polanyi, in his book 
Personal Knowledge, foregrounds the fact that scientists, who are persons possessing 
identity, judgment and freedom, create scientific knowledge. Contrary to what positivistic 
B-theorists often assume, science is not produced by machines that operate according to 
invariant rules of reasoning, nor does it crystallize out of collections of disembodied 
ideas. Polanyi makes this fact the foundation for a full-scale personalist epistemology, 
one that harmonizes with the person-centered theory of time that we have advocated, and 
that can show that science and subjectivity are not opposites after all. 
 Polanyi begins by defending the importance of what he calls “indefinable” or 
“tacit knowledge.”  All people know more than they can say, and descriptions of any 
reasonably complex procedure will fail to convey important nuances. This falling short 







better off on this score than anyone else. Rather, the problem inheres in the nature of 
knowledge. All knowledge, Polanyi argues, has a “tacit dimension,” a band of 
information that runs deeper than verbal communication. This is a familiar concept in 
artistic or purely sensory contexts. We often speak of the impression that a work of art 
creates as being beyond the power of language to describe, and in the word qualia we 
have a term to denote the irreducibly non-propositional content of a sensory experience. 
Polanyi, however, applies the idea of tacit knowledge much more broadly. He offers 
several examples of procedures that could not be reproduced, or at best were imperfectly 
reproduced, even when detailed instructions were given. An imported industrial machine 
that he once observed in his native Hungary failed to operate as well as an identical 
machine in Germany, where it was developed. The training that the Hungarian workers 
had received did not convey the tacit knowledge upon which the German workers 
depended to get the best performance out of the machine.40 No amount of skill in 
technical writing could have transmitted this knowledge verbally; only by observing the 
experts and imitating their actions could the beginners have learned what they needed. 
Polanyi finds the same phenomenon at work during Europe’s Age of Revolutions. Liberal 
political philosophers of the eighteenth century frequently modeled their prescriptions for 
improved governmental systems on the United Kingdom. In practice, British policies 
proved difficult to export because the application of British common law was founded on 
judgments drawn from a complex web of highly specific precedents. Interpreting the 
                                                          







meaning of these precedents for a case under consideration required indefinable 
knowledge that was not expressed in the text of the laws or even of judicial opinions, but 
could only be imparted tacitly through contact with those who already possessed it.41 This 
means that the transmission of knowledge, rather than taking place in a Platonic realm of 
ideas, cannot be separated from its context of person, place, and time.  
Tacit knowledge cannot be expressed propositionally; rather, Polanyi assumes 
that the greater the logical precision of a statement, the less tacit content it carries, and 
vice versa.42 The owner’s manual of a car imparts a great deal of specific information, but 
a great poem an equivalent number of column inches in length will contain vastly more 
meaning, because that meaning is not limited to the literal import of the poem’s words. 
We sometimes speak of some endeavor as being “more of an art than a science” when we 
mean that its results are conditioned by indefinable savoir faire more than by a 
specifiable procedure with perfectly predictable results. Polanyi would say that the 
universal importance of tacit knowledge means that every task of any complexity is an 
“art” as much as a “science.” Because the things we know tacitly by definition cannot be 
expressed in words, they cannot be grasped logically, but only intuitively. Tacit 
knowledge is as important in physics or biology as it is in artisanship: in the skills of 
designing and interpreting experiments, operating scientific instruments, and forming and 
testing theories, much is passed on from teacher to learner without ever having been 
                                                          
41 Polanyi 54. 







expressed in words, much less logical propositions. As Polanyi puts it, “The scientist’s 
procedure is of course methodical. But his methods are the maxim of an art which he 
applies in his own original way to the problem of his own choice.”43 
 Having argued that what we know always includes more than what we can 
express, Polanyi goes on to call into question the boundary between the knower and what 
is known with his concept of “subsidiary awareness.” In Polanyi’s terminology, if I direct 
my attention to some object O1—say, a hammer in my hand—in order to examine it or 
interact with it in some way, then I am “focally aware” of it. If I use that object as a tool 
in order to interact with some second object O2—if I use that same hammer to drive in a 
nail, for instance—then I am “subsidiarily aware” of O1  and focally aware of O2. I cannot 
experience both kinds of awareness of the same subject at the same time, and indeed, if I 
focus on a tool as I am using it, gaining focal awareness at the cost of subsidiary 
awareness, my use of the tool is likely to be impaired.44 If I want to take a photograph 
with an unfamiliar camera, for instance, I may be tempted to center my attention on the 
camera itself in an effort to get its various features to work the way I want them to. If I do 
so, however, I may well lose sight of the shot itself, and end up with an inferior image. 
Both of these kinds of awareness apply to ideas as well as to physical objects: when we 
speak, listen, read or write, we have subsidiary awareness of the words that are being 
used and focal awareness of the message that they convey. Here again, if I focus on 
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words themselves while trying to encode or decode meaning in them, as I might be forced 
to do in a language that I do not speak very well, then I am bound to miss nuances and 
fine shades of meaning, and I am likely to trip over my own tongue.45 Perfect focal 
awareness of meaning implies perfect subsidiary awareness of language, with no 
hesitation or uncertainty, but rather fluid eloquence. It is under these conditions that 
communication is most successful.   
 Polanyi ties subsidiary awareness closely to proprioception.46 When I become 
subsidiarily aware of a tool, I make it in effect a part of my own body. In the same way, 
when I focus my attention on that tool, I mentally disincorporate it, and it is no longer 
functionally a part of me. Even our actual body parts are subject to this effect. When I run 
my hand over a surface and feel its texture, and am therefore subsidiarily aware of my 
hand, it functions as the part of myself by which I experience that texture. When I put my 
hand in front of my face and look closely at it, however, I cannot help but think of it as a 
thing outside myself, and “myself” retreats to a vaguely defined place behind my eyes. 
To give another example, when I am only subsidiarily aware of the words I am using and 
focally aware of the thought I am trying to express, then the words do not register as 
different from the thought itself. They are simply the form that the thought takes, so to 
speak. When I focus my awareness on my words, I distinguish them from my thought and 
place them outside my conception of “me”; thought and words become two different 
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things, one internal and one external, which I am trying to fit together. For us to be only 
subsidiarily aware of the language, the assumptions, or the theories we are using means 
that they are functionally a part of ourselves. If we reflect on our own awareness, the 
aspect of awareness that is the object of our reflection becomes a locus of focal rather 
than subsidiary awareness, and it is thus disincorporated. The very act of consciously 
accessing our own thoughts makes them functionally no longer a part of ourselves. As we 
think critically, therefore, impressions and concepts are continually passing back and 
forth across the boundary between self and other. Knowledge, like the knowers in whose 
heads contain it, is thus time-bound, constantly changing in form and context.  
 In keeping with his formulation of subsidiary awareness, Polanyi argues that it 
would be impossible for us to state the true foundations of our beliefs, because in order 
for them to serve as foundations we must be subsidiarily aware of them.47 Analyzing 
foundational beliefs would require subjecting them to focal awareness, which would in 
turn require thinking outside of the epistemic framework that they supported. If the 
beliefs are sufficiently basic, then it will not be possible to question them: any framework 
that would permit such questioning would have to be based on a still more fundamental 
set of assumptions. Instead, Polanyi proposes that “[a]ny inquiry into our ultimate beliefs 
can be consistent only if it presupposes its own conclusions. It must be intentionally 
                                                          







circular.”48 These “ultimate beliefs” which are both arrived at and presupposed have 
foundations of their own, but these foundations are not propositional beliefs.   
 Rather, the foundations of Polanyi’s epistemological system lie in the act of 
assertion that the believer makes in choosing to accept her own basic assumptions. In 
both the scientific and the everyday realms, our judgments about what we know and how 
we know it are shaped by what Polanyi calls a “vision of reality.” Such a vision supplies 
a set of epistemic norms that categorize questions as either interesting and useful or 
pointless and irrelevant. This molds the overall shape of our knowledge by determining 
which subjects we need to investigate and which we are content to leave unaddressed. It 
defines what kinds of answers are admissible to the questions we judge to be worth 
asking, setting standards of plausibility and ruling out lines of inquiry as unproductive. It 
allows us to determine how much evidence justifies the rejection of one of our beliefs, 
and how much information that appears dissonant with our beliefs we are willing to 
tolerate.49 Without a vision of reality, therefore, knowledge is impossible, an undefined 
quantity. Through all of his discussion of the role of a knower’s vision of reality, Polanyi 
makes frequent use of aesthetic terminology: a vision commands assent by virtue of its 
appeal to a sense of beauty. This aesthetic connection underscores the personal, tacit 
character of a vision of reality. A standard of justification does exist, but it is not imposed 
from without. We must define it for ourselves. What is more, we use this standard as a 
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tool, and therefore we are subsidiarily aware of it, and so, according to Polanyi’s 
definition of subsidiary awareness, we make it a part of ourselves. As long as we are 
applying a standard, therefore, it is not external. It should be noted that this is not just a 
self-justifying confidence that erects a backstop in an attempt to avoid an infinite regress. 
Instead, it is, in Polanyi’s terms, a “fiduciary act” that takes effect by virtue of its 
performance rather than by virtue of any merely propositional significance.50 No such act 
can be timeless. Rather, as Kierkegaard observes, we must repeat again and again our act 
of affirming the values that govern our beliefs and actions. A fiduciary act of this kind 
does not remain atemporally and once-and-for-all; rather, we must consciously return to 
it, in whatever conditions the future may bring.51  
Polanyi himself recognizes that an argument of this kind is necessarily circular: 
“In a given case I can know that my judgment is right,” he seems to say, “because it 
maximizes this self-chosen virtue, and I know that this virtue is virtuous because it is in 
line with my intellectual passion, and I know that my passion will lead me in the right 
direction because I have so judged.” However, he denies that circularity of this kind 
necessarily results in refutation or lapse into skepticism. First, he makes the argument 
that circles of this kind are basic to human experience: we evaluate much of our 
knowledge, and all of the knowledge that Polanyi would call “personal,” according to 
standards set in terms of that knowledge.52 In sense perception, for example, we build 
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expectations through accumulated sensory experience, and then judge the reliability of 
what we perceive by comparing it to those expectations.53 This phenomenon is rooted in 
the way in which all animals respond to their biologically determined drives: the drive is 
both the impetus for action and the standard for success. There is no way to craft a 
description of what it will take to sate a biological urge that is more complete than “do 
whatever it takes to satisfy the urge.”54 Polanyi also argues that this circularity is not self-
defeating because the judgments that form the basis of the system cannot be arbitrary: 
“The paradox of self-set standards is eliminated, for in a competent mental act the agent 
does not do as he pleases, but compels himself forcibly to act as he believes he must.”55 
In other words, a true knower does not just believe however she likes, but rather she 
affirms those beliefs that she feels she cannot help but affirm. Moreover, the beliefs that 
compel us amount in the aggregate to a “universal standard” that allows us to “transcend 
subjectivity”: they point to something external to ourselves, so that the compulsion we 
feel depends on more than our own idiosyncrasies.56 As with Kierkegaard, then, the 
inwardness of subjectivity ought not to lead to solipsism. To keep ourselves honest, we 
must balance our knowledge of ourselves with knowledge of our external responsibilities. 
Finally, Polanyi points out that, in practice, no system of axioms (including, for example, 
the one that undergirds mathematics) is chosen in a vacuum without an idea of what 
theorems it will produce. We must have a general conception of the overall system’s 
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shape before we can deduce the system’s fundamental premises: “Our acceptance of what 
is logically anterior is based on our prior acceptance of what is logically derivative.”57 
Again, a certain degree of circularity is universal. If this circularity is not fatal to other 
systems of knowledge, then why, Polanyi asks, should it be fatal to his idea of self-set 
standards?  
 By this point the outline of Polanyi’s epistemological picture is becoming clear. 
There is an important category of knowledge that is tacit; incommensurable with verbal 
description or representation. We cannot describe it fully even to ourselves. Seeking 
knowledge of this kind is an irreducibly intuitive process, an “art” as much as a 
“science.” It cannot be arrived at by means of an externally prescribed procedure, but 
only by self-chosen means evaluated according to self-chosen criteria. Indeed, this 
knowledge is founded ultimately on a set of beliefs that the knower appropriates for 
herself by means of an act of assertion. The context for this kind of knowledge and for 
the choices that condition it is a vision of reality, which must itself be chosen and which 
is deeply tied to the knower’s aesthetic sensibilities. Finally, this way of knowing, while 
distinctive, is never entirely absent from any perceptual or intellectual matter to which 
human beings address themselves. This, in sum, is Polanyi’s titular “personal 
knowledge,” and it lies at the very heart of his epistemology. By introducing personal 
knowledge and arguing for its centrality, Polanyi hopes to restore the thinking subject to 
what he thinks of as its rightfully central place in philosophy and in science. Any 
                                                          







statement of a proposition, he argues, ought to be understood as an act of assertion that is 
just as incomplete without a subject as it would be without content.58 We are apt to 
misinterpret the phrase “some condition C obtains” unless we bear in mind both that it 
represents an assertoric act (“someone asserts that C”), and that this act must have a 
subject to be intelligible (“I assert” or “you assert” or “René Descartes asserts that C”). 
As the act of a temporal person, the assertion of a proposition necessarily takes place in 
time, and in particular in the here-now: it is a phenomenon of Kierkegaard’s moment or 
Brightman’s shining present. Whenever I make a claim to knowledge, that claim is 
infused with my memories of the past, my expectations for the future, and my 
experiences and state of mind in the present. In every such claim I am defining my 
relationship with the world outside me, and defining myself as well.  
 Like Kierkegaard, Polanyi also draws ethical conclusions from his emphasis on 
personhood. One of the motivating factors that leads Polanyi to explore personal 
knowledge is his experience with what he calls “objectivism.” Objectivism as Polanyi 
defines it is a focus on epistemic objectivity to the exclusion of subjectivity, so that the 
part the individual knower plays in determining the landscape of knowledge is forgotten. 
Under objectivism, then, we no longer recognize an interpretation of reality as an 
interpretation. Instead, it becomes a set of purportedly indisputable facts, shorn of 
judgment or valuation.  Polanyi sees a profound ethical danger in this failure to take 
personality into account. When we refuse to think of our own point of view in personal 
                                                          







terms, we can “indulge [our] moral passions in terms which also satisfy [our] passion for 
ruthless objectivity,”59 acting on personal motives while telling ourselves that we are only 
doing what is objectively necessary.  
Indeed, Polanyi suggests that the totalitarian systems that marked twentieth 
century history depended on this tendency officially to de-emphasize subjective desires 
with one hand while unwittingly affirming them with the other. He argues that, as the 
effort goes on to root out uncertain subjectivity in favor of reliable, “scientific” 
objectivity, tension mounts between this effort and moral and ethical claims, with all of 
their subjective motivations. People sensitive to this tension search constantly for a solid 
moral basis on which to make their own decisions and judge those of others, or at least 
one that they can verbally affirm while operating under the same set of half-articulated 
moral assumptions as ever.60 Many eventually find this moral basis in the sociopolitical 
aims of some movement, which are framed as objective necessities, the products of hard-
headed, realistic analyses of the state of the world, unhampered by the niceties of 
subjective considerations. Any moral or ideological objections to these aims are 
correspondingly described as, at best, fantastical and unrealistic, and at worst, as mere fig 
leaves for an ulterior motive.61 The movement’s goals are thus based on the solidest and 
most objective basis of all: the basic will to success and survival. Falling back on a 
purportedly self-justifying philosophy such as this offers both the logical consistency 
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required by the search for objectivity and a tremendous emotional relief from the sense of 
moral vertigo common among the searchers. As it offers this relief, the movement can 
make profound breaks from prior moral norms in the name of “objective necessity” while 
remaining insulated from criticism, because it provides all of the intensely personal (in 
Polanyi’s sense) satisfactions of conviction and belonging without ever admitting that its 
philosophy has any personal component. Moral scruples cannot be brought to bear 
against the movement’s moral choices and exhortations because its followers deny that 
their actions have any moral dimension. Thus, as Polanyi puts it, “[i]deologies framed in 
these terms have enlisted man’s highest aspirations in the service of soul-destroying 
tyrannies.”62 Polanyi articulates the epistemology of Personal Knowledge primarily as an 
attempt to defend against such denial of our human responsibilities to one another. He 
hopes that, by arguing for the validity of personal and tacit modes of knowing alongside 
objective, propositional ones, he can help to reinforce the connections among free will, 
ethical obligation, and knowledge production. Just as we can never really achieve the 
“view from nowhere” outside of time, place, and personality that scientific positivism 








                                                          









 Affirming Robert John Russell’s relational, inhomogeneous temporal ontology 
and his relativized present interpretation of relativity reconciles our subjective perception 
of past, present, and future with modern physics’ discoveries about time. As Russell 
himself observes, this view of time preserves the possibility of key Abrahamic ideas such 
as free will, salvation history, conversion, and eschatological judgment against the threats 
that block time poses to them. Even more fundamentally, it reinforces the point that, 
contrary to what many B-theorists claim, subjective experience is not merely an illusion 
that we ought to ignore as much as possible. Indeed, it can tell us true and important 
things about the world that an exclusive focus on objectivity could cause us to miss. 
Certainly no religion could survive such a wholesale rejection of interiority as Mellor, 
Reichenbach, and Quine recommend.  
 In this final chapter we have seen how the relativized present can lead us to a 
more broadly person-centered view of existence. The Boston personalists bridge the 
conceptual gap between the meaning of time for those events that human beings observe 
and for those events that we do not, in a way that meshes well with Russell and 
Pannenberg’s existing theology. Meanwhile, they establish a place for personhood in 
fundamental ontology. Kierkegaard champions a vision of persons not just as perceivers 
of and reflectors upon events in time, but as actors who shape the future, weaving 
flowing temporality and freedom even more closely together. In so doing, he emphasizes 







time and the potentiality of eternity. Polanyi shows that science requires a symbiosis 
between knowing and acting, and argues that neither of these can be separated from our 
nature as temporal persons, or from the responsibilities that Kierkegaard points out.  
   As contemporary scholars study the culture of science, they are showing with 
greater and greater clarity that scientists (and academics in general) need to reckon with 
the biases that they as subjects bring to their work, rather than assuming that their 
methodology will strain out such impurities. Dressing up our personal judgments as 
objective, value-free facts has created injustices that linger to this day, of which people of 
color, women, and the LGBTQ community have borne the brunt.63 Understanding that 
scholarship is created by people who make choices, and not by impersonal, cultureless 
knowledge-producing machines, will not solve this problem all by itself, but it is a 
necessary step toward any solution. To take that step is a decision that lies before each of 
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